


GI SPECIAL 5C13:



“Here, In Iraq, I See The Movie [Sir! No Sir!] Or The Book ‘Soldiers In Revolt’ In Some Of The Other Soldier’s Rooms”

From: neoscrew February 22nd
Hi
Anyone seen Sir! No Sir!, what did you think?

February 22nd, 2007 [xxxxxxxx] - Active Duty Soldier, Location: Baghdad, IZ


I thought it was inspiring enough to give a link to it on my main page.


And here, in Iraq, I see the movie or the book “Soldiers in Revolt” in some of the other soldier’s rooms. There’s no way for me to guess how many have seen it or heard of it, but yeah, it’s getting around.

I was inspired by MSG Duncan and CPT Levy. Actually, I sympathized with all the people interviewed. It inspired me to start this site actually. I wanted to start an underground paper, but it would have been too much in terms of logistics.

But I liked the documentary so much that I bought the special addition with the extra footage.

February 22nd, [xxxxxxxx] Location: FT. Stewart, GA (Coastal Empire) Same here. Rita Martinson is banging. My girlfriend actually has that song [Soldier We Love You] on her LiveJournal.





Sir! No Sir!:
At A Theatre Near You!
To find it: <http://www.sirnosir.com/>

**The Sir! No Sir! DVD is on sale now, exclusively at
www.sirnosir.com.**

Also available is a Soundtrack CD (which includes the entire song from the FTA Show, "Soldier We Love You"), theatrical posters, tee shirts, and the DVD of "A Night of Ferocious Joy," a film about the first hip-hop antiwar concert against the "War on Terror."

Do you have a friend or relative in the service? Forward GI Special along, or send us the address if you wish and we'll send it regularly. Whether in Iraq or stuck on a base in the USA, this is extra important for your service friend, too often cut off from access to encouraging news of growing resistance to the war, inside the armed services and at home. Send email requests to address up top or write to: The Military Project, Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657

IRAQ WAR REPORTS

Marine Killed In Anbar

12 March 2007 HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND RELEASE
No. 20070312-03

CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq – A Marine assigned to Multi National Force-West was killed Sunday while conducting combat operations in Al Anbar Province.

MND-B Loses Soldier To Non-Battle Death

12 March 2007 HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND RELEASE
No. 20070312-02

A Multi-National Division – Baghdad Soldier died March 11, due to a non-battle related cause.

Fallen Newport Soldier Had Planned To Propose On Next Trip Home

March 7, 2007 NEWPORT, N.H. (AP)

The Newport soldier killed in Iraq this week planned to propose marriage to his long-time girlfriend during an upcoming leave.

Army Spc. Justin Rollins was killed by a roadside bomb Monday. He was 22.

His father, Skip Rollins, said he was scheduled to come home in about three weeks and planned to pop the question to girlfriend Brittney Murray.

“We love Brittany like she was our own daughter,” Skip Rollins said. “We were looking forward to having her as our daughter-in-law.”

Skip Rollins said his son had recently purchased a diamond ring for Murray. Rollins was scheduled to have a two-week break in March or April and be rotated out of Iraq in August, his father said.

The 2003 Newport High School graduate was an infantryman in the 82nd Airborne. He recently was promoted to squad sniper. “The Army gave him a dinky little scope,” said the elder Rollins. “He went out and spent \$600 of his own money so he could shoot farther.”

According to his father, Rollins was offered the chance to become an Army recruiter, but he didn't want a cushy job and instead wanted to be with his men.

"He kicked and screamed and wanted to be in Iraq," his dad said.

He said his son also recently told him in a telephone call from Iraq that he thought there was no higher honor than to be buried in Arlington National Cemetery. That's where he will be buried after a service in Newport.

The flag at Newport Middle High School was lowered to half-staff on Tuesday. A constant stream of family and friends came to the Rollins home throughout the day.

"It's the support that means so much," Skip Rollins said. "The phone never stops ringing."

Family: Son Killed In Iraq Was Weeks Away From Coming Home

March 4, 2007 KENT, Ohio (AP)

A sailor who was scheduled to return home to northeast Ohio by the end of the month was killed in Iraq, his family said Saturday.

Luke Emch, 21, a Navy corpsman assigned to the Marines, was killed Thursday by an explosive device near Ramadi, said his father, Wesley Emch of Brimfield Township.

Navy officials didn't provide further details, the family said.

Emch, a 2004 graduate of Tallmadge High School, was scheduled to wrap up his tour of duty Saturday and, after a few weeks of debriefings, return home by the end of March, the family said.

"We worried about him constantly," his father said.

Emch attended the University of Akron for a year before deciding to join the Navy in 2006, against his father's wishes.

"We argued over it long and hard," Wesley Emch said. "I was adamant about him not joining and he just sat there and said, 'Dad, there are 19-year-old kids joining the military because they can't afford college, and they're getting shot up.'"

"He said he felt a responsibility. He said he wanted to be the one to take care of them. He couldn't stand the idea that he had something they didn't."

