

## GI SPECIAL 7C23:

Uncle Sucker

THE PRESIDENT SAYS  
WE CAN'T GOVERN  
FROM ANGER...



HE'S RIGHT.  
AND I AM  
NOT ANGRY  
ANY MORE.



TRY WHITE HOT  
BOILING  
RAGE!



HELL,  
I PASSED  
"ANGER"  
A YEAR  
AGO...



**Just One More Betrayal:  
[Big Surprise]  
Obama Regime Breaking U.S.  
Troop Withdrawal Agreement;  
General Says U.S. Combat Troops To  
Stay In Key Cities;  
Fighting Will Go On In Mosul, Baquba,  
And Basra After June 30 Deadline For  
Getting Out Of Urban Areas**

March 27, 2009 By Jane Arraf, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor  
[Excerpts]

Some troops are preparing to go home and others have pulled back from outposts to bases.

But the planned pullback [**notice how a signed agreement with the Iraqi government suddenly gets demoted to a “planned pullback”**] of American soldiers from all Iraqi cities by the end of June will probably not be fully met. [

Senior military commanders say US troops will also likely stay on in the southern city of Basra.

“In Mosul and Diyala (Province), as we do a combined or joint assessment of the situation on the ground, I have every expectation that both sides will say we need to stay with this a little bit longer until this improves,” says Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, echoing sentiments of Iraqi officials concerned about ongoing fighting in those areas.

But he and other senior officers voiced concern that counterinsurgency practices, which have helped stabilize Iraq over the past year by protecting the Iraqi population and dismantling support for the insurgency, might fall by the wayside once US forces withdraw.

Despite gains made in developing the Iraqi Army, US and Iraqi officials say a priority is replacing soldiers in major cities with a competent police force.

Austin says he believes that Iraqi authorities will ask the US to keep troops in Baquba, the capital of Diyala Province, and the city of Mosul, where there is still fighting.

Some US officials have also held open the prospect that American troops, who are replacing withdrawing British forces, would be asked to stay in Basra, where most of the police quit or were fired when the Iraqi Army arrived last spring.

**POLITICIANS CAN'T BE COUNTED ON TO HALT  
THE BLOODSHED**

**THE TROOPS HAVE THE POWER TO STOP THE  
WARS**

**IRAQ WAR REPORTS**

# Fort Drum Soldier Dies At Walter Reed Of Iraq Wounds

Mar 27, 2009 The Associated Press

FORT DRUM, N.Y. — The Army says a 10th Mountain Division soldier recovering from combat wounds has died.

Spc. Justin Antisdell, of Easley, S.C., died Sunday at Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, D.C.

The 25-year-old rifleman had been at Walter Reed since February 2008. He was wounded in Iraq while deployed with the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team.

Antisdell joined the Army in September 2005. After training at Fort Benning, Ga., he was assigned to Camp Casey in South Korea. He was assigned to Fort Drum in January 2007.

Antisdell is survived by his wife and son.

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## **“Militias And Sunni Insurgents Are Reorganizing In Parts Of Baghdad And Its Outskirts And In Basra” “They’re All Waiting For The Americans To Leave,” Abbas Said**

March 27, 2009 By Anthony Shadid, Washington Post Foreign Service [Excerpts]

BAGHDAD, March 26 -- There was a numbed moment Thursday, the interregnum between an attack and its carnage. Then the anger unfurled, as survivors took stock of a car rigged with explosives that had detonated in a market crowded with women and children in northern Baghdad, killing 16 people and wounding dozens more.

“All of this is your fault!” Sgt. Ali Abbas, one of the policemen who arrived at the scene, recalled women shouting at him and his colleagues.

Amid the panic of survivors and the screams of the wounded, elderly women threw sandals at them, he said. Others spat at the police officers and shouted insults.

His face sweaty, a teenager glared at an American soldier passing him.

“Where were you, mister?” he asked in Arabic.

The soldier, not understanding, looked straight ahead.

Some police and Interior Ministry officials have warned that Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents are reorganizing in parts of Baghdad and its outskirts and in Basra.

“They’re all waiting for the Americans to leave,” Abbas said.

