


Military Resistance 10G14



**“This Place Is A
Shooting Gallery”
Staff Sgt. Says “His Men Are
Under Constant Threat Of
Attack”
They “Have Adjusted Accordingly,
Spending Most Of Their Time
During The Day Out Of Sight”**

**“When They Do Venture Outside
The Corridors During The Day, The
Men Will Often Look Up At The
Mountains, Then Dash Between
Buildings To Avoid Getting Shot”
“The Taliban And Other Militant Groups
Such As Hiz I Islami Use The Area As A
Staging Ground For Attacks, Getting
Help From Sympathetic Locals”**

Jul 13, 2012 By Carmen Gentile - USA Today [Excerpts]

KUNAR PROVINCE, Afghanistan — Three weeks of relative calm was shattered when the first crack of gunfire whizzed across the combat outpost and was followed by a barrage of rocket-propelled grenades.

The explosions sent a handful of soldiers tumbling to the ground. U.S. and Afghan forces returned fire on the unseen assailants in the nearby mountains, launching dozens of mortar shells and firing numerous rounds.

The shadowy gunmen persisted until U.S. attack helicopters swooped in and unloaded heavy munitions into the jagged rocky slopes. The gunfire from the ridge stopped four hours after it began.

“This place is a shooting gallery,” Staff Sgt. Ryan Markle said after the fight, the latest of a dozen or so assaults on Combat Outpost Pirtle King since soldiers from the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, arrived here in March.

Commanding officer Capt. Erik Norman says the dual role of soldier and Afghan National Army mentor is a challenging one, particularly when he and his men are under constant threat of attack. “It’s aggravating because we could be crushing this cell,” Norman says. “But then we wouldn’t be achieving our goal of training the ANA.”

A few miles from the Pakistan border, the area is flanked by steep mountains on all sides, giving the enemy the high ground from which to launch attacks.

Militants coming in by way of valleys from Pakistan appear more brazen than in years past, soldiers say.

They are bold enough to strike the outpost directly rather than wait to ambush soldiers who emerge regularly for patrols.

American forces have adjusted accordingly, spending most of their time during the day out of sight.

Militants rarely attack at night since muzzle flashes would easily give away their position.

Pirtle King outpost is a series of corridors made of 8-foot-high metal baskets filled with rock and dirt that resemble World War I trenches. Camouflage netting is draped overhead.

When they do venture outside the corridors during the day, the men will often look up at the mountains, then dash between buildings to avoid getting shot.

A village elder from a nearby town comes by to say the Taliban and other militant groups such as Hiz i Islami use the area around his home as a staging ground for attacks, getting help from sympathetic locals.

Norman inquires about their exact whereabouts.

“You can’t shoot them because there are too many children around those houses,” says the elder, Attaullah, who like many here goes by one name.

Months before Pirtle King becomes an Afghan-only base, American soldiers let the ANA and Afghan Uniformed Police take the lead in daylight missions.

Afghan army Capt. Bashir, who also goes by a single name, says a handover can work but not if the Americans abandon the Afghans entirely.

“We’re absolutely ready to take over when the U.S. forces leave,” Bashir says, “but because we don’t have air support of our own, we will need help from them.”

Close air support is not all they will need from the Americans, they say.

Without American air support and manpower, the Afghan army will have to move food, fuel and weapons by road along narrow mountain passes where militants often attack.

Bashir says the Afghan army at Pirtle King is getting only “about 10 percent of the support” it needs from the Afghan Ministry of Defense.

“Our logistics system just isn’t that strong yet,” he says.

Support from the Afghan government isn’t the only problem, says Maj. Tim Faulkner, who leads a team of U.S. soldiers advising Afghan police on how to hang onto the security gains made by the Americans.

This year, the commander of the Afghan police here was killed in an attack, says Faulkner, who notes that the police “neglect to maintain the weapons and vehicles” provided by the Ministry of Interior with U.S. funding.

Troops Invited:

Comments, arguments, articles, and letters from service men and women, and veterans, are especially welcome. Write to Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657 or email contact@militaryproject.org: Name, I.D., withheld unless you request publication. Same address to unsubscribe.

AFGHANISTAN WAR REPORTS

Two Foreign Occupation “Servicemembers” Killed Somewhere Or Other In Afghanistan: Nationality Not Announced

July 16, 2012 Reuters

Two foreign servicemembers died following an insurgent attack in southern Afghanistan today.

Foreign Occupation “Servicemember” Killed Somewhere Or Other In Afghanistan Saturday: Nationality Not Announced

July 14, 2012 Reuters

A foreign servicemember died following an insurgent attack in eastern Afghanistan today.

The First In His Family To Attend College, Austin Soldier Dies In Afghanistan



Juan Navarro, 23, was killed by an improvised explosive device while on his second tour of duty. Jay Janner, AMERICAN-STATESMAN

7.9.12 By Jeremy Schwartz, AMERICAN-STATESMAN STAFF

In his short life, Sgt. Juan Navarro accomplished a lot of firsts. After graduating from Lanier High School in 2007, he became the first of 11 brothers and sisters to attend college. Soon after, he became the first in his family to enter the military, joining the Army as wars raged in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"He wasn't afraid," said his brother-in-law Eleazar Dominguez. "He was courageous. He wasn't afraid of gunshots. He wasn't afraid of anything."

On Saturday, Navarro, 23, was killed by an improvised explosive device in Kandahar Province.

Navarro, who served with the 23rd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division, was on his second tour in Afghanistan. On Tuesday, his body arrived at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. Funeral arrangements haven't been made yet.

