


Military Resistance 12F14



AFGHANISTAN WAR REPORTS

Foreign Occupation “Servicemember” Killed Somewhere Or Other In Afghanistan: Nationality Not Announced

June 26, 2014 AP

A foreign servicemember died as a result of an enemy forces attack in southern Afghanistan yesterday.

Police General Blown Up: “Ge. Mohammad Hadi Was Killed Along With His Body On Wednesday Afternoon”



Jun 26 2014 By Ghanizada, Khaama Press

A senior police official was killed following an explosion in eastern Ghazni province of Afghanistan on Wednesday.

According to local government officials, the incident took place on Wednesday afternoon in Khwaja Omari district.

The officials further added that Gen. Mohammadi was killed following the explosion along with another policeman.

The ministry of interior, following a statement also confirmed that Ge. Mohammad Hadi was killed along with his body on Wednesday afternoon.

The statement further added that the explosion took place around 2:30 pm local time after their vehicle struck with an improvised explosive device (IED).

Zabiullah Mujahid, spokesman for the Taliban group claimed responsibility behind the incident.

Sudden Taliban Attack Sweeps Helmand Province: “Fighting Eventually May Have Included As Many As 1,000 Militants”

June 26, 2014 By Josh Smith and Zubair Babakarkhail, Stars and Stripes & By Ghanizada, Khaama Press [Excerpts]

In the pre-dawn hours of June 20, Taliban forces used the cover of darkness to attack checkpoints across the Helmand province district of Sangin, which was vacated by U.S. Marines only last month, according to district governor Sulaiman Shah.

“After that the serious fighting started between the security forces in the area and the insurgents,” he told Stars and Stripes. “The clashes have continued until now, although the violence has gone up and down.”

The fighting in Helmand, which eventually may have included as many as 1,000 militants, initially spread beyond Sangin to areas in Nawzad and Kajaki districts, said Abdul Ahad Chopan, a spokesman for the Helmand provincial police.

Overnight a Taliban attack on a checkpoint and the subsequent counterattack left seven people dead; a bomb killed five civilians; and insurgents reportedly burned the homes and killed several relatives of local policemen.

Casualty reports remain vague, but Afghan officials claim as many as 150 Taliban have been killed, along with more than 30 government soldiers and police.

Taliban spokesman Qari Yousaf Ahmadi issued his own tally of casualties: 200 ANSF and only seven Taliban killed. He also claimed that foreign armored vehicles were destroyed, but both coalition and Afghan officials say no international ground troops were involved.

Murad Agha further added that heavy clashes are still going on between the Afghan security forces and Taliban militants in Mosa Qala, Kajaki and Sangin districts.

Syed Murad Agha, district chief of Nawzad, said at least 15 policemen were also killed and 7 others were injured during the clashes.

MILITARY NEWS



[Thanks to SSG N (ret'd) who sent this in.]

Insurgents Threaten Balad Air Base, Iraq's Largest Airfield: "Insurgents Have Surrounded The Base, Known As 'Camp Anaconda' Under U.S. Occupation" "The Base Is In Immediate Danger Of Being Taken" Along With Huge Stock Of Advanced Weaponry: "Fighters Also Reported To Be Advancing On The Haditha Dam"

June 25, 2014 Stars and Stripes

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is threatening to take control of Balad air base, Iraq's largest airfield and one of America's most important military outposts during its occupation of the country.

ISIL fighters also were reported to be advancing on the Haditha Dam on the Euphrates River 120 miles northwest of Baghdad.

The New York Times reported that the army had told employees to be prepared to open the floodgates if ordered, a move which would flood roads that could be used by the rebels to advance on the capital.

In April, ISIS fighters seized the Falluja Dam and opened the floodgates, flooding nearby fields of crops and starving Shiite areas downstream of needed water for crops.

According to a Reuters news service report, insurgents have surrounded the air base nearby, which was known as "Camp Anaconda" under U.S. occupation, and struck it with mortars. Eyewitnesses told Reuters that the air base had been surrounded on three sides.

According to The Daily Beast, Russian-made transport helicopters, surveillance planes, and a fleet of pickup trucks fitted with heavy machine guns would all be lost to the militants if the base is overrun.