**MORE:**

## ***Lessons Unlearned:*** **“A Lull In Guerrilla Action Is Usually A Danger Sign, Not A Victory”** **[Vietnam Then, Iraq Now]**

They had never heard of General Gwynn and so did not realize that, in countering an insurgency, the military was fulfilling a police role and had to apply minimum, not maximum, force; nor would they have known of his warning that a lull in guerrilla action is usually a danger sign, not a “victory”.

The oft-expressed American desire to persuade the Viet Cong “to stand and fight,” a desire inherited from the French, was another pathetic fallacy. These were professional guerrillas who would not stand and fight — except on their own terms.

**From: WAR IN THE SHADOWS: THE GUERRILLA IN HISTORY, BY Robert B. Asprey; Captain, USMC, ret’d; William Morrow And Company; New York, 1994**

**Whatever the President said about guerrilla warfare, these officers, in general, secretly believed that military professionalism would prove more than a match in any battle with “irregulars.”** Although, in time, some of the younger advisers would realize this error, the bulk remained convinced that professionalism—by which they meant adherence to Western military doctrines—would *win the war*.

They had never heard of Major Callwell's writings on small wars, so they would never have pondered his sage advice to regard the native as the professional, the newcomer as the amateur.

**They had never studied Gallieni’s and Lyautey’s pacification campaigns. They had never heard of General Gwynn and so did not realize that, in countering an insurgency, the military was fulfilling a police role and had to apply minimum, not maximum, force; nor would they have known of his warning that a lull in guerrilla action is usually a danger sign, not a “victory”.**

**Lacking suitable background, the American command did not realize that Western-style warfare is quantitative and that insurgency warfare is qualitative.** To fight the latter successfully is frequently to reverse normal standards of measurement, just as trick mirrors in an amusement park make a fat person thin and a thin person fat.

**From the beginning, the American command erred by trying to use maximum, not minimum, force, and by designating the guerrilla the primary target rather than the population that supported him.**

**Dead guerrillas became “victories”—enough “victories” would “win” the war.**

**They did not understand that an insurgency is not “won”—except that it fades into relative quiescence.**

**Unlike the Western battlefield, a rising body count in an insurgency is a danger sign.** So is the necessity for “surprise” encounters, no matter how successfully fought.

Progress is not made in an insurgency situation until local peasants are protected sufficiently and have sufficient reason to support government forces and supply necessary information on which to base operations.

**The oft-expressed American desire to persuade the Viet Cong “to stand and fight,” a desire inherited from the French, was another pathetic fallacy. These were professional guerrillas who would not stand and fight—except on their own terms.**

**The Americans also failed to understand that qualitative warfare calls for careful target selection—that “saturation” of a battle area contains a number of built-in booby traps in an insurgency situation. The more units involved, the more-attenuated the lines of communication, thus the more targets available to the enemy.**

Worse than this, saturation of a battle area invariably damaged the peasants’ crops and villages, frequently killing innocent people, thereby alienating the very persons the government needed to “win.”

Military commanders could not understand this. When General Harkins “. . . was asked about the political consequences when villages were hit with napalm, he replied that it ‘really puts the fear of God into the Viet Cong.’ ‘And that,’ he said, ‘is what counts.’”

### **“Impregably Armored By Good Intentions And Ignorance”**

With a few splendid exceptions, American advisers did not understand very much. They came with confidence instead of caution; they taught before they learned. From Nolting on down, too many of them resembled Alden Pyle—Graham Greene’s Quiet American, “. . . who was impregably armored by his good intentions and his ignorance.”

**The insurgencies of our time, not to mention those of history, might never have happened. The lessons they furnished weren’t so much lost— they were never**

**learned. To accomplish the military goal in Vietnam, to win the war,” to achieve “victory,” the American military command sought to repair doctrinal deficiencies with machines.**

**It relied on technology as opposed to motivation, on helicopters and jeeps and trucks and armored personnel carriers, aircraft and ships as opposed to men.**

**It did precisely what the American military command in China had done nearly twenty years earlier. It attempted to remedy political, social, and economic deficiencies with metal.**

The advisers were not at first discouraged because the new technology brought illusory success.

