


Military Resistance 15F4



[Thanks to SSG N (ret'd) who sent this in. She writes: "This is what we're fighting for?"]

AFGHANISTAN WAR REPORTS

22-Year-Old Soldier From Youngsville Among Those Killed In Afghanistan



Cpl. Dillon C. Baldrige. Fort Campbell Courier

June 12 Wral.com/Youngsville

Youngsville, N.C. — A soldier from North Carolina was among three men who were killed in Afghanistan on Saturday, officials said.

Corporal Dillon C. Baldrige, 22 of Youngsville, died in Peka Valley in the Nangarhar Province, according to the Department of Defense. Baldrige was shot, officials said.

Sgt. Eric M. Houck, 25, of Baltimore, Maryland and Sgt. William M. Bays, 29, of Barstow, California were also killed.

An Afghan official said the deaths and injury stem from an attack by an Afghan soldier, who also died, according to The Associated Press.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid says in a statement that a Taliban loyalist had infiltrated the Afghan army "just to attack foreign forces."

In March, an Afghan soldier was killed after he opened fire on foreign forces at a base in Helmand province, wounding three U.S. soldiers.

Officials said the soldiers were assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 3rd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Company D, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY.

Baldrige was a 2012 graduate of Franklinton High School, according to family members. He went to Afghanistan last October and was due to return in August.

"Words cannot express the loss that has been felt by the faculty and staff at Franklinton High School today. Those that knew Dillon well remember him as a distinguished alumni of the class of 2012, who was a kindhearted and possessed a truly giving personality," Franklinton High School Principal Russell Holloman said in a statement.

"He was a member of the wrestling team and always had a heart for serving others. He made an early commitment to the military during his high school career and maintained that focus and selfless dedication after graduation. We are all deeply saddened by the loss of one of our own today. Our community has truly lost a hero."

From an early age, Baldrige's step-mother, Jessie Baldrige, said he was destined to serve.

"What kid didn't just watch cartoons or play video games? He watched the Military Channel," she said. "He was just born a soldier."

Jessie Baldrige said she doesn't want to draw attention to herself, except to honor her son, who she described as smart, funny and kind.

"When you spent some time with him, you wanted to do better tomorrow," she said. "He was that guy who always had something nice to say, always had something positive."

Army Sergeant From Barstow Killed In Afghanistan Joint Military Operation



Sgt. William M. Bays

JUNE 12, 2017 BY NISHA GUTIERREZ-JAIME, KTLA

One of the three U.S. soldiers killed over the weekend in a joint U.S.-Afghan military operation in Nangarhar province has been identified as a Barstow man.

Sgt. William M. Bays, 29, was fatally shot Saturday in Peka Valley during Operation Freedom's Sentinel. Sgt. Eric Houck, 25, of Baltimore, Maryland, and Cpl. Dillon C. Baldrige, 22, of Youngsville, North Carolina, were also killed in the attack, the Defense Department said Monday in a news release.

The service members were fatally shot in an "apparent insider attack," also known as a "green-on-blue" incident because of the color-coding system used by NATO, officials said.

"Today, as we grieve, our thoughts and prayers are with the families of Cpl. Baldrige, Sgt. Houck and Sgt. Bays. We take this as a family loss," Maj. General Andrew Poppas, commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell, said in a news release Monday. "In the days ahead, the 101st Soldiers and Rakkasans will continue the fight against terrorism with unbridled determination. Our soldiers are battle-hardened and committed to the defense of our nation and the freedom for which we fight."

In addition to the three fallen service members, who were assigned to the 101st Airborne Division out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, another soldier was wounded in the attack. The soldiers, part of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team "Rakkasans," were deployed in the fall of 2016, officials said.

Baltimore Soldier Killed In Apparent Insider Attack In Afghanistan



Sgt. Eric M. Houck, Fort Campbell Courier

June 12 By Victoria St. Martin, Washington Post

Sgt. Eric M. Houck had been expected to return from Afghanistan in less than two months.

But family members on Monday prepared for the Baltimore native's coffin to arrive at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, grieving their loss after the 25-year-old was killed Saturday in eastern Afghanistan.

"He is my best friend," said his sister, Jessica Houck, 22, of Baltimore. "Always there for me. He was and is my protector — someone everyone should look up to. I love him with all of my heart."

Houck was killed along with Sgt. William M. Bays, 29, of Barstow, Calif., and Cpl. Dillon C. Baldrige, 22, of Youngsville, N.C. The three soldiers were gunned down in an apparent insider attack by an Afghan soldier, according to Afghan authorities and U.S. officials.

All three belonged to the 101st Airborne Division, and the incident, which happened in Nangahar province, is under investigation, authorities said.

Houck joined the Army in May 2013 and deployed last fall as a forward observer, according to a statement from Fort Campbell in Kentucky, where he had been stationed since 2016.

Family members said Houck, who went to Perry Hall High School before he enlisted, was married to his teenage sweetheart, Samantha.

The pair met when Houck was 15 and she was 14, and they had two children: Eric "EJ" Houck Jr., 5, and Violet Houck, 3.

"It was still a storybook romance, and they were just crazy about each other and their kids," said his grandfather, Bob Houck.

"Soar High Baby, I love you Eric Houck with all I got," his wife posted Monday on Facebook.

"You are and will always be mine!!!"