Since learning of his death, friends and family have gathered at Navarro's small family home on Rundberg Lane in North Austin, trading stories around a makeshift altar of flowers, flags, candles and collages of photos tracing a life from smiling toddler to stern-faced soldier.

On Wednesday, they described him as outgoing, gregarious, respectful of his elders.

"He was the type of person that even if he didn't know you he would give you a big smile and a hug," said his older brother, Miguel Pantoja. "I'm proud of everything he did. I'm proud of him because he did what he wanted to do."

Even after he left Texas and moved through the Army ranks, he remained fiercely loyal to his community — his arm featured a tattooed street sign of Rundberg Lane and Interstate 35, which sits half a block from his home.

Navarro was scheduled to leave the Army within a few months, and he planned to resume his college studies. He joined the Army after briefly attending Texas State University, which he left for financial reasons, his brother said.

In one of his final Facebook posts before he was killed, Navarro wrote: "(L)ets hope i can make it to (November) in one piece and then eventually to mar 3 2013 to get out of this army ... college here i come." Family members said Navarro wanted to enter the medical field.

Tacked to his family's living room wall is a message that Navarro sent in the days before he was killed: "Going home means getting comfortable being who you are and who your soul really wants to be. ... God loves me enough to let me go through all the lessons I came here to learn, even the ones that hurt the most."

Navarro's name will be added to the Veterans Memorial at the Travis County Courthouse, where he will join the two dozen local service members who have died in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Two Wounded In July 4 Ambush Rescued

July 15, 2012 Chron.com

Staff Sgt. Patrick Rogers of Galveston was part of a medevac team that rescued two soldiers from a cliff after a July 4 ambush in Afghanistan, The Daily News reports on its website.

The rescuers' Black Hawk helicopter came under fire as they plucked the two wounded soldiers from the mountainside.

Defense Department officials tell the Galveston newspaper that members of the 25th Infantry Division came under insurgent fire during a July 4 patrol in eastern Afghanistan. One of the soldiers was grazed in the head.

The Daily News reports:

Rogers is a member of a National Guard unit that serves with Task Force Wolfpack of the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade.

He dropped down from a Black Hawk and secured the two soldiers in a hoist. They were safely lifted into the chopper, which hovered about 85 feet above.

**POLITICIANS REFUSE TO HALT THE
BLOODSHED**

**THE TROOPS HAVE THE POWER TO STOP THE
WAR**

Leading Afghan Commander Blown Up At Wedding

14 July 2012 By Rahim Faiez, AP

A bomber blew himself up today in a wedding hall in northern Afghanistan, killing more than 20 people including a well-known commander in an attack that deals a setback to efforts to unify the nation's ethnic factions, Afghan officials said.

Ahmad Khan Samangani, an ethnic Uzbek who is also a member of parliament, was welcoming guests to his daughter's wedding when the explosion occurred in Aybak, the capital of Samangan province.

No one has yet claimed responsibility for the blast. But in announcing their spring offensive on May 2, the Taliban said they would continue to target those who back the Karzai government and the US-led international military coalition.

There is also a long history of conflict between the Taliban — who come mostly from the country's biggest group, the Pashtuns — and members of ethnic minorities.

Mohammad Nawab Sherzai, criminal investigations director in Aybak who was helping provide security for the wedding, said most of the local guests had already gathered on the second and third floors of the three-story wedding hall when the morning explosion occurred.

Samangani and other relatives and elders had moved to the first floor to welcome additional guests arriving from Mazar-i-Sharif, the capital of neighboring Balkh province.

"Suddenly, the attacker, who was among the guests from Mazar-i-Sharif, got very close to Samangani. He detonated his vest," Sherzai said.

"It was a big explosion. There were bloody bodies all around the first floor. The explosion was so strong. There were people even on the third floor who were wounded."

"Everybody was running in different directions. For about 10 minutes, nobody knew what was happening," he said. "There was dark smoke all around. After about 10 minutes, the people were able to see the bodies and start helping with the wounded."

Ghulam Mohammad Khan, the criminal investigations director of the provincial police, said more than 20 people died in the morning blast.

Khan said the provincial chief of intelligence and an Afghan National Army division commander also were among those killed.

More than 40 others were wounded, including Gen. Sayed Ahmad Sameh, a western regional commander for the Afghan National Police, who was a relative of Samangani, Khan said.

Samangani became famous during Afghanistan's fight against the Soviets, who left the country in 1989 after a 10-year occupation.

He became a member of parliament last year and was considered a key leader in Samangan and northern Afghanistan.

More Resistance Action

16 July 2012 TOLONews

The car of district governor Nizamuddin Nasher in Afghanistan's eastern Kunduz province exploded Monday afternoon after a magnetic bomb attached to the car detonated, injuring six people including Nasher, officials said.

Nasher, district governor of Kunduz's Khan Abad district, was driving in the central part of the district called Chawk-e-Kunduz when the blast occurred, according to the spokesman of the provincial police Sayed Sarwar Hussaini.

Three of the six injured were Nasher's bodyguards, he added. Another official, who declined to be named, said as many as 12 people were injured.

<p>IF YOU DON'T LIKE THE RESISTANCE END THE OCCUPATION</p>

MILITARY NEWS

**Post Traumatic Stress:
“Few Service Members Actually
Are Getting The Help They Need”**

“The Panel Strongly Favored Psychotherapy Intervention, Which Has Been Proven By Research And Clinical Use”

“A 2008 IOM Report On PTSD Treatments Concluded That Neither (Selective Serotonin Inhibitors) Nor Any Other Drugs Could Be Considered Effective For The Treatment Of PTSD”

Jul 13, 2012 By Patricia Kime - Staff writer, Army Times [Excerpts]

The Defense Department has a woeful lack of information on the effectiveness and related costs of its post-traumatic stress disorder treatment programs, despite having spent millions on various initiatives to address psychological health and traumatic brain injury, a panel of top scientists concluded in a report released Friday.