Wesley Emch, a science teacher at Cuyahoga Falls High School, said his son played tennis in high school and loved to watch football.

"He was a wonderful person. He was extremely smart and had a great sense of humor," said his mother, Julia Emch, a middle school teacher in the Tallmadge school district.

Emch also is survived by a sister, Samantha, 23.

Father Of Slain Soldier Slain Learns 'What A Hero' His Son Was

Mar 09, 2007 Marlon A. Walker, Staff Writer; The News & Observer Publishing Company

Sgt. Andrew Perkins dashed from his Humvee on Monday, extinguisher in hand, to help save a fellow soldier burning alive in a Humvee hit by an improvised explosive device. Three others in the vehicle were already dead.

The extinguisher ran out, forcing him back to his vehicle for a blanket to try to smother the fire.

He and another soldier made the trip back through the flames to help the burning soldier. A secondary blast killed all three.

It sounds like something Perkins would have done, his father, Weldon Perkins Jr., said Thursday when he received a letter from one of his son's superiors telling the story of how he died.

"He was always looking to help somebody else," the elder Perkins said. "I want everybody to know what a hero my son was."

Perkins, 27, of Northglenn, Colo., and five other Fort Bragg paratroopers were identified Thursday by the Department of Defense as those killed in the explosion Monday while in combat in Samarra, about 60 miles north of Baghdad. The others were Spc. Ryan M. Bell, 21, of Colville, Wash.; Staff Sgt. Justin M. Estes, 26, of Sims, Ark.; Pfc. Cory C. Kosters, 19, of The Woodlands, Texas; Spc. Justin A. Rollins, 22, of Newport, N.H.; and Staff Sgt. Robert M. Stanley, 27, of Spotsylvania, Va. They were all assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division.

Monday's six deaths were the largest loss of life in a single day for the 82nd Airborne, and brought the total number of Bragg soldiers killed in Iraq to 80.

Perkins, a grenadier, joined the Army in April 2004. He was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division in October 2004 as an anti-armor specialist.

Bell, a rifleman, joined the Army in May 2004. He was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division in January 2005.

Estes, a fire team leader, joined the Army in January 2001. He was reclassified to a combat infantryman from a multiple launch rocket system member in 2005, and reported to the 82nd Airborne Division in November of that year.

Rollins, an assistant machine gunner, joined the army in February 2004. He reported to the 82nd Airborne Division in August of that year.

Stanley, a squad leader, joined the army in October 1999. He reported to the 82nd Airborne Division in May 2000 as a machine-gunner. He became a squad leader in January 2006.

Kosters, a rifleman, joined the army in 2005. He was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division in May 2006.

According to an 82nd Airborne Division Public Affairs press release, a memorial service will be held for the soldiers by their unit in Iraq. No family funeral arrangements had been announced Thursday.

Baghdad U.S. Patrol Targeted By IEDs; Casualties Not Announced

12 Mar 2007 By Robert H. Reid, The Associated Press

A joint Iraqi-U.S. patrol was targeted Monday by two roadside bombs detonated about 50 yards apart in western Baghdad. It was not clear if any soldiers were injured.

UNREMITTING HELL ON EARTH; BRING THEM ALL HOME NOW



Thanks to Kevin Ramirez, CCCO. He writes: Pics showing what happens when US bases get mortared/rocketed. Obviously taken by a GI. I found them online, and don't know who took them.

Basra British Bases Attacked

3.12.07 VOI

Three military vehicles were damaged when British bases in the southern Iraqi city of Basra came under attack, the spokeswoman for the British forces in southern Iraq said on Monday.

Occupation Again Forced To Use Artillery To Defend Baghdad

12 Mar 2007 By Robert H. Reid, The Associated Press

Late Monday, thunderous explosions could be heard from the south of the city, and Arab television stations said U.S. forces were shelling two mostly Sunni districts near the Dora neighborhood — the scene of several bombardments in recent weeks.

“Inside The Pentagon Great Pessimism About Whether Mr Bush’s Troop ‘Surge’ Would Work”

“Just The Final Stage Before The Failure Becomes Apparent”

March 13, 2007 Ewen MacAskill in Washington, The Guardian [Excerpts]

The Pentagon is actively considering a series of fallback positions for Iraq in the event that President George Bush’s plan of expanding the US military presence fails.

Among the options are adoption of the El Salvador model, which would see Washington withdraw most of its 150,000-plus troops and replace them with a few hundred, or few thousand, military advisers.

A more drastic option also being looked at is to retreat inside Baghdad's Green Zone and the heavily fortified airport on the outskirts of the city.

An adviser familiar with discussions inside the Pentagon said there was great pessimism about whether Mr Bush's troop "surge" would work, and military planners were studying a range of alternatives.

Winslow Wheeler, a senior fellow at the Centre for Defence Information thinktank, who was involved in El Salvador, also said the El Salvador model was not viable in Iraq. "It is not sufficient to train indigenous forces.

They have to have a government they are willing to die for. There is no moderate centre in Iraq for which people are willing to die."