Bob Houck said his grandson was a good and respectful man who played by the rules and was a hard worker, attaining the rank of sergeant in less than three years.

Bob Houck added that his grandson could have had a bright future, and that "you never really appreciate the sacrifice these kids make until it happens to you."

POLITICIANS REFUSE TO HALT THE BLOODSHED

THE TROOPS HAVE THE POWER TO STOP THE WAR

Insurgents Kill 10 Security Force Members Near Herat's Salma Dam

25 JUNE 2017 By TOLONews.com

Taliban attacked a security check post about 13kms from the dam killing the security force members and making off with their weapons, officials confirmed.

At least 10 security force members were killed at a check post about 13kms from Salma Dam in western Herat province on Saturday night, officials said on Sunday. In addition, four other security force members were wounded.

The attack took place after Taliban insurgents stormed a check post in Chesht district of the province.

The insurgents also managed to get away with most of the security forces' weapons at the check post, a spokesman for provincial police chief, Gelani Farhad said.

Insurgents Kill 4 Police Officers In 2 Attacks

June 28, 2017 Associated Press

KABUL, Afghanistan – An Afghan official says that two policewomen have been killed by gunmen in northeastern Badakhshan province.

Abdullah Naziri, head of the Badakhshan provincial council, said Wednesday that both victims were sisters who were returning to their jobs after Eid holidays.

Meanwhile Jelani Farahi, the deputy police chief for southern Zabul province, said two policemen were killed when their checkpoint came under insurgent attack. Farahi said two insurgents were also killed in the attack late Tuesday night in Qalat, the provincial capital.

“Two Taliban Groups Overrun An Embattled District In Northern Afghanistan” “Fighters Overran All Of Darzab”

JUNE 28, 2017 By JAWAD SUKHANYAR and ROD NORDLAND, New York Times. Jawad Sukhanyar reported from Kabul and Rod Nordland from London. Fahim Abed contributed reporting from Kabul.

KABUL, Afghanistan — Two Taliban groups that recently switched allegiance to the Islamic State have overrun an embattled district in northern Afghanistan, killing at least 10 government fighters and a large number of civilians, according to Afghan officials in the area.

In addition, government officials accuse the Islamic State fighters of being responsible for the deaths of 15 medical patients, but it was not immediately clear if they had died from their wounds or if they had been executed by the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.

The events represent a new front for the extremist group, which is opposed by the Taliban as well as by the government and has not previously had significant successes in northern Afghanistan.

The attack took place in the district of Darzab, in the southwest of Jowzjan Province, a remote area that has long seesawed between government and Taliban control, with local warlords switching allegiances frequently. Fighters loyal to the country's exiled vice president and warlord, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, have also played a role.

Last week, Islamic State fighters overran all of Darzab, according to the acting district governor, Baz Mohammad Dawar. Government officials were able to regain control of the district's center, but not most of the rest of the territory; 10 police officers or soldiers were killed in the fight, he said.

With the district's clinic under Islamic State control, 15 patients were evacuated to the capital of Jowzjan Province, Sheberghan, but they died en route, Afghan officials said.

Mohammad Reza Ghafari, the spokesman for the provincial governor, said that Islamic State fighters had destroyed the 50-bed clinic, forcing the patients to flee.

Mr. Dawar said he thought the patients had died of their injuries on the rugged journey because of a lack of medical staff members in the area. Other officials said it seemed likely that the fighters, who controlled the area the patients had to travel through, had killed them.

In the village of Betaw in Darzab, Islamic State militants killed seven local police officers and 15 civilians, according to a local elder, and threatened to kill anyone who held funeral ceremonies for them. Some held them anyway.

"We live in a state of fear," the elder said by telephone. "All of us who participated in the funeral are now scared that ISIS will attack and kill us." The elder spoke on the condition of anonymity because he feared retaliation by militants. It was not clear if the seven police officers were counted among the 10 cited by the governor, or if they were additional casualties.

"ISIS is more powerful than the Taliban were in Darzab because their fighters are brave," said Hajji Obaidullah, the former police chief of the district.

He and other local officials said that two former Taliban commanders, Qari Hikmat and Mufti Nemat, had combined forces and switched their allegiance to the Islamic State in recent months. He said the government had rushed in hundreds of reinforcements, in the form of police officers and soldiers from other areas, to keep the district center from falling to insurgents.

"There is no Taliban in Darzab now, but only ISIS," said Halima Sadaf, a member of the Jowzjan Provincial Council, who is from Darzab.

"They took over the district before Eid al-Fitr," she said, referring to the holiday signifying the end of Ramadan that began on Sunday.

"But Afghan national security forces pushed them out of the capital of the district; the rest of the district is all with them," she added. "They are strong and regrouping to launch another offensive."

One of the Islamic State commanders, Mufti Nemat, was persuaded last year to quit the Taliban and join the government side after a heavily publicized intervention by General Dostum, the first vice president. Mufti Nemat was previously a religious teacher in General Dostum's home village. He later accused the government and General Dostum

of renegeing on promises made to him, announcing that he was joining forces with Qari Hikmat and would support the Islamic State.

Spokesmen for General Dostum and for the Taliban both confirmed that Mr. Nemat had left the Taliban, joined General Dostum's side, but then gone over to the ISIS camp.

