


Military Resistance 11G11



Make Love, Not War

From: Dennis Serdel
To: Military Resistance Newsletter
Sent: July 27, 2013
Subject: Make Love, Not War

Written by Dennis Serdel, Vietnam 1967-68 (one tour) Light Infantry, Americal Div. 11th Brigade; United Auto Workers GM Retiree

Make Love, Not War

Josh wakes up in his hospital bed
looks at his clock, it's 6am
he pulls himself up & grabs his crutches
goes to the bathroom, shaves his face
brushes his teeth & combs his hair

puts his slippers on & goes down a long grey hall, turns right & goes down another until he enters the coffee room where the people on his floor eat their meals & look out the big windows eight stories up onto the parking lot & town below, he is always the first one, as he sits down and waits.

In less than 10 minutes, an Old Man walks in using his cane & stares out the big windows & then he asks "Where am I?" Then Josh tells him "You're in a hospital." The Old Man looks down & asks, "Is my 1953 Ford in the parking lot below?" Josh says "No." "What year is it?" It's 1975." "Am I in Ohio?" "No you're in Michigan." answers Josh. "Why am I here?"

"Because you are sick."

The old man shakes his head & says "Now I remember," & he gets a cup of black coffee & then he sits down. Others start to come in their wheel chairs saying Good Morning & a Good Morning to you. How did you Sleep ? Read a book until I Did, Same story here. The Nurse walks in & the Help serve breakfast as the Nurse gives each their Meds & then the room calms down as they eat Breakfast & the Old Man Smiles because he knows where He Is. After breakfast, they take an elevator down to a Big Room where they test their muscles & Find out what machine they should use. There are individual moans as the Trainers shout "Harder." Every other Day, the Doctor takes another & pokes their muscles with an electric devise, Often saying "Josh, you're going to have to work Harder to get out of Here." Josh nods his head & wants pain pills at night, the Doctor just nods too. Josh wakes up the Next Morning, Another Hard Night, but 6 in the morning He gets out of bed & the same thing every day as he readies

himself up for the walk down the grey hallways & he is always the First as he draws himself coffee & sits himself down.

In less than 10 minutes, the Old Man with the cane comes shuffling in & He goes to the Big Windows & He asks Josh, "Where am I?" Josh tells him "You're in a Hospital." The Old Man looks down & asks "Is my 1953 Ford in the Parking Lot Below?" Josh says "No." "What Year is it ?" "It's 1975" "Am I in Ohio?" "No. You're in Michigan" "Why am I Here" "Because You are Sick." The Old Man shakes his head & Says, "Now I Remember" & He gets a cup of Black Coffee & sits down. That Very Night, Josh Wakes up with so much Pain at 2 in the Night, He calls for the Nurse, He says He needs a Pain Shot or some Pills. She has to call the Doctor but He will Not answer, So the Old Lady Nurse, rubs his Hand & wipes the sweat off his Face & talks to him like a Mother for Hours until 6 in the morning When the Doctor says give him a Pain Shot & then he settles down But Josh worries about the Old Man until he falls Asleep.

Something Written by Dennis Serdel for Military Resistance

AFGHANISTAN WAR REPORTS

Two American Service Members Killed In IED Attack In Afghanistan

7.28.13 By Courtney Kobe and Tracy Jarrett, NBC News

Two American service members died in an attack in Afghanistan on Saturday, a military official confirmed to NBC News.

The two service members died after an improvised explosive device went off in the eastern part of the country, the International Security Assistance force said in a release on Saturday.

**POLITICIANS REFUSE TO HALT THE
BLOODSHED**

**THE TROOPS HAVE THE POWER TO STOP THE
WAR**

Resistance Action



[Graphic: flickr.com/photos]

July 27, 2013 The News International & AFP

KABUL: An Afghan official says a bomber targeting a village police commander blew himself up in a bazaar in a lawless part of eastern Afghanistan, killing seven people.

Mohammad Ali Ahmadi, the deputy provincial governor of Ghazni province, said Saturday that the attacker on a motorcycle killed Local Police commander Dawlat Khan, three of his men, and three civilians.

He says it took place late Friday in Ghazni's Qarabagh district.

On Friday a bomber on a motorbike detonated himself in a busy marketplace in eastern Ghazni province in an apparent attempt to kill an influential local anti-Taliban leader, Dawlat Khan.

Khan, who led a group of militiamen who were taking on the Taliban in several villages in the province, was killed in the deadly blast along with three of his bodyguards and three civilians, officials confirmed.