Citing internal reports from Balad, and outside analysts, the news outlet reported that the base is in immediate danger of being taken.

Even if ISIL fighters could not operate or maintain aircraft parked there — and it's unlikely they would — denying the Iraqi security forces their use would be a significant gain.

Some attacks on Balad already began this month.

The last American contractors at Balad — many of whom were working to ready the base for the planned delivery of F-16s — were flown by the Iraqi Air Force to Baghdad on June 13.

That delivery is now less certain.

“Clearly, we are facing a fluid situation on the ground at the moment,” said Pentagon spokesman Cmdr. Bill Speaks, “and it’s simply too soon to say how the current ISIL offensive will affect delivery timelines for Iraq’s F-16s.”

If ISIL took Balad, they could add to their already impressive stock of vehicles, weapons and equipment.

James Codling, who served as a contractor and senior engineer on the base between 2008 and 2012, told The Daily Beast that when the U.S. forces left in 2011, they left at least 1,000 trucks and vehicles, some of them armored, along with 500 to 600 portable power generators.

He also said the base housed Russian-made Mi-8 transport helicopters, small surveillance planes, military tactical vehicles, Humvees and a fleet of pickup trucks with machine guns mounted in the truck beds.

Al-Maliki “Ready To Concede The Loss Of Large Portions Of Territory In The North And West Of Iraq”

“He Angrily Ordered Staff At His Office To Stop Watching TV News

Channels Hostile To His Government”

“Iraqi Military Rife With Corruption”

Soldiers “Bribe Commanders So They Can Stay Home And Take A Second Job”

Jun 26, 2014 By Oliver Holmes and Isabel Coles, Reuters [Excerpts

Sunni militants in Iraq took control of several small oil fields Wednesday.

The militants, led by the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria/Levant, also known as ISIS, overran the Ajeel oil site 19 miles outside of Tikrit, an engineer at the facility told Reuters.

The Ajeel oil fields produce 28,000 barrels a day and are connected to two pipelines, one of which runs to the oil refinery in Beiji, the largest in Iraq.

Insurgents surrounded three sides of a huge air base nearby -- called “Camp Anaconda” when it was under U.S. occupation – and shelled it with mortars, witnesses added.

Iraqi officials told the Associated Press Tuesday that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was ready to concede the loss of large portions of territory in the north and west of Iraq -- at least temporarily -- and had deployed the military’s best-trained and best-equipped soldiers to defend Baghdad.

“Al-Maliki is tense. He is up working until 4 a.m. every day. He angrily ordered staff at his office to stop watching TV news channels hostile to his government,” one of the officials said.

Meanwhile, dozens of newly arrived U.S. military advisers and special operations forces began assessing the Iraqi forces in an effort to strengthen Baghdad’s ability to confront the insurgency.

Iraqi officials have said the U.S. advisers were expected to focus on the better units the Americans had closely worked with before pulling out.

Combined with approximately 360 other U.S. forces in and around the American Embassy in Baghdad to perform security, they would bring the total U.S. military presence in Iraq to about 560.

The Iraqi military, rife with corruption and torn by conflicting loyalties, lacks adequate air cover for its ground troops and armor, with the nation’s infant air force operating two Cessna aircraft capable of firing U.S.-made Hellfire missiles.

That leaves the army air wing of helicopter gunships stretched and overworked.

While Iraq's security forces number a whopping 1.1 million, with 700,000 in the police and the rest in the army, corruption, desertion and sectarian divisions have been a major problem.

With a monthly salary of \$700 for newly enlisted men, the forces have attracted many young Iraqis who would otherwise be unemployed.

Once in, some bribe commanders so they can stay home and take a second job, lamented the officials.

On Thursday morning, ISIL fighters staged an assault on the town of Mansouriyat al-Jabal, home to inactive gas fields where foreign firms operate, in northeastern Diyala province.