"Nemat is a threat for the government. He knows the Darzab District and the area very well; he is a very dangerous guy," said Enayatullah Babur Farahmand, General Dostum's chief of staff. He blamed government inaction for alienating Mr. Nemat.

Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman who was reached via WhatsApp, said both local leaders who had joined ISIS had been rejected by the Taliban. Qari Hikmat, Mr. Mujahid said, had been sentenced to prison by the Taliban on corruption charges but he escaped and joined ISIS.

The Islamic State in Khorasan, as the group is known in Afghanistan, has generally been active only in the eastern province of Nangarhar, where fighters are locked in a struggle with the government as well as with local Taliban forces.

Taking a district elsewhere in the country would be a significant advance for the group.

War And Waste: "Official Corruption Has Sapped The Strength And Spirit Of Afghan Soldiers"

**"The Real Problem In Afghanistan Is
That Cronyism And Corruption In The
Government And The Security Forces
Saps The Combat Motivation Of The
Soldiers"**

**"That's Why They Can't Retake Ground,
Even Though They Have Vastly More
Forces In The Field Than The Taliban
Does"**

June 25, 2017 By ROBERT BURNS, The Associated Press [Excerpts]

WASHINGTON (AP) —

One shirt, one pair of pants.

Those are the basics for outfitting an Afghan soldier.

But in that simple uniform combination are the threads of two troubling stories — one about the waste of millions in American taxpayer dollars, the other about the perils of propping up a partner army in a seemingly endless war.

The long war has generated repeated examples of wasted funds, which may be inevitable in a country such as Afghanistan, where the military has been built from scratch, is plagued with corruption and relies almost completely on U.S. money for even the most basic things, including salaries and uniforms.

Among the costs rarely noted publicly: The Pentagon has spent \$1 billion over the past three years to help recruit and retain Afghan soldiers.

The money wasted on uniforms is small potatoes by comparison with other U.S. missteps in Afghanistan, but it is emblematic of broader problems.

The Pentagon has not disputed the gist of findings by its special inspector general for Afghanistan, John Sopko, that the U.S. spent as much as \$28 million more than necessary over 10 years on uniforms for Afghan soldiers with a camouflage “forest” pattern that may be inappropriate for the largely desert battlefield.

In a report released this past week, Sopko’s office said the Pentagon paid to license a propriety camouflage pattern even though it owns patterns it could have used for free.

The choice, it said, was based on the seemingly offhand fashion preference of a single Afghan official.

“This is not an isolated event,” Sopko said in a telephone interview. The U.S., he said, has been “in a mad rush to spend money like a drunken sailor on a weekend furlough.” It reflects a pattern, he said, of spending too much money, too quickly, with too little oversight and too little accountability.

Sopko’s office is still investigating the camouflage uniform contract process, which it found “questionable.”

“This was more than just a bad fashion move,” he said. “It cost the taxpayer millions of dollars” more than might have been necessary.

Money is rarely part of the debate over what the United States should do differently or better in Afghanistan, and thus the accumulating costs are often overlooked.

Since 2002, the U.S. has spent \$66 billion on Afghan security forces alone. In recent years this spending has grown, even though President Barack Obama's stated goal was to wean the Afghans from U.S. military help after he formally ended the American combat role there three years ago. U.S. spending on Afghan forces rose from \$3.6 billion last year to \$4.2 billion this year, and President Donald Trump's proposed 2018 budget asks for \$4.9 billion.

Stephen Biddle, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, said the money wasted on camouflage uniforms is symptomatic of a broader problem of official corruption that has sapped the strength and spirit of too many Afghan soldiers.

"The real problem in Afghanistan is not, 'Can we get a rational decision about which camouflage design it should be.' The real problem in Afghanistan is that cronyism and corruption in the government and the security forces saps the combat motivation of the soldiers," Biddle said in an interview.

"That's why they they're having such a problem holding onto a stalemate," he added. "That's why they can't retake ground, even though they have vastly more forces in the field than the Taliban does."

Even keeping Afghan troops in uniform — any uniform — is a problem. The army is chronically about 20,000 soldiers short of its authorized total of 195,000. The U.S. has about 8,400 troops there to train and advise the Afghans and to hunt extremist groups, down from a peak of 100,000 in 2010-2011.

FORWARD OBSERVATIONS



“At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed. Oh had I the ability, and could reach the nation’s ear, I would, pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke.

“For it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder.

“We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake.”

“The limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppose.”

Frederick Douglass, 1852

If our colleges and universities do not breed men who riot, who rebel, who attack life with all the youthful vision and vigor, then there is something wrong with our colleges. The more riots that come out of our college campuses, the better the world for tomorrow.

-- William Allen White

Trump Christian Gladiator



Vietnam Veteran Demo in Portland, Oregon June 4, 2017. Photo by Mike Hastie

From: Mike Hastie
To: Military Resistance Newsletter
Sent: June 27, 2017
Subject: Trump Christian Gladiator

History is not the past, history is the present. We carry our history with us. To think otherwise is criminal.
James Baldwin

Photo and caption from the portfolio of Mike Hastie, US Army Medic, Vietnam 1970-71. (For more of his outstanding work, contact hastiemike@earthlink.net)

One day while I was in a bunker in Vietnam, a sniper round went over my head. The person who fired that weapon was not a terrorist, a rebel, an extremist, or a so-called insurgent. The Vietnamese individual who tried to kill me was a citizen of Vietnam, who did not want me in his country. This truth escapes millions.