Referring to the chaotic scenes that accompanied the US pullout from Saigon, Mr Wheeler said retreat into Baghdad's fortified zones would be tantamount to "bringing in the wooden steps for helicopters to take us out.

"That is just the final stage before the failure becomes apparent."

AFGHANISTAN WAR REPORTS

Foreign Occupation Soldier Wounded In Helmand

03/12/07 AFP

A NATO soldier and two Afghan troops taking part in a major offensive in southern Afghanistan were wounded Monday during a clash with Taliban rebels, officials said.

NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) aircraft were called in to back up their forces during the battle with insurgents near the Girishk district of Helmand province.

"It was an operation early this morning near Girishk. Two ANA (Afghan National Army) soldiers and one ISAF soldier were wounded," NATO spokesman Captain Andre Salloum told AFP.

TROOP NEWS

Shitbird Kiley Fired



Kiley [Sheila Vemmer]

12 March 2007 By Jonathan Karl and Jennifer Duck, ABC News & Army Times Staff & March 13, 2007 Ewen MacAskill in Washington, The Guardian

[Thanks to David Honish, Veteran, who sent this in.]

The scandal over conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center has ended the career of another top Army official.

Lt. Gen. Kevin Kiley, the embattled surgeon general of the Army, has submitted his retirement papers.

A senior defense official told ABC News that Kiley had been forced out.

The official said that acting Secretary of the Army Pete Geren had asked Kiley to submit his retirement papers, which he did Sunday, and that Defense Secretary Robert Gates had fully supported the move.

The decision to fire Kiley comes 10 days after Gates fired Army Secretary Francis Harvey.

Harvey on March 1 fired Maj. Gen. George Weightman as commander of Walter Reed. The Army appointed Maj. Gen. Eric Schoomaker, brother of Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker, to replace Weightman.

Weightman's sacking brought criticism by those who noted he had been in the job for little more than six months and saw him as a scapegoat for others more responsible for the dilapidated conditions that medical-hold troops were forced to endure living in Building 18 while awaiting medical care and processing for related benefits.

Kiley, who served as the commander of the Walter Reed center from 2002 to 2004, and, as surgeon general, lived across the street from Building 18.

His performance before the media and Congress raised further concerns that he was insensitive to the issues the wounded troops faced and out of touch.

At one hearing, he told lawmakers: “I don’t do barracks inspections at Walter Reed.”

He came under withering criticism after stories in the Washington Post exposed the poor treatment and deplorable living conditions facing some wounded soldiers at Walter Reed.

Kiley’s first reaction was to criticize the stories as one-sided “yellow journalism.”

In the initial aftermath of the Post story, Gen Kiley played down the revelations, insisting the problems "weren't serious and there weren't a lot of them".

THIS IS HOW BUSH BRINGS THE TROOPS HOME: BRING THEM ALL HOME NOW, ALIVE



The casket of Army Sgt. Pedro J. Colon, Church of Santa Maria, March 2, 2007, in the Bronx borough of New York. Colon died Feb. 19 in Baghdad, of wounds suffered when his unit came under attack by enemy forces using multiple weapons. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

Officer Retention A Problem For The Army Because Of Combat Operations In Iraq And Afghanistan:

“Big Shortages” “They’re Going To Have To Limp Through.”

Mar 12, 2007 By Tom Vanden Brook, USA Today

WEST POINT, N.Y.: The Army, forced by five years of war to expand its ranks, faces a critical shortage in midlevel officers, interviews and military records show.

Those officers — majors and lieutenant colonels — manage troops at war.

The Army expects to have an annual shortage of 3,000 such officers through 2013 as it increases its ranks by 40,000 soldiers.

Beyond the shortage of midlevel officers looms an impending shortage of entry-level officers — lieutenants — from the U.S. Military Academy and university Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs, records show. Last year, 846 cadets graduated from West Point; the goal was 900. There were 25,100 enrolled in ROTC out of a goal of 31,000, according to a Government Accountability Office report.

Only a rise in soldiers put through the Army’s Officer Candidate School has allowed the service to meet its goal for lieutenants, the GAO report said. OCS is a 14-week course that obligates graduates to two years in the Army. It is expected to reach capacity this year, the GAO said.

“They’re going to have problems with field-grade officers — big shortages,” says Charles Moskos, a military sociologist at Northwestern University in Evanston, Ill. “They’re going to have to limp through.”

The GAO report said officer retention remains a problem for the Army, in part because it “continues to remain heavily involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.” In 2005, 62 percent of West Point graduates stayed beyond their five-year active-duty commitment. That’s as much as 30 percent lower than the rates for Naval and Air Force Academy graduates.