Iraqi Oil Infrastructure “Sabotaged” Before ISIS Attack: “Most Pumping Stations In Iraq Are Under ISIS Control.” “ISIS Have A Lot Of Experts, Including Oil Experts” “Gas Stations Have Been Taking Supplies From Government-Controlled Stores Since Start Of Crisis, But It Is Unclear How Long Those Stocks Will Last”

26 Jun, 2014 by: Hannah Lucinda Smith; Asharq Al Awsat [Excerpts]

Kirkuk —

Iraq's oil infrastructure was subjected to repeated sabotage and theft in the months before the fall of Mosul, an industry insider has told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“There was a sabotage on the pipeline from Baiji two weeks before the attack on Mosul,” said the source, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on the condition of anonymity.

“The line was tapped at Al-Hadr (around 25 miles south of Mosul) and the stolen oil was loaded into tankers and smuggled out. There were three different types of insurgents in that area—ISIS, Ba’athists and criminals.”

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its predecessor, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, have long targeted the country’s oil infrastructure in order to raise funds and create instability.

The group now controls all the oil fields in eastern Syria’s Deir Ezzor province.

“ISIS have a lot of experts, including oil experts,” said the source. “The problem now is that most pumping stations in Iraq are under ISIS control.”

The collapse of the Iraqi Army has placed extra pressure on Iraq’s oil security. The army’s 12th Division was previously responsible for maintaining the security of some of the region’s pipelines.

The Baiji Oil Refinery, which supplies 60 percent of Iraq’s fuel, has been out of action since the city of Mosul slipped out of government control on June 10. The town was captured by insurgents on June 11.

The line between Baiji and Kirkuk was set on fire on June 13, as the fighting around Baiji began.

As a fuel shortage grips the country, drivers in the Kurdish-controlled region of northern Iraq have been lining up overnight at gas stations to fill up their cars.

Opening hours have been limited to 7 am to midday at government-controlled stations, and drivers are only allowed to purchase 8 gallons (30 liters) every other day.

At stations in Kirkuk, the city worst hit by the crisis, the line stretches to a couple of miles by late afternoon.

One taxi driver in the city told Asharq Al-Awsat that he had been forced to wait in line for five hours to fill up his tank.

“The queues started right from the day that Mosul fell,” said Fazel Raza, the manager of a petrol station in the Rahimawa district of the city.

“The government is always telling us that they have backup stocks, but people are not comfortable when they have empty tanks.”

Gas stations have been taking their supplies from government-controlled stores since the start of the crisis, but it is unclear how long those stocks will last.

“We think that they may be mixing the fuel to make it last longer,” said Raza. “The quality is not as good as it was before. We have been testing it on our own vehicles, and three of them have broken down.”

Insurgent General Says ISIS Is Less Than Third Of Rebels In Iraq: “The Formation Of The Fighting Groups Was Decided In A Meeting Of All Sunni Groups Apart From ISIS” “Any Political Solution On The Ground That Meets The Demands Of The Sunnis And Saves Them From Al-Maliki’s Oppression Will Be Accepted”

17 June 2014 The Middle East Monitor

A senior Sunni leader in Iraq has claimed that ISIS fighters make up less than one-third of the rebels in the country.

Major General Montasir Al-Anbari said that the decision to form the Sunni fighting groups was taken by clerics and tribesmen in the wake of the Hawija Protest Massacre, which was carried out by the Iraqi army in May last year; dozens were killed and wounded in the incident.

Al-Anbari stressed that the formation of the fighting groups was decided in a meeting of all Sunni groups apart from ISIS.

He did not disclose the place of the meeting, but said that some groups suggested starting action after the elections, giving a chance for Al-Maliki to respond to their demands for reform.

ISIS, he said, asked to join the groups several months after their formation and asked to be part of the Sunni military action.

Many reservations were expressed, claimed Al-Anbari, before it was agreed to accept the ISIS request.

"Without doubt, though, we are worried about unilateral movements of ISIS because they attacked the city of Telafer and kidnapped the Turkish consul," said Al-Anbari, "and they are threatening to head to Baghdad, Karbala and Al-Najaf." All of this, he insisted, violates the agreement reached between the Sunni rebel groups.

"In any case, ISIS only forms around 30 per cent of the rebel fighters but it is linked to us by certain agreements and recognises that it cannot face other fighting groups."

According to the rebel general, any political solution on the ground that meets the demands of the Sunnis and saves them from Al-Maliki's oppression will be accepted.