Mike Hastie
U.S. Army Medic
Vietnam 1970-71
December 13, 2004

**THE SUCCESSFUL ANTI-WAR
REBELLION OF THE ARMED
FORCES IN VIETNAM:
“Sedition – Coupled With Disaffection
Within The Ranks, And Externally
Fomented With An Audacity And
Intensity Previously Inconceivable –
Infests The Armed Services”**

[Thanks to Mark Shapiro, who sent this in.]

Excerpts from an article by Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., North American Newspaper Alliance, Armed Forces Journal, 7 June, 1971

THE MORALE, DISCIPLINE and battleworthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly in the history of the United States.

By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and non commissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near mutinous.

Elsewhere than Vietnam, the situation is nearly as serious.

To understand the military consequences of what is happening to the U.S. Armed Forces, Vietnam is a good place to start.

It is in Vietnam that the rearguard of a 500,000 man army, in its day and in the observation of the writer the best army the United States ever put into the field, is numbly extricating itself from a nightmare war the Armed Forces feel they had foisted on them by bright civilians who are now back on campus writing books about the folly of it all.

“They have set up separate companies,” writes an American soldier from Cu Chi, quoted in the New York Times, “for men who refuse to go into the field. Is no big thing to refuse to go. If a man is ordered to go to such and such a place he no longer goes through the hassle of refusing; he just packs his shirt and goes to visit some buddies at another base camp.

Operations have become incredibly ragtag. Many guys don’t even put on their uniforms any more... The American garrison on the larger bases are virtually disarmed. The lifers have taken our weapons from us and put them under lock and key...There have also been quite a few frag incidents in the battalion.”

“Frag incidents” or just “fragging” is current soldier slang in Vietnam for the murder or attempted murder of strict, unpopular, or just aggressive officers and NCOs. With extreme reluctance (after a young West Pointer from Senator Mike Mansfield’s Montana was fragged in his sleep) the Pentagon has now disclosed that fraggings in 1970(109) have more than doubled those of the previous year (96).

Word of the deaths of officers will bring cheers at troop movies or in bivouacs of certain units.

In one such division -- the morale plagued Americal -- fraggings during 1971 have been authoritatively estimated to be running about one a week.

Yet fraggings, though hard to document, form part of the ugly lore of every war. The first such verified incident known to have taken place occurred 190 years ago when Pennsylvania soldiers in the Continental Army killed one of their captains during the night of 1 January 1781.

Bounties, raised by common subscription in amounts running anywhere from \$50 to \$1,000, have been widely reported put on the heads of leaders whom the privates and Sp4s want to rub out.

Shortly after the costly assault on Hamburger Hill in mid-1969, the GI underground newspaper in Vietnam, “G.I. Says”, publicly offered a \$10,000 bounty on Lt. Col.

Weldon Honeycutt, the officer who ordered (and led) the attack. Despite several attempts, however, Honeycutt managed to live out his tour and return Stateside.

“Another Hamburger Hill,” (i.e., toughly contested assault), conceded a veteran major, is definitely out.”

The issue of “combat refusal”, and official euphemism for disobedience of orders to fight -- the soldier’s gravest crime – has only recently been again precipitated on the frontier of Laos by Troop B, 1st Cavalry’s mass refusal to recapture their captain’s command vehicle containing communication gear, codes and other secret operation orders.

As early as mid-1969, however, an entire company of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade publicly sat down on the battlefield. Later that year, another rifle company, from the famed 1st Air Cavalry Division, flatly refused -- on CBS-TV -- to advance down a dangerous trail.

While denying further unit refusals the Air Cav has admitted some 35 individual refusals in 1970 alone. By comparison, only two years earlier in 1968, the entire number of officially recorded refusals for our whole army in Vietnam -- from over seven divisions - was 68.

“Search and evade” (meaning tacit avoidance of combat by units in the field) is now virtually a principle of war, vividly expressed by the GI phrase, “CYA (cover your ass) and get home!”

That “search-and-evade” has not gone unnoticed by the enemy is underscored by the Viet Cong delegation’s recent statement at the Paris Peace Talks that communist units in Indochina have been ordered not to engage American units which do not molest them. The same statement boasted - not without foundation in fact - that American defectors are in the VC ranks.

Symbolic anti-war fasts (such as the one at Pleiku where an entire medical unit, led by its officers, refused Thanksgiving turkey), peace symbols, “V”-signs not for victory but for peace, booing and cursing of officers and even of hapless entertainers such as Bob Hope, are unhappily commonplace.

Only last year an Air Force major and command pilot for Ambassador Bunker was apprehended at Ton Son Nhut air base outside Saigon with \$8 million worth of heroin in his aircraft.

The major is now in Leavenworth.

Early this year, an Air force regular colonel was court-martialed and cashiered for leading his squadron in pot parties, while, at Cam Ranh Air Force Base, 43 members of the base security police squadron were recently swept up in dragnet narcotics raids.

All the foregoing facts – and mean more dire indicators of the worse kind of military trouble – point to widespread conditions among American forces in Vietnam that have only been exceeded in this century by the French Army’s Nivelle mutinies of 1917 and the collapse of the Tsarist armies in 1916 and 1917.