A vehicle carrying Khairullah Anosh, governor of the northern Samangan province, hit an improvised explosive device as the politician was heading to work in the provincial capital Aibak.

“As a result of the attack, the governor along with his two bodyguards were slightly wounded,” his spokesman Sediq Aziz said.

The Taliban, who have been fighting a decade-long insurgency to overthrow the Western-backed Kabul government, claimed responsibility the attack and vowed to continue targeting the officials.

“They are strong supporters of foreign forces and enemies of the Taliban,” spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid said in a statement.

**IF YOU DON'T LIKE THE RESISTANCE
END THE OCCUPATION**

**“U.S. Diplomatic Facilities In
Afghanistan Have Serious
Security Lapses That Pose
‘Unnecessary Risk To Staff’”**

**“Enemy Fighters Are In A Position To
Use American Tax Dollars Paid To
Criminal Afghan Contractors To
Attack U.S. Troops And Personnel”**

**“Officials At The State Department And
U.S. Agency For International
Development Don't Have ‘Express
Authority To Terminate Or Default
Contracts’ With Known Afghan
Contractors Connected To Enemy
Forces”**

July 25, 2013 By Sara Carter, The Washington Times

U.S. diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan have serious security lapses that pose “unnecessary risk to staff,” including poor emergency preparedness and inadequate protections that might allow classified materials to fall into the hands of attacking enemies, according to an internal report that raises fresh questions about the State Department’s commitment to safety in the aftermath of the Benghazi tragedy.

The problems with security planning and resources aren’t the only red flags for the safety of American diplomats in Afghanistan.

A separate report this summer from the office of the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction found that U.S. civilian and military personnel face increased security risks because officials at the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development don’t have “express authority to terminate or default contracts” with known Afghan contractors connected to enemy forces. Only the Defense Department has the authority, the report found.

In other words, enemy fighters are in a position to use American tax dollars paid to criminal Afghan contractors to attack U.S. troops and personnel, the special inspector general’s report warned.

An after-action review of the 2011 attack found that the Kabul embassy employed law enforcement personnel who were “unsure as to what emergency response role they were expected to play, if any” during the attack.

In fact, the State Department report noted that the current emergency action plan in Kabul “did not reflect the increased threat in Kabul or the significant growth in staffing levels at Embassy Kabul from 2009 to 2012.”

The Bureau of Counterterrorism’s 2011 country reports on terrorism stated that the number of attacks increased in Afghanistan from 1,122 in 2007 to 2,872 in 2011.

In fact, “six of the ten major attacks in Afghanistan during 2011 were in Kabul, two of those attacks were on diplomatic facilities” and a number of hotels frequented by Westerners were attacked.

During the September 2011 attacks in Kabul, armed Taliban militants fired small arms from the rooftops of high-rise buildings surrounding the embassy.

They also targeted the headquarters of NATO’s International Security Assistance Forces, where senior U.S. commanders work and reside. The complex attack also included targeted bombings of police and military checkpoints in the city.

“Many times, security is not the emphasis during the planning process but it’s more of a check-the-block afterthought,” the official said.

“Basically, you can’t put an embassy underneath unsecure overhanging structures. In the case of Kabul, they did and according to the IG report the embassy failed on multiple fronts to ensure their employees safety based on what

was required by the (emergency action plan). They were lucky no one died in the embassy attack. “

TROOPS INVITED:


Comments, arguments, articles, and letters from service men and women, and veterans, are especially welcome. Write to Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657 or email contact@militaryproject.org: Name, I.D., withheld unless you request publication. Same address to unsubscribe.

“For All The Differences, There Are Striking Parallels Between The Twenty-First-Century Occupation Of Afghanistan And That Of 1839—42”

“‘Whoever Comes To Afghanistan, Even Now, They Will Face The Fate Of Burnes, McNaughton And Dr. Brydon,’ Agreed Mohammad Khna, Our Host In The Village”

“Everyone Nodded Sagely Into Their Rice: The Names Of The Fallen Of 1842, Long Forgotten In Their Home Country, Were Still Common Currency Here”

“In Truth, All The Americans Here Know Their Game Is Over. It Is Just Their Politicians Who Deny This”



I talked about my great-great-uncle, Cohn Mackenzie, who had been taken hostage nearby, and I asked if they saw any parallels with the current situation.

“It is exactly the same,” said Jagdalak. “Both times the foreigners have come for their own interests, not for ours. They say, ‘We are your friends, we want to help.’ But they are lying.”