The South Vietnamese Government estimated that the Viet Cong began the year with about sixteen thousand hard-core guerrillas. They estimated that in 1962 they had killed about twenty thousand “guerrillas” (I use quotation marks because we shall never know how many innocents were included in the figure). Yet VC strength, they estimated, had increased to twenty thousand!” . . . At the same time,” Roger Hilsman later wrote, “captured documents, interrogation of prisoners, and other intelligence indicated that at the most only three to four thousand infiltrators had come down the Ho Chi Minh trail.” The other replacements came from hamlets and villages, and if some arrived under duress, a great many others came freely.

Despite ARVN “victories,” the Viet Cong retained control of major areas.

**In summer of 1962, this writer flew several missions with U. S. Marine Corps helicopter squadrons operating out of Soc Trang, south of Saigon, the mission being to haul ARVN units to this or that threatened area. Fuel for these machines came from Saigon by tank truck, the Saigon trucker paying the Viet Cong a “toll” in order to pass to Soc Trang.**

**This meant that at any moment the Viet Cong could prevent marine helicopters from flying. This rarely if ever happened—should it not have occurred to MACV that the effort could scarcely have been hurting the Viet Cong if the choppers were allowed to keep flying?**

The fallacy of the new approach was already becoming evident. Initial Viet Cong fright soon turned to bewilderment; analysis followed to produce countertactics. Night operations increased, since helicopters at first did not fly at night.

**Assassinations and kidnappings greatly increased, the reasons being to enforce discipline, demonstrate determination, and gain recruits.** By spring of 1962, the Viet Cong were beginning to fight back, and, by autumn, were not only pursuing active guerrilla tactics but were standing against ARVN units. Once again, Viet Cong countertactics were immensely aided by intelligence derived from peasant networks that, while on the defensive, were scarcely defunct.

**Marines at Soc Trang and American field units elsewhere were living, to use Bernard Fall’s term, in a fishbowl, their every movement, their take-off and landing, their resupply, noted and reported by Viet Cong agents.**

## Static Defense

The new technology did nothing to repair the existing gap between Vietnamese army units and peasants; indeed, helicopter delivery widened the intelligence gap by flying troops over villages and thus eliminating personal contact with the peasants—perhaps a good thing in the case of rapacious army units.

The new vehicles also proved expensive.

**Helicopters and armored personnel carriers require large workshop and storage complexes, installations that in Vietnam demanded ground troops to provide security and nonetheless remained vulnerable to guerrilla attack, as did their lines of communication to major supply centers.**

**Troops so assigned inevitably assumed a static role, to the guerrilla's benefit.**

Armor plate and motors did not erase poorly conceived plans. American and Vietnamese planners were trying to strike the enemy all over the place. All too often, these were random strikes, because the commands lacked proper intelligence on which to base specific and profitable operations.

**Where good intelligence existed, Viet Cong intelligence frequently countered it. Helicopters and APCs are noisy, and a black-pajama-clad Viet Cong did not take long to ditch his weapon and either commence work in the field or hide along the reeded bank of a nearby canal.**

**By summer of 1962, frustrated American airmen had begun developing new tactics, for example "eagle flights," whereby helicopters landed a unit in a suspect area. If contact resulted, other, lingering helicopters immediately brought in reinforcements. The poverty of this tactic is too obvious for comment.**

## Blaming The Reporters

**The conflict between Saigon and the field—between wishes and facts—had already produced a chilling corollary: extreme intolerance, on the part of both the Saigon regime and the American mission, of journalists who questioned the validity of allied performance.**

In March 1962, Mme. Nhu had begun persuading President Diem to expel three troublemakers, the veteran news correspondents Homer Bigart of the *New York Times*, François Sully of *Newsweek*, and James Robinson of NBC, each of whom was increasingly harassed by the Saigon government, as were other correspondents who, in Joseph Buttinger's words, were ". . . accused of being part of an international Communist- inspired conspiracy to slander the regime."