In a review of DoD and Veterans Affairs Department PTSD treatments mandated by Congress in 2010, an Institute of Medicine panel found fewer than half of all service members and veterans who screen positive for the disorder's symptoms — 40 percent — have received referrals for care, and of those, just 65 percent actually go on to get help.

“Treatment isn't reaching everyone who needs it, and the departments aren't tracking which treatments are being used or evaluating how well they work in the long term,” said committee chairman Sandro Galea, head of the epidemiology department at Columbia University.

The withering report comes as DoD and VA grapple with rising mental health issues within their ranks, including suicide.

Studies show those who get treatment — proven, evidence-based therapies such as cognitive or exposure therapy — can recover in half the time than those who don't get treatment.

But the report says few service members actually are getting the help they need.

Regarding treatment, the panel looked at various approaches, ranging from individual and group psychotherapy to medication and alternative medicine, including yoga and animal assisted therapy.

The panel strongly favored psychotherapy intervention, which has been proven by research and clinical use, and was less positive about drug or alternative therapies, which lack scientific studies to support their effectiveness.

Regarding medication, which the report says is taken by 80 percent of VA patients diagnosed with PTSD, the panel concluded more research is necessary.

“A 2008 IOM report on PTSD treatments concluded that neither (selective serotonin inhibitors) nor any other drugs could be considered effective for the treatment of PTSD. ... The evidence base for other antidepressants, tricyclic and monoamine oxidase inhibitors and other drugs as effective pharmacotherapy for PTSD is at best mixed and inconclusive,” the report states.

MORE:

Confirmed!
**“Only One Treatment Method —
Exposure Therapy — Has Been
Proven To Help PTSD In Studies
By Objective Researchers”**
**Previous Research Finding
Confirmed By Atlanta V.A. Test
Program;**
**“81% Showing ‘Clinically Significant
Improvement,’ Which Was Still At 81
% Six Months Later”**

July 28, 2008 By Kelly Kennedy, Army Times

Three new studies looking at combat stress have found group exposure therapy seems to work, that troops with traumatic brain injuries are more likely to have post-traumatic stress disorder, and that stress debriefings held after traumatic events don't appear to prevent PTSD.

The research comes as the Department of Veterans Affairs works to find the best treatment methods for combat veterans.

It follows a report by Rand Corp. that showed only one treatment method — exposure therapy — has been proven to help PTSD in studies by objective researchers.

The first study looked at a program that had been in place for four years at the Atlanta VA Medical Center. The center's Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Clinical Team began researching group-based exposure treatment.

Past studies have shown group therapy to be ineffective on veterans with PTSD, but authors of this study, published in the April issue of the Journal of Traumatic Stress, said the amount of exposure therapy — 60 hours — in this group may be the key to why it works.

First, nine to 11 people get to know each other and talk about their experiences before they joined the military. Then, they spend several weeks talking about their wartime experiences.

A total of 93 Vietnam veterans, four Gulf War veterans, one Korean War veteran and two Iraq war veterans took part in the study, with 81 percent showing “clinically significant improvement,” which was still at 81 percent six months later.

And the study found something else: VA clinicians indicated to researchers that they do not use exposure therapy out of concern for possible increases in suicide ideation, hospitalizations and dropout rates, but “we found the opposite to be true,” the study's authors said.

Many patients said hearing others' traumatic experiences evoked painful recall of what had happened to them, but “none reported any negative lasting effects, and many indicated that this process helped them put their own experience into better perspective,” the study said.

For example, one-third of the group members said they had frozen under fire. “Learning how common this was helped reduce the shame and guilt that many patients had felt for decades,” researchers said.

MORE: From GI SPECIAL 6E15: 5.24.08:

This Information Could Save Your Sanity, Or Your Life:

If Somebody Tries To Drug You Or A Family Member, The Fact The Information Below Appeared In Army Times Can Be A Powerful Weapon Of Self-Defense

Comment: T

Because of the extreme importance of this information to every member of the armed forces, for or against the war, it is being reprinted again.

This news report below makes clear that there is now new evidence based research about what works and what doesn't work for troops experiencing PTSD.

The credibility and importance of this research -- initiated by the Department of Veterans Affairs -- is underlined by publication of the findings in Army Times, rather than appearing on some obscure web site or other as somebody or other's opinion.

The V.A. has long practiced drugging troops with all kinds of very dangerous pills as a "treatment" for PTSD. As this article documents, that's useless. And dangerous: overdoses can kill. Benzodiazepines [Valium & Klonopin are well known examples] are viscosly addictive and potentially deadly drugs handed out to troops like bags of popcorn.

As the article below reports, the only effective treatment for PTSD so far is "exposure therapy; reliving a traumatic experience by writing or talking about it."

A lot of quacks, including at V.A. facilities as well as privately, are hustling other bullshit phony treatments, ranging from moving your eyeballs around to eating herbs and weeds.

Excuse a personal note, but I've been working professionally with traumatic stress survivors for over 30 years, both military and civilian, both at VA and private facilities, and can testify that the research finding reported in this article is 100% right: the only effective treatment for PTSD so far is "reliving a traumatic experience by writing or talking about it."

But you don't have to believe that.

Here's the report, from Army Times.

Assuming you give a shit about whether troops live or die, send it around, word for word, and be sure to mention it comes from Army Times in case some idiot thinks you sucked it out of your thumb.