“Whoever comes to Afghanistan, even now, they will face the fate of Burnes, McNaughton and Dr. Brydon,” agreed Mohammad

Another Popalzai ruler lacking a real power base, Hamid Karzai — astonishingly, from the same sub-tribe as Shah Shuja [in 1842]—faces the brunt of concerted guerrilla attacks led by the eastern Ghilzai who today make up the footsoldiers of the Taliban.

They are directed by another Ghilzai tribal leader from the Hotak ruling clan, in this case Mullah Omar. (Mullah Omar is a distant relative of the first Afghan ruler of southern Afghanistan, Mir Waiz Hotaki.)

Excerpts from

RETURN of a KING
The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839—42

By William Dalrymple,
ALFRED A. KNOPE;
NEW YORK 2013

At the end of Kim, Kipling has his eponymous hero say, “When everyone is dead, the Great Game is finished. Not before.”

In the 1980s it was the Russians’ Withdrawal from their failed occupation of Afghanistan that triggered the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union.

Less than twenty years later, in 2001, British and American troops arrived in Afghanistan, where they proceeded to begin losing what was, in Britain’s case, its fourth war in that country.

As before, in the end, despite all the billions of dollars handed out, the training of an entire army of Afghan troops and the infinitely superior weaponry of the occupiers, the Afghan resistance succeeded again in first surrounding then propelling the hated Kafirs into a humiliating exit.

In both cases the occupying troops lost the will to continue fighting at such cost and with so little gain.

For all the differences, there are of course striking parallels between the twenty-first-century occupation of Afghanistan and that of 1839—42.

There is a real continuity in the impact of political geography on the evolution of both conflicts. The significance of Kabul’s location is one issue — adjacent to both the Tajik population of Kohistan, on one side, and the eastern Ghilzais on the other.

Then there is the tribal issue, as another Popalzai ruler lacking a real power base, Hamid Karzai — astonishingly, from the same sub-tribe as Shah Shuja—faces the brunt of concerted guerrilla attacks led by the eastern Ghilzai who today make up the footsoldiers of the Taliban.

They are directed by another Ghilzai tribal leader from the Hotak ruling clan, in this case Mullah Omar. (Mullah Omar is a distant relative of the first Afghan ruler of southern Afghanistan, Mir Waiz Hotaki.)

On my extended visits to Afghanistan to research this book in 2009 and 2010 I set myself two goals.

Firstly, I wanted to try to find the elusive Afghan sources telling of the war which I was certain had to exist and which I have in due course used to write this book.

Secondly, I was keen to see as many of the places and landscapes associated with the First Afghan War as was possible in a situation where ISAF’s (International Security Assistance Force, established by the United Nations in 2001 and taken over by NATO in 2003.) hold on Afghanistan was already visibly shrinking every day.

By 2110, the Taliban had a strong presence in over 70 per cent of the country and Karzai's government had firm control of only 29 out of 121 key strategic districts.

That 70 per cent included most of the route of the British retreat of January 1842 which I knew I would have to travel if I was to have an idea of the geography I was going to write about. I particularly wanted to try to get to Gandamak and see the site of the British last stand.

The route of the 1842 retreat backs on to the mountain range that leads to Tora Bora and the Pakistan border, the Ghilzai heartlands that have always been—along with Quetta—the Taliban's main recruiting ground.

I had been advised not to attempt to visit the area without local protection, so eventually set off in the company of a regional tribal leader who was also a minister in Karzai's government: a mountain of a man named Anwar Khan Jagdalak, a former village wrestling champion and later captain of the Afghan Olympic wrestling team, who had made his name as a Jami'at-Islami Mujehedin commander in the jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s.

It was Jagdalak's Ghilzai ancestors who inflicted some of the worst casualties on the British army of 1842, something he proudly repeated several times as we drove through the same passes.

"They forced us to pick up guns to defend our honour," he said. "So we killed every last one of those bastards." None of this, incidentally, has stopped Jagdalak from sending his family away from Kabul to the greater safety of Northolt in north London.

On the day we were to drive to Gandamak, I had been told to report at seven in the morning to Jagdalak's Ministry in the heart of the administrative district now named Wazir Akbar Khan. Threading my way through a slalom of checkpoints and razor wire surrounding the Ministry, I arrived to find Jagdalak being hustled into a convoy of heavily armoured SUVs by his ever-present phalanx of bodyguards, walkie-talkies crackling and assault rifles primed.

Jagdalak drove himself, while pick-ups full of heavily armed Afghan bodyguards followed behind.

As we headed through the capital, evidence of the failure of the current occupation lay all around us.

Kabul remains one of the poorest and scrappiest capital cities in the world.