Sedition – coupled with disaffection within the ranks, and externally fomented with an audacity and intensity previously inconceivable – infests the Armed Services:

At best count, there appear to be some 144 underground newspapers published on or aimed at U.S. military bases in this country and overseas. Since 1970 the number of such sheets has increased 40% (up from 103 last fall).

These journals are not mere gripe-sheets that poke soldier fun in the “Beetle Bailey” tradition, at the brass and the sergeants.

“In Vietnam,” writes the Ft Lewis-McChord Free Press, “the Lifers, the Brass, are the true Enemy, not the enemy.” Another West Coast sheet advises readers: “Don’t desert. Go to Vietnam and kill your commanding officer.”

At least 14 GI dissent organizations (including two made up exclusively of officers) now operate more or less openly. Ancillary to these are at least six antiwar veterans’ groups which strive to influence GIs.

Three well-established lawyer groups specialize in support of GI dissent. Two (GI Civil Liberties Defense Committee and new York Draft and Military Law Panel) operate in the open. A third is a semi-underground network of lawyers who can only be contacted through the GI Alliance, a Washington, D.C., group which tries to coordinate seditious antimilitary activities throughout the country.

One antimilitary legal effort operates right in the theater of war. A three-man law office, backed by the Lawyers’ Military Defense Committee, of Cambridge, Mass., was set up last fall in Saigon to provide free civilian legal services for dissident soldiers being court-martialed in Vietnam.

Besides these lawyers’ fronts, the Pacific Counseling Service (an umbrella organization with Unitarian backing for a profusion of antimilitary activities) provides legal help and incitement to dissident GIs through not one but seven branches (Tacoma, Oakland, Los Angeles, San Diego, Monterey, Tokyo, and Okinawa).

Another of Pacific Counseling’s activities is to air-drop planeloads of sedition literature into Oakland’s sprawling Army Base, our major West Coast staging point for Vietnam

On the religious front, a community of turbulent priests and clergymen, some unfrocked, calls itself the Order of Maximilian.

Maximilian is a saint said to have been martyred by the Romans for refusing military service as un-Christian. Maximilian’s present-day followers visit military posts, infiltrate brigades and stockades in the guise of spiritual counseling, work to recruit military chaplains, and hold services of “consecrations” of post chapels in the name of their saintly draft-dodger.

By present count at least 11 (some go as high as 26) off-base antiwar “coffee houses” ply GIs with rock music, lukewarm coffee, antiwar literature, how-to-do-it tips on desertion, and similar disruptive counsels. Among the best-known coffee houses are:

The Shelter Half (Ft Lewis, Wash.); The Home Front (Ft Carson, Colo.); and The Oleo Strut (Ft Hood, Tex.).

Virtually all the coffee houses are or have been supported by the U.S. Serviceman's Fund, whose offices are in new York City's Bronx.

While refusing to divulge names, IRS sources say that the serviceman's Fund has been largely bankrolled by well-to-do liberals.

One example of this kind of liberal support for sedition which did surface identifiably last year was the \$8,500 nut channeled from the Philip Stern Family Foundation to underwrite Seaman Roger Priest's underground paper OM, which, among other writings, ran do-it-yourself advice for desertion to Canada and advocated assassination of President Nixon.

"Entertainment Industry for Peace and Justice," the antiwar show-biz front organized by Jane Fonda, Dick Gregory, and Dalton Trumbo, now claims over 800 film, TV, and music names. This organization is backing Miss Fonda's antimilitary road-show that opened outside the gates of Ft. Bragg, N.C., in mid-March.

Describing her performances (scripted by Jules Pfeiffer) as the soldiers' alternative to Bob Hope, Miss Fonda says her case will repeat the Ft Bragg show at or outside 19 more major bases.

Freshman Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.) runs a somewhat different kind of antimilitary production.

As a Congressman, Dellums cannot be barred from military posts and has been taking full advantage of the fact. At Ft Meade, Md., last month, Dellums led a soldier audience as they booed and cursed their commanding officer who was present on-stage in the post theater which the Army had to make available.

MORE:

THE SUCCESSFUL ANTI-WAR REBELLION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM [Part 2]

“Unpunished Seditious, And Recalcitrant Antimilitary Malevolence”

Elected Enlisted Men’s Councils “Made Up Of Privates And Sp 4s (NCOs Aren’t Allowed) Which Sits At The Elbow Of Every Unit Commander Down To The Companies”

[Thanks to Mark Shapiro, who sent this in.]

By Col. Robert D. Heintz, Jr., Armed Forces Journal, 7 June, 1971 [Excerpts]

The Action Groups

Not unsurprisingly, the end-product of the atmosphere of incitement of unpunished seditious, and of recalcitrant antimilitary malevolence which pervades the world of the draftee (and to an extent the low-ranking men in “volunteer” services, too) is overt action.

During 1970, large armory thefts were successfully perpetrated against Oakland Army Base, Vets Cronkhite and Ord, and even the marine Corps Base at Camp Pendleton, where a team wearing Marine uniforms got away with nine M-16 rifles and an M-79 grenade launcher.

Operating in the middle West, three soldiers from Ft Carson, Colo., home of the Army’s permissive experimental unit, the 4th Mechanized Division, were recently indicted by a federal grand jury for dynamiting the telephone exchange, power plant and water works of another Army installation, Camp McCoy, Wis., on 26 July 1970.