Most important, if somebody in command or at the V.A. tries to drug you or a buddy or family member, the fact this information appeared in Army Times can be a powerful weapon of self-defense:

“Research Has Not Shown Serotonin Re-Uptake Inhibitors, Such As Prozac, Zoloft Or Celexa, To Be Effective In Treating PTSD”
“Exposure Therapy -- Reliving A Traumatic Experience By Writing Or Talking About It -- Is The Only Therapy Proved Effective By Independent Research”

April 14, 2008 By Kelly Kennedy, Army Times [Excerpts]

“Problems related to getting troops adequate mental health treatment cannot be resolved unless two issues — stigma and access — are addressed,” Todd Bowers, director of government affairs for Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, told the House Veterans’ Affairs subcommittee on health on April 1.

Almost 59,000 veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been diagnosed with PTSD by the Department of Veterans Affairs. Army post-deployment health assessments have found that 20 percent of active-duty and 40 percent of reserve-component troops had symptoms of PTSD, and some experts say the real numbers could be much higher.

But because PTSD hasn’t been addressed until fairly recently — the first scientific paper about the disorder in veterans of the 1991 Persian Gulf War didn’t come out until five years after that war ended — VA and Pentagon officials say much needs to be done to determine good screening techniques and therapies.

“This is the first war where DoD and VA recognized the psychological impact going in,” said Army Col. Charles Hoge, chief of psychiatry and neuroscience at the Walter Reed Institute of Research.

Combat vets are not sleeping, experience startle reactions and are hyper-alert.

“All of these things that we label as symptoms are things they need in combat,” Hoge said. “No sooner are they transitioned back home than they’re right back in rotation.”

At the House hearing, Hoge said an Army assessment last summer showed that the numbers of soldiers with PTSD is going up with each deployment.

“There’s a direct connection between mental health and multiple deployments,” he said, adding that troops also need more time between deployments.

David Matcher, of the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, said a recent study found that research has not shown serotonin re-uptake inhibitors, such as Prozac, Zoloft or Celexa, to be effective in treating PTSD.

Exposure therapy — reliving a traumatic experience by writing or talking about it — is the only therapy proved effective by independent research, he said.

Other treatments exist, but they have been tested mainly by the same people who developed them.

That’s an important point because the Defense Department and VA use several such methods, including group and drug therapy, to treat combat veterans.

DO YOU HAVE A FRIEND OR RELATIVE IN MILITARY SERVICE?

Forward Military Resistance along, or send us the address if you wish and we’ll send it regularly.

Whether in Afghanistan or at a base in the USA, this is extra important for your service friend, too often cut off from access to encouraging news of growing resistance to the wars and economic injustice, inside the armed services and at home.

Send email requests to address up top or write to: The Military Resistance, Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657. Phone: 888.711.2550

ANNIVERSARIES

**July 17, 1927:
Dishonorable Anniversary:
A Bloody Day In A 24 Year U.S.
Occupation**

After taking office on January 1, 1925, Solórzano requested that the United States delay the withdrawal of its troops from Nicaragua. Nicaragua and the United States agreed that United States troops would remain while United States military instructors helped build a national military force.

Carl Bunin Peace History July 16-22

In a significant early use of close air support, a U.S. Marine squadron of seven airplanes dive-bombed rebels and peasants surrounding Marines and Nicaraguan military (then under direct U.S. control) in Ocotal, Nicaragua, killing more than 100.

The rebels were opposed the presence of U.S. forces, essentially continuous since 1909.

United States Occupation 1909-33:

Countrystudies.us/nicaragua/15

United States interest in Nicaragua, which had waned during the last half of the 1800s because of isolationist sentiment following the United States Civil War (1861-65), grew again during the final years of the Zelaya administration.

Angered by the United States choice of Panama for the site of a transisthmian canal, President Zelaya made concessions to Germany and Japan for a competing canal across Nicaragua.

Relations with the United States deteriorated, and civil war erupted in October 1909, when anti-Zelaya liberals joined with a group of conservatives under Juan Estrada to overthrow the government.

The United States broke diplomatic relations with the Zelaya administration after two United States mercenaries serving with the rebels were captured and executed by government forces.

Soon thereafter, 400 United States marines landed on the Caribbean coast.

Weakened and pressured by both domestic and external forces, Zelaya resigned on December 17, 1909. His minister of foreign affairs, José Madriz, was appointed president by the Nicaraguan Congress. A liberal from León, Madriz was unable to restore order under continuing pressure from conservatives and the United States forces, and he resigned on August 20, 1910.

Conservative Estrada, governor of Nicaragua's easternmost department, assumed power after Madriz's resignation. The United States agreed to support Estrada, provided that a Constituent Assembly was elected to write a constitution. After agreeing with this stipulation, a coalition conservative-liberal regime, headed by Estrada, was recognized by the United States on January 1, 1911.

Political differences between the two parties soon surfaced, however, and minister of war General Luis Mena forced Estrada to resign. Estrada's vice president, the conservative Adolfo Díaz, then became president. In mid-1912 Mena persuaded a Constituent Assembly to name him successor to Díaz when Díaz's term expired in 1913.

When the United States refused to recognize the Constituent Assembly's decision, Mena rebelled against the Díaz government. A force led by liberal Benjamín Zelaydón quickly came to the aid of Mena.

Díaz, relying on what was becoming a time-honored tradition, requested assistance from the United States.

In August 1912, a force of 2,700 United States marines once landed again at the ports of Corinto and Bluefields. Mena fled the country, and Zelaydón was killed.