Despite the U.S. pouring around \$80 billion into Afghanistan, almost all that money has disappeared into defence and security and the roads of Kabul were still more rutted than those in the most neglected provincial towns of Pakistan. There was no street lighting and apparently no rubbish collection.

According to Jagdalak, that was only the tip of the iceberg. Despite all the efforts of a dozen countries and a thousand agencies over more than a decade since 2001, the country is still a mess: a quarter of all teachers in Afghanistan are illiterate. In many

areas, governance is almost non-existent: half the governors do not have an office; even fewer have electricity. Civil servants lack the most basic education and skills.

We bumped through the potholed roads of Kabul, past the blast walls of the U.S. Embassy and the NATO barracks that has been built on the very site of the British cantonment of 170 years ago, past Butkhak, then headed down the zigzagging road into the line of bleak mountain passes—first the Khord Kabul, then the Tezin—that link Kabul with the Khyber Pass.

It is a suitably dramatic and violent landscape: faultlines of crushed and tortured strata groaned and twisted in the gunpowder-coloured rockwalls rising on either side of us. Above, the jagged mountain tops were veiled in an ominous cloud of mist.

As we drove, Jagdalak complained bitterly of the western treatment of his government. “In the 1980s when we were killing Russians for them, the Americans called us freedom fighters,” he muttered as we descended the first pass. “Now they just dismiss us as warlords.”

At Sarobi, where the mountains debouch into a high-altitude ochre desert dotted with encampments of Ghilzai nomads, we left the main road and headed into Taliban territory; a further five pick-up trucks full of Jagdalak’s old Mujehedin fighters, all brandishing rocket-propelled grenades and with faces wrapped in their turbans, appeared from a side road to escort us.

At the village of Jagdalak, on 12 January 1842, the last 200 frostbitten British soldiers found themselves surrounded by several thousand Ghilzai tribesmen; only a handful made it beyond the holly hedge.

Our own welcome that April was, thankfully, somewhat warmer.

It was my host’s first visit to his home since he became a minister, and the proud villagers took their old commander on a nostalgia trip through hills smelling of wild thyme and wormwood, and up through mountainsides carpeted with hollyhocks and mulberries and shaded by white poplars.

Here, at the top of the surrounding peaks, near the watchtower where the naked and freezing sepoy had attempted to find shelter, lay the remains of Jagdalak’s old Mujehedin bunkers and entrenchments from which he had defied the Soviet army.

Once the tour was completed, the villagers feasted us, Timurid style, in an apricot orchard at the bottom of the valley: we sat on carpets under a trellis of vine and pomegranate blossom, as course after course of kebabs and raisin pullao were laid in front of us.

During lunch, as my hosts casually pointed out the site of the holly barrier and other places in the village where the British had been massacred in 1842, we compared our respective family memories of that war.

I talked about my great-great-uncle, Cohn Mackenzie, who had been taken hostage nearby, and I asked if they saw any parallels with the current situation.

“It is exactly the same,” said Jagdalak. “Both times the foreigners have come for their own interests, not for ours. They say, ‘We are your friends, we want to help.’ But they are lying.”

“Whoever comes to Afghanistan, even now, they will face the fate of Burnes, McNaughton and Dr. Brydon,” agreed Mohammad Khna, our host in the village and the owner of the orchard we were sitting.

Everyone nodded sagely into their rice: the names of the fallen of 1842, long forgotten in their home country, were still common currency here.

“Since the British went we’ve had the Russians,” said one old man to my right. “We saw them off too, but not before they bombed many of the houses in the village.”

He pointed at a ridge full of ruined mudbrick houses on the hills behind us.

“We are the roof of the world,” said Khan. “From here you can control and watch everywhere.”

“Afghanistan is like the crossroads for every nation that comes to power,” agreed Jagdalak. “But we do not have the strength to control our own destiny. Our fate is determined by our neighbours.”

It was nearly 5 p.m. before the final flaps of naan bread were cleared away, by which time it became clear that it was now too late to head on to Gandamak. Instead we went that evening by the main highway direct to the relative safety of Jalalabad, where we discovered we’d had a narrow escape.

It turned out that there had been a battle at Gandamak that very morning between government forces and a group of villagers supported by the Taliban. The sheer size and length of the feast and our own gluttony had saved us from walking straight into an ambush.

The battle had taken place on exactly the site of the British last stand of 1842.

The following morning in Jalalabad we went to a jirga, or assembly, of Ghilzai tribal elders, to which the greybeards of Gandamak had come, under a flag of truce, to discuss what had happened the day before.

The story was typical of many I heard about Karzai’s government, and revealed how a mixture of corruption, incompetence and insensitivity had helped give an opening for the return of the once hated Taliban.