*"The U.S. mission was anything but forceful in defending these correspondents against abuse and ill-treatment, and almost apologetic in explaining that these men were merely*

*trying to live up to the American concept of a free press. Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., and General Paul Harkins in particular were incensed by the American newsmen's attacks on the regime. . . . They, as well as their superiors in Washington, spoke repeatedly of the "slanted" or even "irresponsible" press reporting out of Saigon, convinced not only that the correspondents who criticized the regime did harm to U.S.-South Vietnamese relations, but also that they were wrong."*

**Reporters who wrote favorable accounts, among them Marguerite Higgins, Joseph Alsop, and Richard Tregaskis, received comforting little pats for their part in what was rapidly becoming the great deception. The Administration was running scared.**

## **Recruiting for The Resistance, 1960's Style**

Lansdale warned that the most urgent function is ". . . to protect and help the people":

**"When the military opens fire at long range, whether by infantry weapons, artillery or air strike, on a reported Viet Cong concentration in a hamlet or village full of civilians, the Vietnamese officers who give those orders and the American advisers who let them "get away with it" are helping defeat the cause of freedom.**

**"The civilian hatred of the military resulting from such actions is a powerful motive for joining the Viet Cong."**

**On the following day, Ambassador Taylor joined the select group of officials to report on the Vietnam situation. His words could not have been more gloomy. A new civilian government in Saigon was proving no more effective than the former military government, either in the capital or in the provinces. The Viet Cong everywhere had advanced and were threatening to cut the country in half. Despite heavy casualties produced by an increasingly stronger professionally competent ARVN, the Viet Cong not only were making good their losses but were adopting new and improved tactics:**

**"The ability of the Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild their units and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. ... (We find) no plausible explanation of the continued strength of the Viet-Cong if our data on Viet-Cong losses are even approximately correct.**

**"Not only do the Viet-Cong units have the recuperative powers of the phoenix, but they have an amazing ability to maintain morale. Only in rare cases have we found evidences of bad morale among Viet-Cong prisoners or recorded in captured Viet-Cong documents."**

### **Troops Invited:**

**Comments, arguments, articles, and letters from service men and women, and veterans, are especially welcome. Write to Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657 or send email**



[contact@militaryproject.org](mailto:contact@militaryproject.org): Name, I.D., withheld unless you request publication. Same address to unsubscribe. Phone: 917.677.8057

## **ENOUGH OF THIS SHIT; ALL HOME NOW**



An engineer from the 225th Engineer Brigade levels concrete mix for the 6th Iraqi Army Engineer Regiment during a training session at Al Muthana Airfield in Baghdad March 4, 2009. Fixing drains and filling in potholes are not classic military tasks.  
REUTERS/Sgt.Rebekah Malone/U.S.Army/Handout

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## **AFGHANISTAN WAR REPORTS**

# **Pashtu Leadership Unites To Fight U.S. Occupation; “New, Younger Commanders Have Been Preparing To Step Up A Campaign Of Roadside Bombings**

# **And Attacks To Greet The Americans”**

## **“In Confident Spirits, The Fighters Predicted That 2009 Was Going To Be A ‘Very Bloody’ Year”**



Pakistanis attended a funeral for a victim of a United States missile attack just outside the North Waziristan region. European Pressphoto Agency

[Substitute “Pashtu nationalist” for “Taliban,” and it’s possible to understand what is being written about. T]

March 26, 2009 By CARLOTTA GALL, New York Times [Excerpts]

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — After agreeing to bury their differences and unite forces, Taliban leaders based in Pakistan have closed ranks with their Afghan comrades to ready a new offensive in Afghanistan as the United States prepares to send 17,000 more troops there this year.

In interviews, several Taliban fighters based in the border region said preparations for the anticipated influx of American troops were already being made. A number of new, younger commanders have been preparing to step up a campaign of roadside bombings and attacks to greet the Americans, the fighters said.

The reformed alliance was forged after the reclusive Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, sent emissaries to persuade Pakistani Taliban leaders to join forces and turn their attention to Afghanistan, Pakistani officials and Taliban members said.

The Pakistani Taliban, an offspring of the Afghan Taliban, are led by veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan who come from the border regions. They have always supported the fight against foreign forces in Afghanistan by supplying fighters, training and logistical aid.

The new Taliban alliance has raised concern in Afghanistan, where NATO generals warn that the conflict will worsen this year.