The Navy, particularly on the West Coast, has also experienced disturbing cases of sabotage in the past two years, mainly directed at ships’ engineering and electrical machinery.

It will be surprising, according to informed officers, if further such tangible evidence of disaffection within the ranks does not continue to come to light. Their view is that the situation could become considerably worse before it gets better.

Part of the defense establishment’s problem with the judiciary is the now widely pursued practice of taking commanding officers into civil courts by dissident soldiers either to harass or annul normal discipline or administrative procedures or the services.

Only a short time ago, for example, a dissident group of active-duty officers, members of the concerned Officers' Movement (COM), filed a sweeping lawsuit against Defense Secretary Laird himself, as well as all three service secretaries, demanding official recognition of their "right" to oppose the Vietnam war, accusing the secretaries of "harassing" them, and calling for court injunction to ban disciplinary "retaliation" against COM members.

Such nuisance suits from the inside (usually, like the Laird suit, on constitutional grounds) by people still in uniform, let alone by officers, were unheard-of until two or three years ago.

Now, according to one Army general, the practice has become so command that, in his words, "I can't even give a /34/ directive without getting permission from my staff judge advocate."

Other reports tell of jail-delivery attacks on Army stockades and military police to release black prisoners, and of officers being struck in public by black soldiers. Augsburg, Krailsheim, and Hohenfels are said to be rife with racial trouble.

Desertions And Disasters

With conditions what they are in the Armed Forces, and with intense efforts on the part of elements in our society to disrupt discipline and destroy morale the consequences can be clearly measured in two ultimate indicators: man-power retention (reenlistments and their antithesis, desertions); and the state of discipline.

In both respects the picture is anything but encouraging.

Desertion, to be sure, has often been a serious problem in the past. In 1826, for example, desertions exceeded 50% of the total enlistments in the Army. During the Civil War, in 1864, Jefferson Davis reported to the Confederate Congress: "Two thirds of our men are absent, most absent without leave."

Desertion rates are going straight up in Army, Marines, and Air Force. Curiously, however, during the period since 1968 when desertion has nearly doubled for all three other services, the Navy's rate has risen by less than 20 percent.

In 1970, the Army had 65,643 deserters, or roughly the equivalent of four infantry divisions.

This desertion rate (52.3 soldiers per thousand) is well over twice the peak rate for Korea (22.5 per thousand).

If desertions continue to rise (as they are still doing this year), they will attain or surpass the WWII peak of 63 per thousand, which, incidentally, occurred in the same year (1945) when more soldiers were actually being discharged from the Army for psychoneurosis than were drafted.

The marines in 1970 had the highest desertion index in the modern history of the Corps and, for that year at least, slightly higher than the Army's. Meanwhile, grimly remarked one officer, "let the bastards go. We're all the better without them."

But letting the bastards go doesn't work at all for the Army and the Navy, who do need a lot of recruits and whose reenlistment problems are dire.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., chief of naval Operations, minces no words. "We have a personnel crisis," he recently said, "that borders on disaster."

The Navy's crisis, as Zumwalt accurately describes it, is that of a highly technical, material oriented service that finds itself unable to retain the expensively-trained technicians needed to operate warships, which are the largest, most complex items of machinery that man makes and uses.

"Discipline," George Washington once remarked, "is the soul of an army."

Washington should know.

In January 1781, all the Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops in the Continental Army mutinied. Washington only quelled the outbreaks by disarming the Jersey mutineers and having their leaders shot in hollow square – by a firing squad made up of fellow mutineers.

(The navy's only mutiny, aboard USS Somers in 1842, was quelled when the captain hanged the mutineers from the yardarm while still at sea.)

If Washington was correct (and almost any professional soldier, whether officer or NCO, will agree), then the Armed Forces today are in deep trouble.

What enhances this trouble, by exponential dimensions, is the kind of manpower with which the Armed Forces now have to work.

As early as three years ago, U.S. News and World Report reported that the services were already plagued with "... a new breed of man, who thinks he is his own Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Attorney General. He considers himself superior to any officer alive. And he is smart enough to go by the book. He walks a tightrope between the regulations and sedition."

Yet the problem is not just one of trouble-makers and how to cope with them.

The trouble of the services – produced by and also in turn producing the dismaying conditions described in this article – is above all a crisis of soul and backbone.

It entails – the word is not too strong – something very near a collapse of the command authority and leadership George Washington saw as the soul of military forces. This collapse results, at least in part, from a concurrent collapse of public confidence in the military establishment.

Elected Enlisted Men's Councils

General Matthew B. Ridgway, one of the Army's finest leaders in this century (who revitalized the shaken Eighth Army in Korea after its headlong rout by the Chinese in 1950) recently said, "Not before in my lifetime ... has the Army's public image fallen to such low esteem ..."

But the fall in public esteem of all three major services – not just the Army – is exceeded by the fall or at least the enfeeblement of the hierarchic and disciplinary system by which they exist and, when ordered to do so, fight and sometimes die.

Take the case of the noncommissioned and petty officers.

In Rudyard Kipling's lines, "the backbone o' the Army is the noncommissioned man!"

In the 4th Mechanized Division at Ft. Carson, Sp 4 David Gyongyos, on his second year in the Army, enjoys an office across the hall from the division commander, a full-time secretary, and staff car and driver also assigned full time. He has the home phone numbers of the general and chief of staff and doesn't hesitate to use them out of working hours when he feels like it.