As Predator drones took off and landed incessantly at the nearby airfield, the Ghilzai elders related how the previous year government troops had turned up to destroy the opium harvest.

The troops promised the villagers full compensation and were allowed to plough up the crops; but the money never turned up.

Before the planting season, the Gandamak villagers again went to Jalalabad and asked the government if they could be provided with assistance to grow other crops.

Promises were made; again nothing was delivered. They planted poppy, informing the local authorities that if they again tried to destroy the crop, the village would have no option but to resist.

When the troops turned up, about the same time as we were arriving at nearby Jagdalak, the villagers were waiting for them and had called in the local Taliban to assist. In the fighting that followed, nine policemen were killed, six vehicles were destroyed and ten police hostages taken.

After the jirga was over, two of the tribal elders of Gandamak came over and we chatted for a while over a pot of green tea.

“Last month,” said one, “some American officers called us to a hotel in Jalalabad for a meeting. One of them asked me, ‘Why do you hate us?’

I replied, ‘Because you blow down our doors, enter our houses, pull our women by the hair and kick our children. We cannot accept this. We will fight back, and we will break your teeth, and when your teeth are broken you will leave, just as the British left before you. It is just a matter of time.’”

“What did he say to that?”

“He turned to his friend and said, ‘If the old men are like this, what will the younger ones be like?’

“In truth, all the Americans here know their game is over. It is just their politicians who deny this.”

“These are the last days of the Americans,” said the other elder. “Next it will be China.”

SOMALIA WAR REPORTS

**Somalia:
Govt Troops Fight Each Other;
“Troops Have ‘Repeatedly Been Involved
In Setting Up Illegal Checkpoints And**

Harassing Civilians, Including Raping Women’”

Jul 27, 2013 Garowe Online

MARKA, Somalia July 26, 2013

Somali government troops fought each other along clan loyalties last week in Lower Shabelle region, and the federal government has dispatched a ministerial delegation to resolve the violent dispute over regional influence, Garowe Online reports.

Fighting erupted on July 24 in the outskirts of Marka, provincial capital of Lower Shabelle region, between Somali government troops belonging to Biyamal and Habar Gedir clans. Local reports said at least three soldiers were killed.

The fighting erupted after one group of government soldiers attacked another group of government soldiers at El Warego village near Marka. Renewed fighting occurred on July 25 in Janale area, local reports said.

On July 26, Lower Shabelle Governor Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur Sidi accused unnamed groups in Mogadishu of “fuelling” the conflict in Lower Shabelle region.

“Clan fighting among government troops is unfortunate. The fighting is fuelled from Mogadishu by select groups who are responsible for it,” said Governor Sidi.

Also on July 26, Somali government dispatched a ministerial delegation led by Interior and National Security Minister Abdikarim Hussein Guled, along with a number of federal parliamentarians to try and diffuse tensions.

Speaking to reports later that day, Minister Guled declared that a “ceasefire” had been reached and that government troops and AMISOM [foreign occupation] forces were now in control of areas where the fighting occurred. Minister Guled said the government officials had meetings with traditional elders to try and diffuse clan tensions in the region.

Local reports say political tensions have been heightened in Lower Shabelle region in recent months, as the Biyamal clan the native residents of Lower Shabelle region clashed with Habar Gedir clan members, who settled in Lower Shabelle region since the outbreak of Somali civil war in 1991.

According to a new report from the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, the 3rd Brigade of the Somali National Army (SNA) controls the Afgoye-Marka area of Lower Shabelle region.

“The 3rd Brigade is principally drawn from the Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr clan. It consists of approximately 840 men...General Mohamed Roble Jimale ‘Gobale’ (Hawiye / Habar Gedir / Ayr), a close associate of Indha’adde, officially controls the 3rd Brigade”, according to the UN report.

The report alleged that areas under the control of the 3rd Brigade have been “heavily infiltrated by Al Shabaab” and that 3rd Brigade troops have “repeatedly been involved in setting up illegal checkpoints and harassing civilians, including raping women”, the UN report noted.

Citing military intelligence sources, the UN report stated: “During the course of 2012, 3rd Brigade has engaged in skirmishes with at least one other SNA brigade (6th Brigade).”

Yusuf Mohamed Indha’adde, the former warlord of Lower Shabelle region, is known to have used Habar Gedir clan militia to subjugate local populations in the 2000s in Lower Shabelle region – including Biyamal clan – and Indha’adde remains deeply unpopular in Lower Shabelle region among native clans.