“Some Experts Have Declared The Iraqi Army A Defeated Force”

“When The Militants Overran Mosul They Captured The Second-Largest Ammunition Storage Site In Iraq, Which One Expert Described As A ‘WalMart Of Ammunition’”

“The Militants Also Captured 52 Artillery Pieces, Including Howitzers, Which Were Abandoned By Iraqi Troops As They Fled South”

JUNE 22, 2014 By ALISSA J. RUBIN and MICHAEL R. GORDON
JUNE, New York Times [Excerpts]

Recent assessments by Western officials and military experts indicate that about a quarter of Iraq's military forces are “combat ineffective,” its air force is minuscule, morale among troops is low and its leadership suffers from widespread corruption.

“Now we are just in the position of protecting what we have left of our territory,” said an Iraqi Army commander in Diyala, where ISIS fighters and other Sunni groups are fighting.

“Our army soldiers are really down,” said the commander, who asked not to be identified because he was not authorized to speak with reporters.

In the face of that, some experts have declared the Iraqi Army a defeated force, posing a dire counterpoint to the hopes and assessments of American trainers when the United States withdrew in 2011.

Michael Knights, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote recently that 60 out of 243 Iraqi Army combat battalions “cannot be accounted for, and all of their equipment is lost.”

American officials said their assessment was that five of the Iraqi Army's 14 divisions were "combat ineffective," including the two that were overrun in Mosul. Remnants of shattered units and soldiers who were on leave when the ISIS offensive began have been sent to the military base at Taji, north of Baghdad, to be cobbled together into fresh units. But that, officials and experts underscored, is a process that is going to take time.

But a measure of the military's desperation is that its chief assistance now comes from hundreds of thousands of volunteers and a smaller number of highly trained militia members. For army units — and there are a number of them — that are fighting hard, often under difficult circumstances, adding volunteers who have little or no experience has been of questionable benefit. Hundreds of volunteers have been killed or wounded in ambushes on their way to the battlefield, for example.

That is not true of the trained militias, which have far fewer fighters but are experienced and highly trained, mostly by the Iranians, and who augment the regular army's morale, said commanders.

From the point of view of Iraqi Army officers, they are in a desperate situation: ill-equipped against an enemy they say they were not trained to fight.

When the militants overran Mosul they captured the second-largest ammunition storage site in Iraq, which one expert described as a "WalMart of ammunition."

The militants also captured 52 artillery pieces, including Howitzers, which were abandoned by Iraqi troops as they fled south.

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FORWARD OBSERVATIONS



“At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed. Oh had I the ability, and could reach the nation’s ear, I would, pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke.

“For it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder. We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake.”

“The limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppose.”

Frederick Douglass, 1852

**Rise like Lions after slumber
In unvanquishable number,
Shake your chains to earth like dew
Which in sleep had fallen on you-
Ye are many — they are few**

-- Percy Bysshe Shelley, 1819, on the occasion of a mass murder of British workers by the Imperial government at Peterloo.

Iraq Veteran: This Is Not What We Tortured Detainees For!



June 19, 2014 G-Had, The Duffle Blog

By Pvt. Charles A. Graner Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.)

Like many veterans of the Iraq War, I've been glued to the TV lately, and like many of my brothers and sisters-in-arms I've been extremely saddened to see pictures of terrorists swarming all over Iraq's cities, stealing equipment and routing security units.

This isn't the Iraq I or my fellow veterans from the 372nd Military Police Company remember: the Iraq we remember was an orderly place — one of dark cellars full of naked screaming men.

Now I have to wonder: was our sacrifice worth it just to ensure that thousands of prisoners were properly threatened with rape or terrorized by working dogs?

I don't know if anyone can answer that question.

I first came to Iraq in May of 2003 and left one year later and even today I remember it like it was yesterday.

The smell of a prisoner who just shit himself in fear, the feel of a brand-new leash as we buckled it around his neck, the tender touch on my wife's shoulder as we forced two grown men to masturbate each other at gunpoint.

These are memories that even time and age can't fade.

When I left, I felt that I had done everything that I could do: beaten every detainee until my fists were raw, sodomized as many as I could before the broomstick broke, and of course documented it all to help the soldiers who would follow us continue the good work.