Gyongyos (with a bachelor's degree in theology and two years' law school) is chairman of the division's Enlisted Men's Councils, a system of elected [councils] made up of privates and Sp 4s (NCOs aren't allowed) which sits at the elbow of every unit commander down to the companies.

"I represent, electively," Gyongyos expansively told this reporter, "the 17,000 men on this post."

The division sergeant major, with a quarter-century in the Army, who is supposed to be the division's first soldiers and – non-electively – father and ombudsman of every soldier, has an office with is on even on the same floor with the general (or Sp 4 Gyongyos either). He gets his transportation, as needed, from the motor pool.

The very most that Gyongyos will concede to the sergeant major, the first sergeants, the platoon sergeants – the historic enlisted leadership of armies – is that they are "combat technicians." They are not, he coldly adds, "highly skilled in the social sciences."

The soldiers' [councils] of the 4th Division represent an experiment in what the Army calls "better communications".

Conditions throughout the rest of the Army do not quite duplicate those at Carson, but the same spirit is abroad. And experienced NCOs everywhere feel threatened or at least puzzled.

Most major units of the Army, Navy, and Air force have some form of enlisted men's councils, as well as junior officer councils.

Even the trainee companies at Ft. Ord, Calif. have councils, made up of recruits, who take questions and complaints past their DIs to company commanders and hold weekly meetings and post minutes on bulletin-boards.

General Pershing, who once said, "All a soldier needs to know is how to shoot and salute", would be surprised.


As for the officers, said a four-star admiral, "We have lost our voice."

The foregoing may be true as far as admirals are concerned, but hasn't hampered short-term junior officers (including several West Pointers) from banding together into highly vocal antiwar and antimilitary organizations, such as the Concerned Officers' Movement (COM).

At Norfolk, the local COM chapter has a peace billboard outside gate 2, Norfolk Naval Station, where every sailor can profit by the example of his officers.

ANNIVERSARIES

June 1918: Anniversary Of A Political Atrocity



Eugene V. Debs when he was a prisoner at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, sentenced for opposing U.S. entry into World War I.

U.S. Department of Labor, "Labor Hall of Fame Honoree"

Carl Bunin Peace History June 25 - July 1


[S]ocialist organizer Eugene Debs was arrested June 26, 1918, for giving an anti-war speech in Canton, Ohio, 10 days earlier.

He was charged with “uttering words intended to cause insubordination and disloyalty within the American forces of the United States, to incite resistance to the war, and to promote the cause of Germany,” despite his repeated and vehement criticism in the speech of Germany and its landed aristocracy, known as the Junkers.

“And that is war in a nutshell. The master class has always declared the wars; the subject class has always fought the battles.

“The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject class has had nothing to gain and all to lose — especially their lives.”

June 30, 1966: Three Fort Hood Soldiers Refuse Vietnam War Deployment “Large Numbers Of Men In The Service Either Do Not Understand This War Or Are Against It”



Carl Bunin Peace History June 28 - July 4

The first GIs—known as the Fort Hood Three, U.S. Army Privates James Johnson, Dennis Mora and David Samas—refused to be sent to Vietnam.

All were members of the 142nd Signal Battalion, 2nd Armored Division stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. The three were from working-class families, and had denounced the war as “immoral, illegal and unjust.” They were arrested, court-martialed and imprisoned.

The Pentagon reported 503,926 “incidents of desertion” between 1966 and 1971.

From NIU.EDU

JOINT STATEMENT BY FORT HOOD THREE

The following statement was read to over 40 cameramen, reporters, and antiwar fighters at a press conference in New York on June 30th. The statement was prepared jointly and read by Pvt. Dennis Mora.

We are Pfc. James Johnson, Pvt. David Samas, and Pvt. Dennis Mora, three soldiers formerly stationed at Fort Hood, Texas in the same company of the 142 Signal Battalion, 2nd Armored Division. We have received orders to report on the 13th of July at Oakland Army Terminal in California for final processing and shipment to Vietnam.

We have decided to take a stand against this war, which we consider immoral, illegal and unjust. We are initiating today, through our attorneys, Stanley Faulkner of New York and Mrs. Selma Samols of Washington, D.C. an action in the courts to enjoin the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army from sending us to Vietnam. We intend to report as ordered to the Oakland Army Terminal, but under no circumstances will we board ship for Vietnam.

We are prepared to face Court Martial if necessary.

We represent in our backgrounds a cross section of the Army and of America. James Johnson is a Negro, David Samas is of Lithuanian and Italian parents, Dennis Mora is a Puerto Rican. We speak as American soldiers.

We have been in the army long enough to know that we are not the only G.I.'s who feel as we do. Large numbers of men in the service either do not understand this war or are against it.

When we entered the army Vietnam was for us only a newspaper box score of G.I.'s and Viet Cong killed or wounded. We were all against it in one way or another, but we were willing to "go along with the program," believing that we would not be sent to Vietnam.

We were told from the very first day of our induction that we were headed for Vietnam. During basic training it was repeated often by sergeants and officers, and soon it became another meaningless threat that was used to make us take our training seriously.

But later on Vietnam became a fact of life when some one you knew wondered how he could break the news to his girl, wife, or family that he was being sent there.