Royally Fucked When Bush Cut Limits On National Guard Deployments:

Double Fucked Because Employers Now Say It's Tougher To Hold Their Civilian Jobs Open For Their Return

Mar 12, 2007 The Associated Press

CLEVELAND — Some employers say they'll have an even tougher time holding jobs open for military reservists and National Guard members now that the military has abandoned its two-year limit on the amount of time citizen-soldiers can be required to spend in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Army reservist Kevin Koehler won a federal lawsuit against PepsiAmericas Inc. that is now under appeal. Koehler, who was a driver for Pepsi's Cincinnati plant, said the company promised to cover the difference between military pay and what he'd be paid by the company during his absences for basic training. The company deposited nearly \$17,000 in his bank account, then took most of it back.

James Moore, representing the company, said the policy was a draft and didn't apply to Koehler's military duty, so the pay was a mistake.

A U.S. District Court judge ruled that Pepsi had violated the Uniformed Services law and ordered payment of double the salary due plus \$50,000. The appeal is pending.

"Someone has to stand up to these big companies and let them know that there are rules and laws that must be followed," Koehler said.

Pissed Anti-War Students Occupy NY City Recruiting Station

12 Mar 2007 Uruj Sheikh, SDS NYC. Contacts: Matt De Vlieger: 954.536.7461 & Uruj Sheikh: 201.407.8670

At noon, Monday, March 12, 2007, nearly 100 students from area universities marched to the armed forces recruiting station on 157 Chambers Street. Twenty-three members of Students for a Democratic Society entered and occupied the recruiting station shutting down recruitment activity for nearly two hours.

Outside dozens more protesters supported those being arrested with chants including, "Troops out now," "No justice, no peace. U.S. out of the Middle East," and "Stop the war. Yes we can. SDS is back again."

Member of Pace University SDS, Uruj Sheikh said, "The fourth anniversary of the occupation of Iraq is in one week. Billions of dollars are being spent and hundreds of thousands have been murdered. Military recruitment has been systematically deceptive

and we as students, as targets of recruitment, say something must be done to stop the war aboard and at home.”

Protester Rakshan Kateeb, sophomore at Pace University said, “The action was successful in that we are building up to the big mobilizing actions at the end of this week and the continued actions that will end this war.”

Visiting on Spring break from the University in Central Florida, SDS member, Matt De Vlieger said, “This demonstration was empowering and necessary. We need to step up our resistance to the war against Iraq and U.S. imperialism. As the war escalates, so does our resistance.” Jessica Rapchik, member from Antioch College SDS in Ohio said, “It was really encouraging to be there locking arms with our brothers and sisters who used civil disobedience for something they believe in.”

Jail solidarity is being held across from New York State court on 100 Centre Street.

IRAQ RESISTANCE ROUNDUP

Assorted Resistance Action

12 Mar 2007 Reuters & By Robert H. Reid, The Associated Press & (VOI)

Two security guards who died Monday in a blast against an Agriculture Ministry convoy in the southeast of the city. The blast against the convoy occurred in the southeastern Baghdad district of Zayouna, killing three security guards and wounding another, officials said.

In northern Iraq, guerrillas killed the director of a government irrigation project, police reported.

An Iraqi army base was attacked on Monday with mortar rounds in the east of Falluja, 45 km west of Baghdad, a security source said.

Three employees from the Iraqi labor and social affairs ministry were captured in the western Baghdad area of al-Mansour on Monday, a ministry source said.

Guerrillas on Monday killed the director of the state-owned water supply company in Badoush, northwest Ninawa province.

Five Iraqi policemen were wounded on Monday when their vehicle came under armed attack in central Baaquba, 57 km northeast of Baghdad.

Four Iraqi policemen were killed on Monday when an explosive charge detonated near their vehicle in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, a police source said

**IF YOU DON'T LIKE THE RESISTANCE
END THE OCCUPATION**

FORWARD OBSERVATIONS

Lessons Unlearned: Vietnam Then, Iraq Now

From GI SPECIAL 3B87

They had never heard of General Gwynn and so did not realize that, in countering an insurgency, the military was fulfilling a police role and had to apply minimum, not maximum, force; nor would they have known of his warning that a lull in guerrilla action is usually a danger sign, not a “victory”.

Unlike the Western battlefield, a rising body count in an insurgency is a danger sign.

The oft-expressed American desire to persuade the Viet Cong “to stand and fight,” a desire inherited from the French, was another pathetic fallacy. These were professional guerrillas who would not stand and fight—except on their own terms.

From: WAR IN THE SHADOWS: THE GUERRILLA IN HISTORY, BY Robert B. Asprey; Captain, USMC, ret'd; William Morrow And Company; New York, 1994

Whatever the President said about guerrilla warfare, these officers, in general, secretly believed that military professionalism would prove more than a match in any battle with “irregulars.” Although, in time, some of the younger advisers would realize this error, the bulk remained convinced that professionalism—by which they meant adherence to Western military doctrines—would *win the war*.

They had never heard of Major Callwell's writings on small wars, so they would never have pondered his sage advice to regard the native as the professional, the newcomer as the amateur.

They had never studied Gallieni's and Lyautey's pacification campaigns. They had never heard of General Gwynn and so did not realize that, in countering an insurgency, the military was fulfilling a police role and had to apply minimum, not maximum, force; nor would they have known of his warning that a lull in guerrilla action is usually a danger sign, not a “victory”.