At the end of the mission, we could truthfully say that conditions in our little corner of Iraq were probably better than anywhere else.

We definitely made an impact on the lives of many Iraqis. Over the years I've gotten plenty of thank-you messages from my former inmates, like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, saying they wouldn't be where they are now if not for me.

I still remember one of those fat little goat fuckers, tears in his eyes, as he begged me to uncuff him from his bars of his cell window where I'd left him hanging.

It's the little moments — or in his case, hours — like that that even Al Qaeda can't take away, the joy of watching Iraqis crawling across the floor to freedom with the bags of democracy over their heads.

But ultimately I don't think Iraq was about the mission.

It was about the man or woman next to you, the one helping you slam someone's head into a wall, beating a prisoner with a chair, or photographing you posing with dead bodies. That's what it's all about.

"Non," as the French would say, *"je ne regrette rien."*

No matter what happens, I will always fondly look back on my time in Iraq, and one day tell my children and grandchildren about the pride I took in a properly-constructed naked pyramid.

I really wish I could somehow go back and finish what I started. I'm off parole in December, so don't be surprised if you somehow see me on the TV back in the sandbox after that.

Don't worry though, I've learned my lesson.


Next time I'm not taking prisoners.

YOUR INVITATION:

Comments, arguments, articles, and letters from service men and women, and veterans, are especially welcome. Write to Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657 or email contact@militaryproject.org: Name, I.D., withheld unless you request publication. Same address to unsubscribe.

ANNIVERSARIES

June 30, 1966: Three Fort Hood Soldiers Refuse Vietnam War Deployment: “Large Numbers Of Men In The Service Either Do Not Understand This War Or Are Against It”



Carl Bunin Peace History June 28 - July 4

The first GIs—known as the Fort Hood Three, U.S. Army Privates James Johnson, Dennis Mora and David Samas—refused to be sent to Vietnam.

All were members of the 142nd Signal Battalion, 2nd Armored Division stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. The three were from working-class families, and had denounced the war as “immoral, illegal and unjust.” They were arrested, court-martialed and imprisoned.

The Pentagon reported 503,926 “incidents of desertion” between 1966 and 1971.

From NIU.EDU

JOINT STATEMENT BY FORT HOOD THREE

The following statement was read to over 40 cameramen, reporters, and antiwar fighters at a press conference in New York on June 30th. The statement was prepared jointly and read by Pvt. Dennis Mora.

We are Pfc. James Johnson, Pvt. David Samas, and Pvt. Dennis Mora, three soldiers formerly stationed at Fort Hood, Texas in the same company of the 142 Signal Battalion, 2nd Armored Division. We have received orders to report on the 13th of July at Oakland Army Terminal in California for final processing and shipment to Vietnam.

We have decided to take a stand against this war, which we consider immoral, illegal and unjust. We are initiating today, through our attorneys, Stanley Faulkner of New York and Mrs. Selma Samols of Washington, D.C. an action in the courts to enjoin the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army from sending us to Vietnam. We intend to report as ordered to the Oakland Army Terminal, but under no circumstances will we board ship for Vietnam.

We are prepared to face Court Martial if necessary.

We represent in our backgrounds a cross section of the Army and of America. James Johnson is a Negro, David Samas is of Lithuanian and Italian parents, Dennis Mora is a Puerto Rican. We speak as American soldiers.

We have been in the army long enough to know that we are not the only G.I.'s who feel as we do. Large numbers of men in the service either do not understand this war or are against it.

When we entered the army Vietnam was for us only a newspaper box score of G.I.'s and Viet Cong killed or wounded. We were all against it in one way or another, but we were willing to "go along with the program," believing that we would not be sent to Vietnam.

We were told from the very first day of our induction that we were headed for Vietnam. During basic training it was repeated often by sergeants and officers, and soon it became another meaningless threat that was used to make us take our training seriously.

But later on Vietnam became a fact of life when some one you knew wondered how he could break the news to his girl, wife, or family that he was being sent there.

After he solved that problem, he had to find a reason that would satisfy him. The reasons were many-"Somebody's got to do it," "When your number's up, your number's up The pay is good," and "You've got to stop them someplace" were phrases heard in the barracks and mess hall, and used by soldiers to encourage each other to accept the war as their own. Besides, what could be done about it anyway? Orders are orders.