The United States kept a contingent force in Nicaragua almost continually from 1912 until 1933.

Although reduced to 100 in 1913, the contingent served as a reminder of the willingness of the United States to use force and its desire to keep conservative governments in power.

Under United States supervision, national elections were held in 1913, but the liberals refused to participate in the electoral process, and Adolfo Díaz was reelected to a full term. Foreign investment decreased during this period because of the high levels of violence and political instability.

Nicaragua and the United States signed but never ratified the Castill-Knox Treaty in 1914, giving the United States the right to intervene in Nicaragua to protect United States interest.

A modified version, the Chamorro-Bryan Treaty omitting the intervention clause, was finally ratified by the United States Senate in 1916.

This treaty gave the United States exclusive rights to build an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua. Because the United States had already built the Panama Canal, however, the terms of the Chamorro-Bryan Treaty served the primary purpose of securing United States interests against potential foreign countries--mainly Germany or Japan--building another canal in Central America.

The treaty also transformed Nicaragua into a near United States protectorate.

Collaboration with the United States allowed the conservatives to remain in power until 1925.

The liberals boycotted the 1916 election, and conservative Emiliano Chamorro was elected with no opposition.

The liberals did participate in the 1920 elections, but the backing of the United States and a fraudulent election assured the election of Emiliano Chamorro's uncle, Diego Manuel Chamorro.

A moderate conservative, Carlos Solórzano, was elected president in open elections in 1924, with liberal Juan Bautista Sacasa as his vice president.

After taking office on January 1, 1925, Solórzano requested that the United States delay the withdrawal of its troops from Nicaragua.

Nicaragua and the United States agreed that United States troops would remain while United States military instructors helped build a national military force.

In June, Solórzano's government contracted with retired United States Army Major Calvin B. Carter to establish and train the National Guard. The United States marines left Nicaragua in August 1925. However, President Solórzano, who had already purged the liberals from his coalition government, was subsequently forced out of power in November 1925 by a conservative group who proclaimed General Emiliano Chamorro (who had also served as president from 1917 to 1921), as president in January 1926.

Fearing a new round of conservative-liberal violence and worried that a revolution in Nicaragua might result in a leftist victory as happened a few years earlier in Mexico, the United States sent marines, who landed on the Caribbean coast in May 1926, ostensibly to protect United States citizens and property.

United States authorities in Nicaragua mediated a peace agreement between the liberals and the conservatives in October 1926. Chamorro resigned, and the Nicaraguan Congress elected Adolfo Díaz as president (Díaz had previously served as president, 1911-16). Violence resumed, however, when former vice president Sacasa returned from exile to claim his rights to the presidency.

In April 1927, the United States sent Henry L. Stimson to mediate the civil war. Once in Nicaragua, Stimson began conversations with President Díaz as well as with leaders from both political parties. Stimson's meetings with General José María Moncada, the leader of the liberal rebels, led to a peaceful solution of the crisis. On May 20, 1927, Moncada agreed to a plan in which both sides--the government and Moncada's liberal forces--would disarm. In addition, a nonpartisan military force would be established under United States supervision. This accord was known as the Pact of Espino Negro.

As part of the agreement, President Díaz would finish his term and United States forces would remain in Nicaragua to maintain order and supervise the 1928 elections.

A truce between the government and the rebels remained in effect and included the disarmament of both liberal rebels and government troops. Sacasa, who refused to sign the agreement, left the country.

United States forces took over the country's military functions, and strengthened the Nicaraguan National Guard.

Sandino Begins Nationalist Guerrilla War Against The U.S. Occupation

A rebel liberal group under the leadership of Augusto César Sandino also refused to sign the Pact of Espino Negro.

An illegitimate son of a wealthy landowner and a mestizo servant, Sandino had left his father's home early in his youth and traveled to Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico.

During his three-year stay in Tampico, Mexico, Sandino had acquired a strong sense of Nicaraguan nationalism and pride in his mestizo heritage.

At the urging of his father, Sandino had returned to Nicaragua in 1926 and settled in the department of Nueva Segovia, where he worked at a gold mine owned by a United States company.

Sandino, who lectured the mine workers about social inequalities and the need to change the political system, soon organized his own army, consisting mostly of peasants and workers, and joined the liberals fighting against the conservative regime of Chamorro.

Highly distrusted by Moncada, Sandino set up hit-and-run operations against conservative forces independently of Moncada's liberal army.

After the United States mediated the agreement between liberal forces and the conservative regime, Sandino, calling Moncada a traitor and denouncing United States intervention, reorganized his forces as the Army for the Defense of Nicaraguan Sovereignty (Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía de Nicaragua-EDSN).

Sandino then staged an independent guerrilla campaign against the government and United States forces.

Although Sandino's original intentions were to restore constitutional government under Sacasa, after the Pact of Espino Negro agreement his objective became the defense of Nicaraguan sovereignty against the United States.

Receiving his main support from the rural population, Sandino resumed his battle against United States troops.

At the height of his guerrilla campaign, Sandino claimed to have some 3,000 soldiers in his army, although official figures estimated the number at only 300.

Sandino's guerrilla war caused significant damage in the Caribbean coast and mining regions.

After debating whether to continue direct fighting against Sandino's forces, the United States opted to develop the nonpartisan Nicaraguan National Guard to contain internal violence. The National Guard would soon become the most important power in Nicaraguan politics.

The late 1920s and early 1930s saw the growing power of Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza García, a leader who would create a dynasty that ruled Nicaragua for four and a half decades.