Lacking suitable background, the American command did not realize that Western-style warfare is quantitative and that insurgency warfare is qualitative. To fight the latter successfully is frequently to reverse normal standards of measurement, just as trick mirrors in an amusement park make a fat person thin and a thin person fat.

From the beginning, the American command erred by trying to use maximum, not minimum, force, and by designating the guerrilla the primary target rather than the population that supported him.

Dead guerrillas became “victories”—enough “victories” would “win” the war.

They did not understand that an insurgency is not “won”—except that it fades into relative quiescence.

Unlike the Western battlefield, a rising body count in an insurgency is a danger sign. So is the necessity for “surprise” encounters, no matter how successfully fought.

Progress is not made in an insurgency situation until local peasants are protected sufficiently and have sufficient reason to support government forces and supply necessary information on which to base operations.

The oft-expressed American desire to persuade the Viet Cong “to stand and fight,” a desire inherited from the French, was another pathetic fallacy. These were professional guerrillas who would not stand and fight—except on their own terms.

The Americans also failed to understand that qualitative warfare calls for careful target selection—that “saturation” of a battle area contains a number of built-in booby traps in an insurgency situation. The more units involved, the more-attenuated the lines of communication, thus the more targets available to the enemy.

Worse than this, saturation of a battle area invariably damaged the peasants’ crops and villages, frequently killing innocent people, thereby alienating the very persons the government needed to “win.”

Military commanders could not understand this. When General Harkins “. . . was asked about the political consequences when villages were hit with napalm, he replied that it ‘really puts the fear of God into the Viet Cong.’ ‘And that,’ he said, ‘is what counts.’”

“Impregably Armored By Good Intentions And Ignorance”

With a few splendid exceptions, American advisers did not understand very much. They came with confidence instead of caution; they taught before they learned. From Nolting on down, too many of them resembled Alden Pyle—Graham Greene’s Quiet American, “. . . who was impregably armored by his good intentions and his ignorance.”

The insurgencies of our time, not to mention those of history, might never have happened. The lessons they furnished weren't so much lost— they were never learned. To accomplish the military goal in Vietnam, to win the war," to achieve "victory," the American military command sought to repair doctrinal deficiencies with machines.

It relied on technology as opposed to motivation, on helicopters and jeeps and trucks and armored personnel carriers, aircraft and ships as opposed to men.

It did precisely what the American military command in China had done nearly twenty years earlier. It attempted to remedy political, social, and economic deficiencies with metal.

The advisers were not at first discouraged because the new technology brought illusory success.

The South Vietnamese Government estimated that the Viet Cong began the year with about sixteen thousand hard-core guerrillas. They estimated that in 1962 they had killed about twenty thousand "guerrillas" (I use quotation marks because we shall never know how many innocents were included in the figure). Yet VC strength, they estimated, had increased to twenty thousand! ". . . At the same time," Roger Hilsman later wrote, "captured documents, interrogation of prisoners, and other intelligence indicated that at the most only three to four thousand infiltrators had come down the Ho Chi Minh trail." The other replacements came from hamlets and villages, and if some arrived under duress, a great many others came freely.

Despite ARVN "victories," the Viet Cong retained control of major areas.

In summer of 1962, this writer flew several missions with U. S. Marine Corps helicopter squadrons operating out of Soc Trang, south of Saigon, the mission being to haul ARVN units to this or that threatened area. Fuel for these machines came from Saigon by tank truck, the Saigon trucker paying the Viet Cong a "toll" in order to pass to Soc Trang.

This meant that at any moment the Viet Cong could prevent marine helicopters from flying. This rarely if ever happened—should it not have occurred to MACV that the effort could scarcely have been hurting the Viet Cong if the choppers were allowed to keep flying?

The fallacy of the new approach was already becoming evident. Initial Viet Cong fright soon turned to bewilderment; analysis followed to produce countertactics. Night operations increased, since helicopters at first did not fly at night.

Assassinations and kidnappings greatly increased, the reasons being to enforce discipline, demonstrate determination, and gain recruits. By spring of 1962, the Viet Cong were beginning to fight back, and, by autumn, were not only pursuing active guerrilla tactics but were standing against ARVN units. Once again, Viet Cong countertactics were immensely aided by intelligence derived from peasant networks that, while on the defensive, were scarcely defunct.

Marines at Soc Trang and American field units elsewhere were living, to use Bernard Fall's term, in a fishbowl, their every movement, their take-off and landing, their resupply, noted and reported by Viet Cong agents.

Static Defense

The new technology did nothing to repair the existing gap between Vietnamese army units and peasants; indeed, helicopter delivery widened the intelligence gap by flying troops over villages and thus eliminating personal contact with the peasants—perhaps a good thing in the case of rapacious army units.

The new vehicles also proved expensive.

Helicopters and armored personnel carriers require large workshop and storage complexes, installations that in Vietnam demanded ground troops to provide security and nonetheless remained vulnerable to guerrilla attack, as did their lines of communication to major supply centers.