As we saw more and more of this, the war became the one thing we talked about most and the one point we all agreed upon. No one wanted to go and more than that, there was no reason for anyone to go.

The Viet Cong obviously had the moral and physical support of most of the peasantry who were fighting for their independence. We were told that you couldn't tell them apart- that they looked like any other skinny peasant.

Our man or our men in Saigon has and have always been brutal dictators, since Diem first violated the 1954 Geneva promise of free elections in 1956.

The Buddhist and military revolt in all the major cities proves that the people of the cities also want an end to Ky and U.S. support for him. The Saigon Army has become the advisor to American G.I.'s who have to take over the fighting.

No one used the word “winning” anymore because in Vietnam it has no meaning.

Our officers just talk about five and ten more years of war with at least ½ million of our boys thrown into the grinder.

We have been told that many times we may face a Vietnamese woman or child and that we will have to kill them. We will never go there-to do that for Ky.

We know that Negroes and Puerto Ricans are being drafted and end up in the worst of the fighting all out of proportion to their numbers in the population; and we have first hand knowledge that these are the ones who have been deprived of decent education and jobs at home.

The three of us, while stationed together, talked a lot and found we thought alike on one over-riding issue-the war in Vietnam must be stopped. It was all talk and we had no intentions of getting into trouble by making waves at that stage.

Once back in Texas we were told that we were on levy to Vietnam. All we had discussed and thought about now was real. It was time for us to quit talking and decide. Go to Vietnam and ignore the truth or stand and fight for what we know is right.

We have made our decision. We will not be a part of this unjust, immoral, and illegal war.

We want no part of a war of extermination. We oppose the criminal waste of American lives and resources.

We refuse to go to Vietnam!!


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DANGER: POLITICIANS AT WORK



[Thanks to David McReynolds for posting.]

**“Three Hours Of Pitched Battles
Between Riot Police And
Protesters” In Mitrovica, Kosovo:
“The Crowd Swarmed Around The
Cars To Delay The Disembarkation Of
The Police Inside, Chanting, ‘UÇK!
UÇK! UÇK!’”
After Police Attack, “The Crowd Counter-
Attacked, Hurling Chunks Of Concrete At
The Police’s Riot Shields”**

24 Jun 14 by Jack Davies, Kosovo 2.0

At 3 pm, residents of South Mitrovica gathered for a peaceful and largely calm protest against the installation by North Mitrovica mayor Goran Rakic of a “peace park” on the Ibar River Bridge.

The park had been put there to replace a concrete and earth barricade that had been erected in 2011 by North Mitrovica's Serbian population as an act of defiance against Prishtina rule.

The original barricade was removed last Tuesday night, with the park appearing the following afternoon after North Mitrovica residents expressed distress at the barricade's disappearance.

Provocation, however, quickly turned a reasoned channeling of anger by South Mitrovica residents at what they see as an illegal impediment to freedom of movement into three hours of pitched battles between riot police and protesters.

When protesters first arrived at the foot of the bridge, which was blocked by armoured KFOR vehicles, the mood was calm, jovial even.

Less than 10 minutes into the protest, a convoy of four police jeeps drove into the middle of the crowd that numbered in the low hundreds.

The crowd swarmed around the cars to delay the disembarkation of the police inside, chanting, "UÇK! UÇK! UÇK!" ("KLA! KLA! KLA!")

When the police were finally able to exit the vehicles, they did so clad in full armour and carrying automatic weapons.

The crowd became inflamed and the chanting grew louder.

Mere minutes later, the police deployed tear gas and all hope of a peaceful resolution to the day's events was lost.

For the next three hours, Mitrovica's main street and its capillary alleyways and side streets would be the scene of running pitched battles between police and protesters.

Tear gas cannisters would screech through the air, several of them a minute, howling like vengeful angels before skidding across the floor as incandescent fragments, seeping their payload as they did.

The crowd counter-attacked, hurling chunks of concrete at the police's riot shields. With every fresh volley of tear gas, the crowd would scatter into doorways or take cover behind the furniture on cafe terraces.