Mullah Omar dispatched a six-member team to Waziristan in late December and early January, several Taliban fighters said in interviews in Dera Ismail Khan, a town in North-West Frontier Province that is not far from South Waziristan. The Afghan Taliban delegation urged the Pakistani Taliban leaders to settle their internal differences, scale down their activities in Pakistan and help counter the planned increase of American forces in Afghanistan, the fighters said.

The three Pakistani Taliban leaders agreed.

In February, they formed a united council, or shura, called the Council of United Mujahedeen.

In a printed statement the leaders vowed to put aside their disputes and focus on fighting American-led forces in Afghanistan.

The mujahedeen should unite as the “enemies” have united behind the leadership of President Obama, it said. “The mujahedeen should put aside their own differences for the sake of God, God’s happiness, for the strength of religion, and to bring dishonor on the infidels.” The Taliban fighters interviewed said that the top commanders removed a number of older commanders and appointed younger commanders who were good fighters to prepare for operations in Afghanistan in the coming weeks.

In confident spirits, the Taliban fighters predicted that 2009 was going to be a “very bloody” year.

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## **No New Troop Promise From Australian Prime Minister**

3.25.09 USA Today

Australia is committed to keeping Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist haven, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd said after meeting with President Barack Obama, but he did not commit to sending more troops there.

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## **“Dozens” Of Militants Attack Afghan Occupation Supply Terminal In Pakistan**



Workers of Farhad transport terminal examine a burnt room after rockets attack by militants on the outskirts of Peshawar, Pakistan, March 28, 2009. (AP Photo/Mohammad Sajjad)

28 March 2009 By Riaz Khan, Associated Press

Dozens of suspected militants fired rockets early today at a transport terminal in northwest Pakistan that is used to ship supplies to NATO troops based in Afghanistan, police said.

At least 12 shipping containers were damaged in the attack at the Farhad terminal in Peshawar, capital of troubled North West Frontier Province, local police official Zahur Khan told The Associated Press.

He said police opened fire at the insurgents but they managed to flee.

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## **Canadian Prime Minister Says Resistance Will Never Be Defeated**

March 2, 2009 The Washington Times

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper said Sunday that the insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be defeated and Canada would not provide more troops without a clear exit strategy.

Mr. Harper said in a CNN interview that Afghanistan needs an indigenous government that can manage the insurgency and is not perceived as foreign-installed.

“We are not going to win this war just by staying,” Mr. Harper said. “My own judgment is, quite frankly, that we are not going to ever defeat the insurgency.”

**IF YOU DON'T LIKE THE RESISTANCE  
END THE OCCUPATION**

## **Top U.S. General Admits He Is Clueless As To Military Situation In Afghanistan**

Mar 25, 2009 By Andrew Gray, WASHINGTON (Reuters)

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - NATO has no reliable way to assess its performance in the war in Afghanistan even as the United States prepares to announce the results of an Afghan strategy review, the alliance's top commander, U.S. Army General John Craddock said on Tuesday.

Craddock said his headquarters had tried to find ways to measure factors, such as security and the effectiveness of Afghan authorities, but the task had proven “overwhelming”.

“Right now, our assessments of progress are anecdotal and they vary daily, weekly, with whoever makes the observation and where they are making them,” Craddock told a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“We have to find a metric that tells us whether or not more or less of the country is secure,” Craddock said.

“Right now, it's based upon incidents,” he said. “Gunfire in a bazaar counts the same as a suicide bomber killing 13 people. That's not correct.”

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## **When He Was A General In Command, Obama's Choice For Ambassador To Afghanistan**

**Fucked Up Everything He  
Touched:  
“Eikenberry Failed To Provide Full  
And Unfettered Access To  
Information And Locations For A  
DoD Team To Conduct A Full  
Audit And Inspection”  
“Waste And Disunity Within The U.S.  
Mission”  
“\$5 Billion In Previously Appropriated  
Aid Has Not Been Fully Spent, Money  
Meant For Short-Term Humanitarian  
Projects Was Diverted To Road Building  
And Afghan Police Received Inadequate  
Training”**

**When an independent audit of CERP funds was attempted by the Defense Department in 2006, the two officials said, the auditors weren't given full access to review all projects, even though a July 2005 memo from the Pentagon comptroller's office had required all officials to "cooperate fully with any review, audit or investigation" by U.S. authorities.**

March 25, 2009 Jason Motlagh, Washington Times [Excerpts]

As the U.S. prepares to send more money and troops to Afghanistan, investigators are reviewing why \$5 billion in previously appropriated aid has not been fully spent, how money meant for short-term humanitarian projects was diverted to road building and why Afghan police received inadequate training.