Troops so assigned inevitably assumed a static role, to the guerrilla's benefit.

Armor plate and motors did not erase poorly conceived plans. American and Vietnamese planners were trying to strike the enemy all over the place. All too often, these were random strikes, because the commands lacked proper intelligence on which to base specific and profitable operations.

Where good intelligence existed, Viet Cong intelligence frequently countered it. Helicopters and APCs are noisy, and a black-pajama-clad Viet Cong did not take long to ditch his weapon and either commence work in the field or hide along the reeded bank of a nearby canal.

By summer of 1962, frustrated American airmen had begun developing new tactics, for example "eagle flights," whereby helicopters landed a unit in a suspect area. If contact resulted, other, lingering helicopters immediately brought in reinforcements. The poverty of this tactic is too obvious for comment.

Blaming The Reporters

The conflict between Saigon and the field—between wishes and facts—had already produced a chilling corollary: extreme intolerance, on the part of both the Saigon regime and the American mission, of journalists who questioned the validity of allied performance.

In March 1962, Mme. Nhu had begun persuading President Diem to expel three troublemakers, the veteran news correspondents Homer Bigart of the *New York Times*, François Sully of *Newsweek*, and James Robinson of NBC, each of whom was

increasingly harassed by the Saigon government, as were other correspondents who, in Joseph Buttinger's words, were " . . . accused of being part of an international Communist- inspired conspiracy to slander the regime."

"The U.S. mission was anything but forceful in defending these correspondents against abuse and ill-treatment, and almost apologetic in explaining that these men were merely trying to live up to the American concept of a free press. Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., and General Paul Harkins in particular were incensed by the American newsmen's attacks on the regime. . . . They, as well as their superiors in Washington, spoke repeatedly of the "slanted" or even "irresponsible" press reporting out of Saigon, convinced not only that the correspondents who criticized the regime did harm to U.S.- South Vietnamese relations, but also that they were wrong."

Reporters who wrote favorable accounts, among them Marguerite Higgins, Joseph Alsop, and Richard Tregaskis, received comforting little pats for their part in what was rapidly becoming the great deception. The Administration was running scared.

Recruiting for The Resistance, 1960's Style

Lansdale warned that the most urgent function is " . . . to protect and help the people":

*"When the military opens fire at long range, whether by infantry weapons, artillery or air strike, on a reported Viet Cong concentration in a hamlet or village full of civilians, the Vietnamese officers who give those orders and the American advisers who let them "get away with it" are helping defeat the cause of freedom. **The civilian hatred of the military resulting from such actions is a powerful motive for joining the Viet Cong.**"*

On the following day, Ambassador Taylor joined the select group of officials to report on the Vietnam situation. His words could not have been more gloomy. A new civilian government in Saigon was proving no more effective than the former military government, either in the capital or in the provinces. The Viet Cong everywhere had advanced and were threatening to cut the country in half. Despite heavy casualties produced by an increasingly stronger professionally competent ARVN (!), the Viet Cong not only were making good their losses but were adopting new and improved tactics:

"The ability of the Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild their units and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. ... (We find) no plausible explanation of the continued strength of the Viet-Cong if our data on Viet-Cong losses are even approximately correct.

"Not only do the Viet-Cong units have the recuperative powers of the phoenix, but they have an amazing ability to maintain morale. Only in rare cases have we found evidences of bad morale among Viet-Cong prisoners or recorded in captured Viet-Cong documents."

$$2 + 2 = 4$$

“Unlike the Western battlefield, a rising body count in an insurgency is a danger sign.” [Quoted above]

US and Iraqi security forces have killed around 400 suspected militants since the start of a major crackdown in Baghdad, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki says.

February 25, 2007 ABC.AU

Happy Anniversary: March 12, 1912 Women Warriors Win Bread And Roses



IWW organizer Elizabeth Gurley Flynn addresses a strike rally

Carl Bunin Peace History March 12-18

The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) won the Lawrence, Massachusetts, "Bread & Roses" textile strike after 32,000 workers (mostly young female immigrants who spoke twenty-five different languages) stayed out for nine weeks.

They were striking for better pay, a 54-hour workweek and safer working conditions: the equipment was dangerous and the air quality caused lung disease in nearly one-third of the workers before the age of twenty-five.



Bread & Roses victory parade

"Bread and Roses," by James Oppenheimer

**As we go marching, marching, in the beauty of the day,
A million darkened kitchens, a thousand mill lots gray
Are touched with all the radiance that a sudden sun discloses
For the people hear us singing: bread and roses, bread and roses.**

**As we go marching, marching, we battle, too, for men,
For they are women's children and we march with them again.
Our lives shall not be sweated from birth until life closes;
Hearts starve as well bodies; give us bread but give us roses.**

**As we go marching, marching, unnumbered women dead
Go crying through our singing their ancient call for bread.
Small art and love and beauty their drudging spirits knew;
Yes, it is bread we fight for, but we fight for roses, too.**

**As we go marching, marching, we bring the greater days;
The rising of the women means the rising of the race.
No more the drudge and idler, 10 that toil where one reposes,
But a sharing of life's glories: bread and roses, bread and roses.**

January 18, 2002 By ELIZABETH SCHULTE, Socialist Worker

JAMES OPPENHEIMER wrote the song "Bread and Roses" for striking textile workers in Lawrence, Mass.