Before the hour was out, a SUV had been set on fire.

The crowd was divided. It had been swollen in number by angry youths, their backs bare and faces shielded with makeshift balaclavas fashioned from their t-shirts. The majority of the original protesters had been docile, middle-aged men who had seemed intent on peacefully airing their dismay at the reinstatement of a barrier that had always been more psychological than physical. Most of them expressed sorrow at the carnage unfolding before them.

The riot that unfolded was a spectator sport. The old men and wiser youths who had opted not to take part in the violence lined the street, sat on railings or cafe terraces, murmurs of, “Nuk është mirë,” (“Not good,”) passing between them.

An hour and a half into the chaos, the police had pushed the crowd back just 250 meters from the bridge to the Nene Tereze statue adjacent to the mayor’s office.

They had been slowed down by parallel skirmishes instigated by protesters on the main drag’s many side streets. As the fighting raged from street corner to street corner, tear gas cannisters were launched through the sky and over rooftops.

As both sides exchanged volleys of tear gas and concrete down on one of the larger streets, an explosion was heard in the distance.

The sound was the petrol tank of a second vehicle, which had been set on fire on the main street.

A third car would be set alight just meters ahead of it, as well as two official vehicles in a municipality carpark where all others had had their windows smashed.

By the time both sides had regrouped near the statue, the road to the bridge was littered with rubble, burned-out cars and pools of sedimented tear gas. Police and protesters faced off across opposite sides of a crossroads as a man in a white polo shirt pleaded with the crowd, “Hajde, ju lutem!” (“Go, please!”) to no avail.

The streets cleared abruptly a little after 6 pm, just in time for people to catch the last minibuses back to their hometowns.

Sending heavily armed officers into what was an angry — although relatively placid — crowd, was always sure to irritate the situation.

It’s the job of the police and the political organs that direct them not to provoke trouble. Yesterday, the police failed in that mandate.

Belgrade also shoulders a sizeable portion of the blame.

The removal of the original barricade could never have been orchestrated without Belgrade’s involvement, or at least its proxy, mayor of North Mitrovica Goran Rakic. That twelve hours after the barricade was removed it was replaced by a “peace park” replete with pine trees shows that the latter event was not a spontaneous reaction.

It almost certainly took more than 12 hours to organise the trucks of dirt, trees and concrete pots that miraculously rolled onto the bridge last Wednesday.

Worse still was South Mitrovica mayor Agim Bathiri’s public ultimatum, “This barrier must be removed tonight, if not, then you will see tomorrow.”

What did he expect to come of this firebrand rhetoric? That Rakic would back down and remove the park? And how were his constituents supposed to feel when his threat came up empty? He essentially gave the citizens of South Mitrovica carte blanche to carry out his undefined threat, and that’s precisely what they did.

**A SWAT Team Blew A Hole In
My 2-Year-Old Son;
Officers Threw A Flashbang
Grenade In My Son's Crib, And
Left A Hole In His Chest:
“I Heard My Baby Wailing And Asked
One Of The Officers To Let Me Hold
Him”
“He Screamed At Me To Sit Down And
Shut Up And Blocked My View, So I
Couldn't See My Son”**



June 24, 2014 By Alecia Phonesavanh, Alternet

After our house burned down in Wisconsin a few months ago, my husband and I packed our four young kids and all our belongings into a gold minivan and drove to my sister-in-law's place, just outside of Atlanta.

On the back windshield, we pasted six stick figures: a dad, a mom, three young girls, and one baby boy.

That minivan was sitting in the front driveway of my sister-in-law's place the night a SWAT team broke in, looking for a small amount of drugs they thought my husband's nephew had.

Some of my kids' toys were in the front yard, but the officers claimed they had no way of knowing children might be present.

Our whole family was sleeping in the same room, one bed for us, one for the girls, and a crib.

After the SWAT team broke down the door, they threw a flashbang grenade inside.

It landed in my son's crib.

Flashbang grenades were created for soldiers to use during battle.

When they explode, the noise is so loud and the flash is so bright that anyone close by is temporarily blinded and deafened.

It's been three weeks since the flashbang exploded next to my sleeping baby, and he's still covered in burns.