Moncada won the 1928 presidential elections in one of the most honest elections ever held in Nicaragua. For the 1932 elections, the liberals nominated Juan Bautista Sacasa and the conservatives, Adolfo Díaz. Sacasa won the elections and was installed as president on January 2, 1933.

In the United States, popular opposition to the Nicaraguan intervention rose as United States casualty lists grew.

Anxious to withdraw from Nicaraguan politics, the United States turned over command of the National Guard to the Nicaraguan government, and United States marines left the country soon thereafter.

President Sacasa, under pressure from General Moncada, appointed Somoza García as chief director of the National Guard. Somoza García, a close friend of Moncada and nephew of President Sacasa, had supported the liberal revolt in 1926.

Somoza García also enjoyed support from the United States government because of his participation at the 1927 peace conference as one of Stimson’s interpreters. Having attended school in Philadelphia and been trained by United States marines, Somoza García, who was fluent in English, had developed friends with military, economic, and political influence in the United States.

After United States troops left Nicaragua in January 1933, the Sacasa government and the National Guard still were threatened by Sandino’s EDSN.

True to his promise to stop fighting after United States marines had left the country, Sandino agreed to discussions with Sacasa. In February 1934, these negotiations began.

During their meetings, Sacasa offered Sandino a general amnesty as well as land and safeguards for him and his guerrilla forces. However, Sandino, who regarded the National Guard as unconstitutional because of its ties to the United States military, insisted on the guard’s dissolution.

His attitude made him very unpopular with Somoza Garcia and his guards.

Without consulting the president, Somoza Garcia gave orders for Sandino’s assassination, hoping that this action would help him win the loyalty of senior guard officers. On February 21, 1934, while leaving the presidential palace after a dinner with President Sacasa, Sandino and two of his generals were arrested by National Guard officers acting under Somoza García’s instructions.

They were then taken to the airfield, executed, and buried in unmarked graves.

Despite Sacasa’s strong disapproval of Somoza García’s action, the Nicaraguan president was too weak to contain the National Guard director.

After Sandino's execution, the National Guard launched a ruthless campaign against Sandino's supporters. In less than a month, Sandino's army was totally destroyed.

President Sacasa's popularity decreased as a result of his poor leadership and accusations of fraud in the 1934 congressional elections. Somoza García benefited from Sacasa's diminishing power, while at the same time he brought together the National Guard and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal-PL) in order to win the presidential elections in 1936. Somoza García also cultivated support from former presidents Moncada and Chamorro while consolidating control within the Liberal Party.

Early in 1936, Somoza García openly confronted President Sacasa by using military force to displace local government officials loyal to the president and replacing them with close associates.

Somoza García's increasing military confrontation led to Sacasa's resignation on June 6, 1936. The Congress appointed Carlos Brenes Jarquín, a Somoza García associate, as interim president and postponed presidential elections until December. In November, Somoza García officially resigned as chief director of the National Guard, thus complying with constitutional requirements for eligibility to run for the presidency. The Liberal Nationalist Party (Partido Liberal Nacionalista--PLN) was established with support from a faction of the Conservative Party to support Somoza García's candidacy.

Somoza García was elected president in the December election by the remarkable margin of 107,201 votes to 108.

On January 1, 1937, Somoza García resumed control of the National Guard, combining the roles of president and chief director of the military.

Thus, Somoza García established a military dictatorship, in the shadows of democratic laws, that would last more than four decades.

MORE:

July 17, 1979: Honor Restored: 22 Years Later To The Day, Sandinistas Overthrow The Traitors So Beloved By The U.S. Empire

Carl Bunin Peace History July 16-22

Fighters of the Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrew the U.S.-supported dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza in the Central American republic of Nicaragua and forced him to flee the country.

The notorious and feared U.S.-trained National Guard crumbled and its surviving commanders negotiated a surrender, despite their superiority in armaments.

THE SANDINISTAS TAKE POWER

Countrystudies.us/nicaragua/15.htm [Excerpts]

The new government inherited a country in ruins, with a stagnant economy and a debt of about US\$1.6 billion.

An estimated 50,000 Nicaraguans were dead, 120,000 were exiles in neighboring countries, and 600,000 were homeless. Food and fuel supplies were exhausted, and international relief organizations were trying to deal with disease caused by lack of health supplies.

Yet the attitude of the vast majority of Nicaraguans toward the revolution was decidedly hopeful.

Most Nicaraguans saw the Sandinista victory as an opportunity to create a system free of the political, social, and economic inequalities of the almost universally hated Somoza regime.

One of the immediate goals of the new government was reconstruction of the national economy.

The junta appointed individuals from the private sector to head the government's economic team. They were responsible for renegotiating the foreign debt and channeling foreign economic aid through the state-owned International Reconstruction Fund (Fondo Internacional de Reconstrucción--FIR). The new government received bilateral and multinational financial assistance and also rescheduled the national foreign debt on advantageous terms.

Pledging food for the poor, the junta made restructuring the economy its highest priority.

At first the economy experienced positive growth, largely because of renewed inflow of foreign aid and reconstruction after the war.

The new government enacted the Agrarian Reform Law, beginning with the nationalization of all rural properties owned by the Somoza family or people associated with the Somozas, a total of 2,000 farms representing more than 20 percent of Nicaragua's cultivable land.

These farms became state property under the new Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Large agroexport farms not owned by the Somozas generally were not affected by the agrarian reform. Financial institutions, all in bankruptcy from the massive capital flight during the war, were also nationalized.

The second goal of the Sandinistas was a change in the old government's pattern of repression and brutality toward the general populace.

Many of the Sandinista leaders were victims of torture themselves, and the new minister of interior, Tomás Borge Martínez, tried to keep human rights violations low.