He took the title from the banners of strikers, who demanded not just decent treatment at work, but the right to dignity and a better quality of life.

The textile bosses in Lawrence had hired women and children because they thought they could pay poverty wages and never face resistance. And they employed

immigrants--who spoke more than 25 different languages--with the aim of keeping workers from uniting and fighting back.

But the bosses were wrong on both counts. More than 20,000 Lawrence workers struck against a 30-cent pay cut in January 1912.

Many workers were lured to Lawrence by advertisements in their home cities--throughout the Balkans and the Mediterranean--showing happy textile workers carrying bags of money home from their jobs. Instead, the new immigrants were greeted with miserable labor at poverty wages.

The strike came as a surprise to bosses, considering that the workers were largely unorganized. Because of its craft orientation and its policy of ignoring immigrant and women workers, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had few locals in the textile industry.

AFL leaders actually opposed the Lawrence strike and by the end of the struggle had sided with the bosses -- denouncing strikers as anarchists and saboteurs. In contrast, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), or Wobblies, saw the Lawrence battle as a key struggle in their strategy of organizing all workers into "One Big Union."

ALTHOUGH THE IWW had been organizing in Lawrence since 1905, at times working with the more conservative AFL unions, they accelerated their campaign when one of the largest mills, Atlantic Cotton, struck against speedups in 1911. The Wobblies sent in some of their best organizers--J.P. Thompson, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Big Bill Haywood, Arturo Giovannitti and Joe Ettor, whose ability to speak six languages was a tremendous asset.

But the backbone of the struggle was the workers of Lawrence themselves. In January 1912, Massachusetts passed labor reform legislation that limited women and children from working more than 54 hours a week. In Lawrence, the typical workweek was 56 hours. But because the law didn't have a provision preserving the two hours' pay, bosses instead decided to use the measure to cut wages.

Local 20, the Italian branch of the IWW, called a meeting on January 10 to discuss what action to take on payday. Some 1,000 workers showed up and voted to call workers on strike as soon as they received the checks.

On January 12, strikers poured out of the mills, some of them forming flying squads to go into factories to bring out other workers. Mill owners ordered their goons to attack workers, hosing them down with freezing water in the subzero January weather. But workers resisted, going into the factories and smashing machinery and windows.

The governor used this as an excuse to call out the National Guard, which joined police on the streets in intimidating workers.

In the course of the struggle, Lawrence workers devised several new and effective strike tactics. One was the mass picket. Instead of small picket lines, Lawrence strikers organized all their forces to block workplaces.

In the face of thousands of workers surrounding a factory, neither the bosses' scabs nor the police could do a thing.

And as they marched, sang and chanted in the thousands, workers built solidarity and a sense of their own power.

Building solidarity among the different immigrant groups--the largest were Italians, Poles, Russians, Syrians and Lithuanians--was critical to the strike's victory.

Questions in the struggle were debated and decisions made in weekly mass meetings attended by thousands of strikers. After each meeting, workers sang the workers' anthem from the Paris Commune, "The Internationale."

Day-to-day decisions were made by a strike committee, which was made up of elected representatives from each of the different language groups.

THE ROLE of women -- wives of strikers and strikers themselves -- was key to the strike's success, and the IWW did everything it could to foster their participation. The Wobblies organized special meetings for women and encouraged them to take on leadership positions.

"The women worked in the mills for lower pay and in addition had all the housework and the care of the children," wrote Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. "The old-world attitude of man as the 'lord and master' was strong. We resolutely set out to combat these notions. The women wanted to picket. We knew that to leave them at home alone, isolated from the strike activity, prey to worry...was dangerous for the strike."

Women proved to be some of the fiercest fighters.

On one occasion, a group of Italian women found a police officer alone on a bridge. They had taken his gun, club and badge and were in the process of removing his pants before throwing him into the water when he was rescued by the cavalry.

"The IWW has been accused of putting the women in the front," wrote Flynn.

"The truth is, the IWW does not keep them in the back, and they go to the front."

So it is no surprise that several women were elected strike committee delegates.

Concrete provisions were made to provide for workers' families. Strikers ran six commissaries and 11 soup kitchens.

And when the Lawrence schools taught strikers' children that their parents were "un-American" for striking, the IWW's Haywood organized meetings for the kids.

When the growing threat of violence from police and company goons made strikers fear for their children's safety, the workers devised a brilliant plan. Strike supporters in other parts of the country--mostly from New York City--were called on to house and care for

the children for the strike's duration. When supporters gathered to meet the Lawrence children at Grand Central Station, it became a huge labor rally.