There's still a hole in his chest that exposes his ribs. At least that's what I've been told; I'm afraid to look.

My husband's nephew, the one they were looking for, wasn't there. He doesn't even live in that house.

After breaking down the door, throwing my husband to the ground, and screaming at my children, the officers – armed with M16s – filed through the house like they were playing war.

They searched for drugs and never found any.

I heard my baby wailing and asked one of the officers to let me hold him. He screamed at me to sit down and shut up and blocked my view, so I couldn't see my son.

I could see a singed crib.

And I could see a pool of blood.

The officers yelled at me to calm down and told me my son was fine, that he'd just lost a tooth.

It was only hours later when they finally let us drive to the hospital that we found out Bou Bou was in the intensive burn unit and that he'd been placed into a medically induced coma.

For the last three weeks, my husband and I have been sleeping at the hospital. We tell our son that we love him and we'll never leave him behind.

His car seat is still in the minivan, right where it's always been, and we whisper to him that soon we'll be taking him home with us.

Every morning, I have to face the reality that my son is fighting for his life. It's not clear whether he'll live or die.

All of this to find a small amount of drugs?

The only silver lining I can possibly see is that my baby Bou Bou's story might make us angry enough that we stop accepting brutal SWAT raids as a normal way to fight the "war on drugs."

I know that this has happened to other families, here in Georgia and across the country.

I know that SWAT teams are breaking into homes in the middle of the night, more often than not just to serve search warrants in drug cases.

I know that too many local cops have stockpiled weapons that were made for soldiers to take to war.

And as is usually the case with aggressive policing, I know that people of color and poor people are more likely to be targeted.

I know these things because of the American Civil Liberties Union's new report, and because I'm working with them to push for restraints on the use of SWAT.

A few nights ago, my 8-year-old woke up in the middle of the night screaming, "No, don't kill him! You're hurting my brother! Don't kill him."

How can I ever make that go away?

I used to tell my kids that if they were ever in trouble, they should go to the police for help.

Now my kids don't want to go to sleep at night because they're afraid the cops will kill them or their family. It's time to remind the cops that they should be serving and protecting our neighborhoods, not waging war on the people in them.

I pray every minute that I'll get to hear my son's laugh again, that I'll get to watch him eat French fries or hear him sing his favorite song from "Frozen." I'd give anything to watch him chase after his sisters again. I want justice for my baby, and that means making sure no other family ever has to feel this horrible pain.

Update: As of the afternoon of 6/24/2014, Baby Bou Bou has been taken out of the medically induced coma and transferred to a new hospital to begin rehabilitation.

The hole in his chest has yet to heal, and doctors are still not able to fully assess lasting brain damage.

DO YOU HAVE A FRIEND OR RELATIVE IN MILITARY SERVICE?

Forward Military Resistance along, or send us the address if you wish and we'll send it regularly.

Whether at a base in the USA or stationed outside the Continental United States, this is extra important for your service friend, too often cut off from access to encouraging news of growing resistance to the war and economic injustice, inside the armed services and at home.

Send email requests to address up top or write to: The Military Resistance, Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657.

'To Defeat Them, I Must Become Them,' John Kerry Says While Putting On Black Face Mask



Jun 25, 2014 The Onion

ERBIL, IRAQ—

After meeting with senior Iraqi leaders to discuss the country's increasing sectarian violence, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry retired to his hotel room Wednesday, where he is said to have donned the black clothing and black face mask commonly worn by ISIS militants while reportedly murmuring to his reflection that in order to defeat one's enemy, one must become them.

"I must know their strengths, their weaknesses—I must see the world as they do if ever I am to triumph," the 70-year-old cabinet official said while wrapping a bandolier of

ammunition around his waist and over his shoulders, one of several steps Kerry reportedly carefully undertook to “make (himself) one and the same” with the Sunni militant group.

“It is said that if you know your enemies as you know yourself, you will be inviolable in many thousands of battles. So it shall be with me. He who is shrewdest shall be victorious.”

The fully black-clad elder statesman was then seen reciting the writings of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, telling himself that “There is no John Kerry; you are Abu Amir now,” and then vanishing into the darkness of the desert night.



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