After he solved that problem, he had to find a reason that would satisfy him. The reasons were many-"Somebody's got to do it," "When your number's up, your number's up The pay is good," and "You've got to stop them someplace" were phrases heard in the barracks and mess hall, and used by soldiers to encourage each other to accept the war as their own. Besides, what could be done about it anyway? Orders are orders.

As we saw more and more of this, the war became the one thing we talked about most and the one point we all agreed upon. No one wanted to go and more than that, there was no reason for anyone to go.

The Viet Cong obviously had the moral and physical support of most of the peasantry who were fighting for their independence. We were told that you couldn't tell them apart- that they looked like any other skinny peasant.

Our man or our men in Saigon has and have always been brutal dictators, since Diem first violated the 1954 Geneva promise of free elections in 1956.

The Buddhist and military revolt in all the major cities proves that the people of the cities also want an end to Ky and U.S. support for him. The Saigon Army has become the advisor to American G.I.'s who have to take over the fighting.

No one used the word "winning" anymore because in Vietnam it has no meaning.

Our officers just talk about five and ten more years of war with at least ½ million of our boys thrown into the grinder.

We have been told that many times we may face a Vietnamese woman or child and that we will have to kill them. We will never go there-to do that for Ky.

We know that Negroes and Puerto Ricans are being drafted and end up in the worst of the fighting all out of proportion to their numbers in the population; and we have first hand knowledge that these are the ones who have been deprived of decent education and jobs at home.

The three of us, while stationed together, talked a lot and found we thought alike on one over-riding issue-the war in Vietnam must be stopped. It was all talk and we had no intentions of getting into trouble by making waves at that stage.

Once back in Texas we were told that we were on levy to Vietnam. All we had discussed and thought about now was real. It was time for us to quit talking and decide. Go to Vietnam and ignore the truth or stand and fight for what we know is right. We have made our decision. We will not be a part of this unjust, immoral, and illegal war.

We want no part of a war of extermination. We oppose the criminal waste of American lives and resources.

We refuse to go to Vietnam!!

Military Resistance In PDF Format?

If you prefer PDF to Word format, email:

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CLASS WAR REPORTS



[Thanks to SSG N (ret'd) who sent this in. She writes: "The real war of terror."]

DANGER: CAPITALISTS AT WORK

**While The Venezuelan Working
Class And Poor Go Hungry,
“You See Hummers, Private
Jets And Obscene New
Mansions”
“18 Generals And Admirals Were
Tasked With Importing”**

“One Brigadier General Was Put In Command Of Acquiring Black Beans; Another Was Charged With Acquiring Toilet Paper, Feminine Napkins And Diapers”

“Logically, An Admiral Was Placed In Charge Of Acquiring Fish”



Scavenging for food in the streets of Caracas, Feb. 21. PHOTO: JUAN BARRETO, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

June 23, 2017 By David Luhnow and José de Córdoba, Wall Street Journal [Excerpts]

Mr. Chávez’s revolution attacked the old elites, sending nearly two million Venezuelans—and billions of dollars—packing in the past 10 years.

But in their stead rose a new elite: the so-called Boliburgueses, or Bolivarian bourgeoisie, who enjoyed a life of premium wines, Scotches and cars as poverty levels rose.

“You don’t see that in Cuba or Vietnam. But here, you see Hummers, private jets and obscene new mansions,” says Miguel Pizarro, an opposition leader whose father was a Marxist guerrilla in Venezuela and whose mother served in Mr. Chávez’s first political party in the mid-1990s.

“These guys literally bought the homes where Venezuela’s elite lived, tore them down and built even bigger ones.”

Few enjoyed la dolce vita of Caracas more than Wilmer Ruperti, a businessman who earned Mr. Chávez's loyalty in 2002 when he helped break an oil strike.

Mr. Ruperti was a familiar sight in Caracas, riding in an armored Jaguar accompanied by two North Korean bodyguards. The magnate cemented his friendship with Mr. Chávez by buying a pair of Simón Bolívar's pistols for \$1.7 million in a New York auction and presenting them to the Venezuelan leader.

Last year, Mr. Ruperti paid the multimillion-dollar legal fees for the criminal defense of Mr. Maduro's nephews. At the same time, Mr. Ruperti's firm won a \$138 million contract from the state oil company.

Mr. Ruperti said it was his patriotic duty to pay the nephews' legal fees as a way of relieving the pressures on Mr. Maduro. He denied any link between the payment of the fees and the state oil-firm contract.

Corruption helps the government maintain political control. And no tool has been more effective than exchange controls, initially adopted by Mr. Chávez in 2002 during a national strike to control capital flight. Fifteen years later, they have reshaped Venezuela's economy and given the government enormous power to pick who gets dollars from the country's oil wealth—often at absurdly low rates.

For instance, firms and others who import food get dollars at the official rate of 10 bolivars. But they can turn around and sell those dollars on the black market for 8,300 bolivars.

Venezuela's army recently got the rights to set up its own mining and oil companies, and the armed forces are in charge of most critical imports.


In 2016, 18 generals and admirals were tasked with importing key foods and sanitary items. One brigadier general was put in command of acquiring black beans; another was charged with acquiring toilet paper, feminine napkins and diapers. Logically, an admiral was placed in charge of acquiring fish.

YOUR INVITATION:

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DANGER: POLITICIANS AT WORK



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