Most prisoners accused of injustices under the Somoza regime were given a trial, and the Ministry of Interior forbade cruelty to prisoners. In their first two years in power, Amnesty International and other human rights groups found the human rights situation in Nicaragua greatly improved.

DANGER: POLITICIANS AT WORK



7-12-12 NEWSWORKS.ORG - UNIVERSAL UCLICK

Saudi Arabian Tyrants Police Its Streets And Cafés With A Fearsome Rigor, But Don't Seem To Know How To Shut

Down The Chatter On Twitter And Facebook: “We Live In A Prison” “We Are Not Far Away From The Uprisings That Are Happening In Other Countries” “Thousands Are Behind Bars For Simply Speaking Out Against The Government”

July 12, 2012 By Jacob Templin / Jidda; Time Magazine [Excerpts]

Every Tuesday night, a few dozen people squeeze into Waleed Abu Alkhair's living room in the port city of Jidda, Saudi Arabia.

Over tea and dates, they share opinions that could get them arrested if uttered in public.

“If you ask people, they are afraid because they know the costs are very high,” says Abu Alkhair, a former civil rights lawyer and activist. “You can see this is a very small house, but we don't have any other place.”

The topic jumps from religion to revolution. “We are not far away from the uprisings that are happening in other countries,” exclaims a young man wearing the traditional Saudi thobe.

His statement ignites a debate about the state of free speech in Saudi Arabia, where thousands are behind bars for simply speaking out against the government.

“We live in a prison,” one patron comments from a cramped love seat, “the cell has gotten a little bigger, but it's still a prison.”

The conversation is broken up by the ring of the doorbell, injecting a moment of tension into the otherwise friendly conversation.

Many at the gathering fear that the government will raid Abu Alkhair's apartment at any point and put an end to the meetings, which have been happening at the location for the past four months. When a familiar face enters the room, their relief gives way to a roar of welcomes, and the chatter picks up again.

Thanks to social media, it's becoming much easier to carry on these conversations in Saudi Arabia. Many of Abu Alkhair's guests will head home and speak to thousands

across the world, on sites like Twitter and Facebook, without the strict censorship they live with in the off-line world.

“Can you imagine going to the street corner and speaking to 10 people? The government would round you up immediately, but now we are speaking out to thousands,” says Mohammed al-Qahtani, a prominent human-rights activist in Riyadh and co-founder of the Saudi Civil & Political Rights Organization.

He says the government underestimated the power of social media in Saudi Arabia, and now it's too widespread to censor. “They will not shut it down because it would be a big embarrassment,” al-Qahtani says.

Saudis are some of the most active social-media users in the Arab world.

According to a recent study by the Dubai School of Government, Saudi Arabia has more Twitter users than any other nation in the region, with around 400,000. They also have around 4 million people on Facebook, second only to Egypt.

“I think we're so thirsty for freedom of expression and a forum for expression that you see that Saudis particularly are far more involved than their neighbors,” says Aiyah Saihati, a political activist and popular Saudi blogger.

She says Twitter and Facebook are filling a void created by the lack of civil society in Saudi Arabia, where organized gatherings remain restricted to religious meetings and government-sponsored events. “Before this, we were living on islands. We had thoughts, but we did not know who was like-minded, if people really cared about those issues that moved us.”

“I can remember my feeling of my first tweet,” says Abu Alkhair, who now has around 40,000 Twitter followers. “I said ‘People, my friends, the government, here I will start to use my freedom clearly.’”

But in February of this year, Saudi Arabia's online freedom was pushed to its limits when a 23-year-old blogger named Hamza Kashgari tweeted about the Prophet Muhammad on a day when millions around the country were celebrating his birth. The tweet said in Arabic: “I have loved things about you, and I have hated things about you, and there is a lot I don't understand about you ... I will not pray for you.” It sparked outrage across the country. On Twitter, Hamza Kashgari the dog became a popular hashtag, while on television, Muslim clerics called for the death penalty.

“Sometimes these kids get confused,” al-Qahtani explains, referring to the Kashgari case. “They don't know whether they are living in a liberal state or an extremely conservative one, and they don't know their limits.”

After fleeing the country and being extradited back by Malaysia, Kashgari now sits in prison awaiting his sentence.

“A funny thing happens here in Saudi Arabia,” says Abu Alkhair, “you can be hosting someone in your home one day, and the next day they will be in jail.”

Kashgari was a friend of Abu Alkhair and a regular at his weekly salons. He is now a regular topic of conversation.

“Are you saying Hamza is wrong only because he provoked the masses?” asks Ali Shabaan, one of the more vocal participants at the gathering, of the bearded man sitting across from him. “If he said it in this salon, I wouldn’t have a problem,” the man replies.

The Kashgari case is an extremely touchy subject at the salon. Many knew him personally and support his right to voice his opinion. But, some admit, speaking about the Prophet Muhammad can be very dangerous and must be done with extreme delicacy. “As soon as you speak of Muhammad critically, you’re seen at a stage close to apostasy,” says one of the guests, who requested that his name not be published.

Abu Alkhair says it became much more difficult to gather as a group after Kashgari’s arrest. Many of his guests used to congregate informally, at different coffee shops around Jidda, but they no longer feel that it is safe to do so.

Their most frequent hangout, Bridges Cafe, was recently raided by the religious police and has been closed indefinitely.

And that’s when Abu Alkhair began hosting the meetings in his living room. He insists on keeping them open to the public and has published his address and phone number online, even though that has put him and his wife in a vulnerable position.