Gobale, a former warlord in Kismayo and now government military officer, commands Indha’adde’s clan militia aiming to exert Habar Gedir clan influence and domination in Lower Shabelle region and thereby exacerbating clan tensions in Lower Shabelle region.

FORWARD OBSERVATIONS



“At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed. Oh had I the ability, and could reach the nation’s ear, I would, pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke.

“For it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder.

“We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake.”

“The limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppose.”

Frederick Douglass, 1852

Wars throughout history have been waged for conquest and plunder and it is the working class who fights all the battles, the working class who makes the supreme sacrifices, the working class who freely sheds their blood and furnishes their corpses, and it is they who have never yet had a voice - in either declaring war or making peace. It is the ruling class that invariably does both. They alone declare war.

They are continually talking about patriotic duty. It is not their patriotic duty but your patriotic duty that they are concerned about. Their patriotic duty never takes them to the firing line or chucks them into the trenches.

-- Eugene V. Debs

Egypt: The Officers' War Of Terror

**“They Are Actively Exploiting
Popular Disdain For Muslim
Brotherhood Rule To Carve Out
An Equally, If Not More,
Regressive Political Order Than
The One That Preceded It”**

**“The Current Transition Is Primarily
Aimed At Shielding State Institutions
From Popular Demands For
Revolutionary Change”**

“The Coercive Apparatus Of The Old Mubarak Regime Is Reconstituting Itself Under The Guise Of A Counter-Terrorism Initiative”

Jul 27 2013 by Jadaliyya Egypt Editors, Jadaliyya

Since the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has become a battlefield of narratives.

Each narrative has sought to appropriate and define the January 25 Revolution.

The wielders of power, most notably the army, along with its allies, advanced a narrative claiming that the revolution succeeded—thanks to the intervention of the officers. The time had come, this narrative went, for protesters to vacate the streets and the squares, and for workers to end their strikes and return to the factories.

The revolution could only continue through the military-engineered transition, through people “going home,” through deferring to elections, constitution writers, and the officers and elites bargaining over Egypt’s future.

But for many, the January 25 Revolution was not simply a quest for an elected government.

It encompassed a host of demands for far-reaching institutional reforms and social and economic rights.

These revolutionaries did not leave that narrative unchallenged.

They pushed back against the military and its civilian partners, who sought to negotiate and construct a political system that could contain rather than amplify revolutionary demands for transformative change.

But the partisans of “bread, freedom, and social justice” remained on the margins long after Mubarak’s ouster.

They struggled to resist the narratives of power. In doing so they faced one of the major paradoxes of revolutionary popular mobilization in Egypt that 25 January revealed.

Those who took to the streets could build enough pressure to “veto” particular political realities. However, they had little to no sway to replace the realities they overturned.

The people, in other words, possess the power to subvert, but without necessarily challenging the ability of the wielders of power to dictate what comes next.

The relevance of this paradox to the events and aftermath of 30 June 2013 cannot be more apparent.

In the prelude to the 30 June protests, millions of disgruntled Egyptians signed the Tamarod Campaign petition, declaring:

“As a member of the Egyptian people, I hereby declare that I withdraw my confidence from the President of the Republic Dr. Mohammed Morsi and call for early presidential elections. I vow to stay true to the goals of the revolution and work towards achieving them, as well as publicizing the Tamarod campaign amongst the ranks of the masses until together we can achieve a society of dignity, justice, and freedom.”

This initiative began as an attempt to gather popular support for early presidential elections after Morsi’s failure to deliver on the demands of the January 25 Revolution.

That effort is now ceding ground to actors that are even more hostile to the aspirations that the Tamarod petition articulated.

It is true that those who took to the streets may have succeeded in overturning one the largest hurdles to revolutionary change in Egypt, namely the uneasy alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the entrenched centers of powers known as the “deep state.”

The popular mobilization that culminated on 30 June made it impossible for the officers and the security establishment to hide their anti-democratic privileges behind the façade of democratic institutions and civilian punching bags.

Yet the fact remains: the murderers of Khaled Said, Sayed Bilal, Mina Danial, and Gaber Salah “Jika” are emerging triumphant in the aftermath of Morsi’s ouster. They are actively exploiting popular disdain for Muslim Brotherhood rule to carve out an equally, if not more, regressive political order than the one that preceded it.

Similar to what they have done after 11 February 2011, the officers today are promoting a narrative in which they have (once again) intervened heroically to save the day and “protect the revolution.”

Accordingly, after they helped oust Morsi out of power, the officers are now asking Egyptians for pay back.