The strikers forced the mill bosses to settle in March--and won most of their demands. They got pay increases on a sliding scale, with the lowest-paid workers getting 25 percent raises; time and a quarter for overtime; and a guarantee that no striker would be discriminated against.

The victory encouraged a wave of strikes in several New England cities. For example, as soon as Wobblies arrived in Lowell, Mass., mill owners offered workers a 5 percent raise.

The history of this amazing struggle--especially its spirit of solidarity among men and women and between different immigrant groups--remains an inspiration today.

OCCUPATION REPORT

U.S. OCCUPATION RECRUITING DRIVE IN HIGH GEAR; RECRUITING FOR THE ARMED RESISTANCE THAT IS



Iraqi citizens plead with foreign occupation soldiers from U.S. 2nd Platoon Charlie Troop, 3rd Squadron of the 61st Cavalry Regiment not to destroy their belongings. They are

forced at gunpoint to get out of their own home while the foreigners search it, taking away whatever they want.

Iraqi citizens have no right to resist home invasions by occupation soldiers from the USA. If they do, they may be arrested, wounded, or killed. Baghdad March 7, 2007. REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

[Fair is fair. Let's bring 150,000 Iraqi troops over here to the USA. They can kill people at checkpoints, bust into their houses with force and violence, butcher their families, overthrow the government, put a new one in office they like better and call it "sovereign," and "detain" anybody who doesn't like it in some prison without any charges being filed against them, or any trial.]

[Those Iraqis are sure a bunch of backward primitives. They actually resent this help, have the absurd notion that it's bad their country is occupied by a foreign military dictatorship, and consider it their patriotic duty to fight and kill the soldiers sent to grab their country. What a bunch of silly people. How fortunate they are to live under a military dictatorship run by George Bush. Why, how could anybody not love that? You'd want that in your home town, right?]

"In the States, if police burst into your house, kicking down doors and swearing at you, you would call your lawyer and file a lawsuit," said Wood, 42, from Iowa, who did not accompany Halladay's Charlie Company, from his battalion, on Thursday's raid. "Here, there are no lawyers. Their resources are limited, so they plant IEDs (improvised explosive devices) instead."

**OCCUPATION ISN'T LIBERATION
BRING ALL THE TROOPS HOME NOW!**

DANGER: POLITICIANS AT WORK

Top House Democrats Tell Bush He Can Attack Iran Anytime He Wants Without Congressional Approval

[Thanks to Pham Binh, Traveling Soldier, who sent this in. He writes: WOW, THIS IS A NEW LOW FOR THE DEMOCRATS - CAPITULATING ON IRAN AND THE WAR HASN'T EVEN STARTED!]

3.12.07 By DAVID ESPO and MATTHEW LEE, Associated Press Writers

Top House Democrats retreated Monday from an attempt to limit President Bush's authority for taking military action against Iran as the leadership concentrated on a looming confrontation with the White House over the Iraq war.

Officials said Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other members of the leadership had decided to strip from a major military spending bill a requirement for Bush to gain approval from Congress before moving against Iran.

Conservative Democrats as well as lawmakers concerned about the possible impact on Israel had argued for the change in strategy.

The Iran-related proposal stemmed from a desire to make sure Bush did not launch an attack without going to Congress for approval, but drew opposition from numerous members of the rank and file in a series of closed-door sessions last week.

The developments occurred as Democrats pointed toward an initial test vote in the House Appropriations Committee on Thursday on the overall bill, which would require the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq by Sept. 1, 2008, if not earlier.

The White House has issued a veto threat against the bill, and Vice President Dick Cheney attacked its supporters in a speech, declaring they "are telling the enemy simply to watch the clock and wait us out."

Pelosi issued a written statement that said the vice president's remarks prove that "the administration's answer to continuing violence in Iraq is more troops and more treasure from the American people."

The measure provides nearly \$100 billion to pay for fighting in two wars, and includes more money than the president requested for operations in Afghanistan and what Democrats called training and equipment shortages.

[PB: AND PELOSI'S REMARKS PROVE THAT THE DEMOCRATS' ANSWER IS TO GIVE HIM THAT MONEY AND THOSE TROOPS]

Troops Invited:


What do you think? Comments from service men and women, and veterans, are especially welcome. Write to The Military Project, Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657 or send email contact@militaryproject.org:. Name, I.D., withheld unless you request publication. Replies confidential. Same address to unsubscribe.

NEED SOME TRUTH? CHECK OUT TRAVELING SOLDIER

Telling the truth - about the occupation or the criminals running the government in Washington - is the first reason for Traveling Soldier. But we want to do more

than tell the truth; we want to report on the resistance - whether it's in the streets of Baghdad, New York, or inside the armed forces. Our goal is for Traveling Soldier to become the thread that ties working-class people inside the armed services together. We want this newsletter to be a weapon to help you organize resistance within the armed forces. If you like what you've read, we hope that you'll join with us in building a network of active duty organizers.

<http://www.traveling-soldier.org/> And join with Iraq War vets in the call to end the occupation and bring our troops home now! (www.ivaw.org/)



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