Abu Alkhair says they woke up one morning to a small fire lit outside their apartment door. “I didn’t ask for revolution, I didn’t ask to change the system. I just have my small house and a lot of young people; I just speak freely on Twitter, a very basic thing in the world, in other countries, so why do you punish me?”

The government has targeted Abu Alkhair: he has just emerged from a monthlong investigation by the Ministry of the Interior.

Abu Alkhair says the process involved two or three meetings a week with an investigator at the ministry’s head office in Jidda, where intense questioning lasted for up to eight hours. His investigator probed him about his weekly salons, his Twitter account and whether or not he would ever take his criticism to the streets in protest.

At the end of the month, he was charged with “disrespecting the judicial system” and could face a year in prison if convicted.

Despite his own uncertain future, Abu Alkhair is optimistic that freedom of speech will continue to grow, both online and outside the walls of his living room.

“In just 10 years, I have seen young people become very brave, and I wonder what will happen in the next five years. I think a lot will happen.”

As one week’s meeting winds down, Abu Alkhair and his wife pile up the empty teacups, and he describes one of the last interrogation sessions he went through before receiving his charges.


"I did not know how long these interrogations would last, so I told my investigator I was going on a hunger strike until they finished," he says, smirking as he repeats the investigator's reaction. "He said 'Fine,' then asked me nicely not to tweet about it."

Abu Alkhair says little victories like that give him hope for the future.

CLASS WAR REPORTS

THIS MODERN WORLD

by TOM TOMORROW



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Comment Unnecessary



A member of the rebel Syrian Free Army waves an opposition flag on top of a damaged government army vehicle in Binsh, near Idlib July 10, 2012. Picture taken July 10, 2012. REUTERS/Shaaam News Network/Handout

Sudan:

**“The Regime’s Attempts To Terrorise
The People Off The Streets Has Not
Been Successful”**

**“Demonstrations Have Continued Daily,
Involving Various Sectors Of Society”**

July 15, 2012 By Meera Zoll, Green Left Weekly [Excerpts]

Since the outbreak of a new protest wave on June 16 that has spread across Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP) regime has conducted mass arrests of thousands of activists in a desperate attempt to quell the revolt.

Some of those arrested have been released, but many remain in detention without charge — often in unknown locations with no outside contact.

Protests continue to be viciously attacked by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), police and what protesters call Rabata (“bandits” — government-armed militias).

Many protesters have been severely injured and the government has pressured doctors and hospitals not to treat the wounded.

One woman was blinded after being shot with rubber bullets, and a mother who simply went to collect her son from university sustained injuries after being beaten by security forces. Protesters have described the effects of new tear gas used by security forces that causes vomiting, bleeding and paralysis.

As well as arrests at demonstrations, the NISS has been rounding up activists in their homes, often detaining a family member in their place if they are not found.

Protesters injured in attacks on rallies have been detained upon leaving the hospital following treatment for their wounds. Journalists, bloggers and activists with high media or online profiles have been targeted.

Torture of detainees has included fierce beatings, sleep and food deprivation, racist and sexist abuse and the shaving of eyebrows and other degrading acts. There have also been reports of the rape of women detainees.

A July 11 statement by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch called for an end to the attacks on peaceful protesters. It detailed the arrest and abuse of scores of activists from a wide range of organisations, including the major opposition parties and student groups Girifna (“we’re fed up”) and Youth for Change.

Many women are among those detained, including Nahid Jabralla, head of the women’s rights group SEEMA.

On July 3, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) issued a statement outlining the kidnapping of party member Salah Samareab by the security forces. The SCP said: “Despite the many attempts by lawyers, Salah’s family, and human rights organisations to locate the place of his detention the official answer is a big no.”

There are serious concerns for his well-being, as he is diabetic, requiring daily insulin. Since then, more SCP members have been arrested.

The regime’s attempts to terrorise the people off the streets has not been successful. Demonstrations have continued daily, involving various sectors of society.

Doctors rallied on July 9 in support of the movement and to announce the formation of a new united doctors’ union. Many were arrested in the hours and days following.

The economic situation is degenerating, with food prices escalating.

One of the latest manifestations of the government’s austerity measures have been bread shortages, leading to long queues in Khartoum to buy the staple food.

Fridays have provided a weekly focus for the uprising, with a different theme each week.

July 13 rallies were dedicated to Sudanese women, who have borne the brunt of the war, poverty and repression of the NCP regime and who have been at the forefront of the struggle against it.

Protests took place once more on the campuses, in the mosques and on the streets of cities and towns across Sudan. And once again the police, NISS and government-armed thugs attacked protesters with tear gas, rubber bullets, sticks and knives.

Women were particularly targeted for arrest, along with mothers of protesters.

On July 13, Azza Tijani, head of the Sudanese Women's Union, was detained along with her daughter. In the days before July 13, Khartoum University, a centre of the uprising, was subjected to raids before NISS forced it to shut down.

Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir continues to downplay the uprising, claiming on June 11 that rather than an Arab Spring, Sudan will face "a hot summer that will burn its enemies".

However his statements appear increasingly ridiculous as the people of Sudan prove that they will no longer accept NCP rule.

Rent-A-Cop Uses Baton On Helpless Prisoner; Crowd Uses Hands And Feet On Rent-A-Cop

Dan Shea posted at GI Café Kaiserslautern [gicafegermany@groups.facebook.com] Jul. 14, 2012

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-8p1TGz_bBk&feature=related

Military Resistance Looks Even Better Printed Out

Military Resistance/GI Special are archived at website

<http://www.militaryproject.org> . The following have chosen to post issues; there may be others: <http://williambowles.info/military-resistance-archives/>; news@uruknet.info

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