The people are now to offer a blind, if not supportive, eye to the military practices as it employs deadly force, repression, and xenophobia to force its challengers into submission.

The fear mongering discourse that the military has used as part of its “war on terror” initiative has clearly turned into more than just “words,” after security forces killed dozens of Muslim Brotherhood protesters Friday night, and dozens others in previous attacks.

Yesterday’s brutal attacks came right after millions of Egyptians rallied in nationwide public gatherings in support of Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s request for a popular mandate to deal with imminent “terrorist” threats. Many media outlets and

opinion shapers in Egypt have uncritically expressed support for this alarming development.

This pattern only highlights the extent to which advocates of dignity and justice in the country face an uphill battle in countering the attempts of the military and their allies to liquidate political dissent and dictate the terms of the new political order.

The Muslim Brotherhood's record in power may have been so horrendous as to justify Morsi's impeachment.

But even so, what is undeniable is that the military's violent campaign against Brotherhood supporters and the propagation of xenophobic discourse against its activists, as well as any explicit or implicit endorsement of such efforts stand in complete contradiction with the professed principles of the January 25 Revolution.

They also defy the vision of a humane, just social order that many individuals have sacrificed their lives or body parts for the past two and a half years.

There can be no freedom in a country where media outlets are shut down because they fail to tow the official line and where individuals face the threat of arrest, slander, and violent retribution for their political views.

There can be no justice in a country where a former president and his associates are being held accountable for suspected wrong-doings through a process dominated by the very system that has killed unarmed protesters, conducted virginity tests, and have long subjected Egyptians to torture, humiliation, and abuse.

There can be no dignity in a country where the coercive apparatus of the old Mubarak regime is reconstituting itself under the guise of a counter-terrorism initiative.

The Muslim Brotherhood's leaders are guilty for failing to build an Egypt that lives up to the demands of the January 25 Revolution.

But their former allies among the officers who are ruling today are just as guilty.

What is next for Egypt?

There is little doubt that the military-sponsored transitional framework—like its predecessor—is structurally unfit to deal with the rampant social inequalities that have long animated the conflict between large social segments and the Egyptian state.


The current transition is primarily aimed at shielding state institutions from popular demands for revolutionary change.

Simply replacing the Muslim Brotherhood with a new cadre of military-allied civilians, even under the framework of democratic institutions, will not quell the struggle for bread, freedom, and social justice.

Thus, some might argue that it is only a matter of time before an open clash ensues between advocates of transformative change and the military-led political order. But even if such a clash is probable, the minority who opposes both the military and the Muslim Brotherhood face significant challenges.

The events of this last week are painful evidence of the tough road ahead. The January 25 Revolution now faces a fight for its existence in an environment in which power and resistance are more convoluted than ever.

DO YOU HAVE A FRIEND OR RELATIVE IN THE MILITARY?



CHANGE WE CAN BEREAVE IN

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“To Hear The Main Stream Media Tell It, Assad Is On A Roll Following His

Victory In Qusayr, But The Ground Truth Is Quite Different”

“Assad Has Lost His Last Major City In Aleppo Province And Is On The Verge Of Losing Aleppo All Together, And With It, Northern Syria”

July 26, 2013 BY Clay Claiborne, claysbeach.blogspot.com [Excerpts]

To hear the main stream media tell it, Assad is on a roll following his victory in Qusayr, but the ground truth is quite different.

After abandoning Qusayr, the opposition was able to re-establish its supply lines through nearby towns.

Assad's "Northern Storm" that was to take Aleppo next has sounded little thunder and shown even less lightning, in fact with the recent victory in, and yes I can say it, the strategic city of Khan al-Assal, Assad has lost his last major city in Aleppo province and is on the verge of losing Aleppo all together, and with it, northern Syria.

With all its difficulties, the opposition has apparently regained its footing after the shock of the massive Hezbollah invasion.

Qusayr, close to the Lebanese border, was relatively easy pickings for them. Still it took much longer than expected. Now their supply lines are getting extended and they are starting to get hit in their rear.

Meanwhile, the main body of Assad's force is still trying to put down the opposition in Damascus and wipe Homs off the map. While he has continued ability to rain down great death and destruction from above, overall, he has been losing ground since Qusayr.

So in spite of the hype, Assad knows what the score is.

Northern Syria is all but lost to him and he probably can't get it back.

So now he is preparing the ground for his "worst case scenario" which would be to carve a rump state in western Syria around Damascus, Homs and heavily Alawite areas like Latakia.

It has been reported that he has already asked Israel to accept this.

He is trying to create an exclusively Alawite-Shia area in which his power can best be conserved and to do this he has to kick all the Sunnis out. So in these areas he has been engaged in a very brutal campaign of 'ethnic cleansing'.

The Guardian reported 22 July 2013:

"In Homs city, Sunni districts of Ashere, al-Khoder, Karm al-Zaitoun and Bab al-Sebaa have largely been emptied and replaced by Alawite families, numerous local leaders claim."

The UN recently reported that the number of Syrian refugees has topped 1.8 million in what they are calling the worst humanitarian crisis since Rwanda, the worst refugee crisis in 20 years.

What has gotten a lot less coverage is the brutal methods Assad is using to force so many people from their homes and their country.

He is using artillery, missiles and aircraft to make certain areas of the country unlivable and he is wantonly slaughtering civilians. He is specifically targeting children, even attacking play grounds, because he knows nothing makes the people give up the fight and flee like killing their children. Assad might say he gets more "buck for the bang" by targeting children.

The Syrian conflict is also unique in all of history in that the worst torture techniques are regularly used even on pre-teen children. In many ways, Assad's strategy directly involves attacking children by the government. In his war, they aren't collateral damage; they are targets.

OCCUPATION PALESTINE

Palestinian Kid With Dual US Citizenship Shot With Live Bullet: Jihad Hamad, 14, Injured In The Neck And Right Shoulder;

**“Around 7 Pm, An Israeli Soldier
Fired Live Bullets At A Small Group
Of Boys Walking Home”
“According To Eyewitness Reports, The
Situation Was Calm And The Israeli
Soldiers In The Area Were Not In Any
Danger”**



25 Jul 2013 Defence for Children International Palestine

An Israeli soldier fired live bullets at Jihad Hamad, 14, injuring him in the neck and right shoulder, on Wednesday in the West Bank town of Silwad.

Defence for Children International Palestine is disturbed by the shooting of a Palestinian child with dual American citizenship by an Israeli soldier in the West Bank town of Silwad on Wednesday.

Around 7 pm, an Israeli soldier fired live bullets at a small group of boys walking home near the main road in the western part of town, according to DCI-Palestine sources.

Two bullets struck Jihad Hamad, 14, in the neck and right shoulder. One of the bullets also caused damage to his vocal chords. He was first rushed to an emergency clinic in Silwad, and later transferred to the Ramallah Medical Complex for treatment. His condition was described as stable.

Hamad's father told DCI-Palestine that his son holds American citizenship.

"It is clear from incidents like this that some Israeli soldiers plainly view Palestinian kids as targets," said Ayed Abu Eqtaish, Accountability Program director.

"Israeli soldiers are rarely held accountable for acts like this and the resulting impunity simply leads to increasing violence against Palestinian civilians, including children."

According to eyewitness reports, the situation was calm and the Israeli soldiers in the area were not in any danger that would allow the use of live ammunition.

The Israeli army's open-fire regulations allow soldiers to use live ammunition "only under circumstances of real mortal danger," according to a recent report by B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights group.

Israeli forces are prohibited from firing rubber-coated metal bullets at women and children. Where firing rubber-coated metal bullets is allowed, police and military procedures state that they must only be fired from a distance of 50-60 meters (165 – 195 feet) and at the legs of people.

Despite these regulations, at least 21 children have been shot and injured by live ammunition, rubber-coated metal bullets or tear-gas canisters since January 2013, including two fatalities, according to evidence collected by DCI-Palestine.

In May, Atta Sabbah, 12, from Jalazoun refugee camp near Ramallah was shot by an Israeli soldier while trying to retrieve his school bag from another soldier nearby. The live bullet struck Atta in the stomach and exited through his back, severing his spinal cord and causing paralysis from the waist down. It also caused damage to his liver, lungs, pancreas and spleen.

DCI-Palestine documentation shows 32 percent of children were shot in the face or head, 18 percent in the arm or chest, and 14 percent in the stomach. One child was shot multiple times with live ammunition.

The majority of these children's families have not filed any complaints to the Israeli authorities regarding injuries incurred through use of lethal or non-lethal weapons, as they do not believe there will be any criminal case brought against soldiers.

Since 2000, Yesh Din reports only five percent of complaints submitted to the Military Police Criminal Investigations Division lead to an indictment. Moreover, victims of soldier crime are reluctant to speak out "for fear they may come to harm, either for the soldiers who discover they filed a complaint or by the denial of various permits."

[To check out what life is like under a murderous military occupation commanded by foreign terrorists, go to: www.rafahtoday.org The occupied nation is Palestine. The foreign terrorists call themselves "Israeli."]

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