U.S. personnel involved in oversight, Afghan officials and documents made available to The Washington Times show that the problems began or intensified from 2005 to 2007, when Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry - President Obama's choice to be the next U.S.

ambassador to Afghanistan - commanded U.S. and NATO forces in the country. Gen. Eikenberry faces confirmation hearings on Thursday.

According to interviews and documents reviewed by the Times:

- Of \$32 billion in aid appropriated for Afghanistan, \$5.625 billion has not been fully disbursed. The problem of “unexpended” funds rose sharply after 2005, according to a SIGAR report to Congress in January.
- Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, are supposed to be used by the military to fund short-term projects such as clinics, were diverted to road building and other long-term capital spending. Of \$700 million in CERP funds, only \$3 million has been audited.
- Afghan police were trained for paramilitary rather than law enforcement duties, and figures were inflated for those capably trained and on active duty. Afghan specialists have said repeatedly that one reason for the resurgence of the Taliban is the fact that Afghan police are corrupt and do not pursue criminals.
- Gen. Eikenberry in 2006 failed to provide full and unfettered access to information and locations for a Defense Department team to conduct a full audit and inspection of some projects.

Former and currently serving U.S. officials said U.S. efforts to win popular support were hampered by the diversion of resources to Iraq and made worse from 2005 to 2007 by waste and disunity within the U.S. mission.

Army Col. David Lamm, chief of staff to Lt. Gen. David Barno, Gen. Eikenberry’s predecessor, said the team in the country had been “tight knit” and centered around an interagency working group at the embassy compound, where Gen. Barno lived along with the U.S. ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad. Regular meetings with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his Cabinet were held to decide on development projects aimed at winning hearts and minds, Col. Lamm said.

He said interagency relations started to fray soon after Gen. Eikenberry and Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann arrived.

Two months after arriving, Gen. Eikenberry moved out of the compound. The responsibilities of the Embassy Interagency Planning Group and the Interagency Resources Cell - units designed to assure integration and monitoring of projects - were abridged and later phased out, said two U.S. officials who remain involved with operational issues and financial oversight.

They spoke only on the condition of anonymity because of concerns of about retribution.

This shift in protocol upset Afghan officials presiding over a fragile government amid a gathering insurgency, Col. Lamm said.

“People saw the U.S. military going its own way,” he said.

Started in Iraq to provide junior officers with authority to spend money quickly on small, high-impact projects, the CERP program was designed to complement the work of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

However, under Gen. Eikenberry, roads became a focal point.

**At one point, said a senior military officer who served under Gen. Eikenberry, road projects accounted for nearly 70 percent of CERP funding, exceeding the capacity of the Army Corps of Engineers and leading to an 18-month backlog.**

**The officer asked not to be named to avoid prejudicing his career.**

In an Oct. 2005 memo obtained by The Times, Gen. Eikenberry informed his staff that “CERP will shift focus from projects to programs [systems]; higher capital program packages to build more capacity [i.e. roads program. I will retain flexibility throughout the fiscal year to shift funds as necessary.]”

In June 2006, Gen. Eikenberry testified before the House Armed Services Committee that better access to markets created more income for Afghan farmers and an alternative to growing opium poppies.

**However, then-acting USAID Administrator James Kunder told the same hearing that the roads being built generally did not help farmers because there were not sufficient markets for them to sell their goods.**

**Mr. Neumann said it was wrong to suggest that they were building roads to nowhere, since “in many cases, markets don’t exist until you have roads to get to them.”**

“I totally believe roads and power were the most important things we could do in Afghanistan,” he said. “As General Eikenberry has repeatedly said, ‘Where the roads stop, the Taliban begin.’ “

Mr. Neumann conceded that the Corps of Engineers at times became overextended, but he added, “So did everyone else.”

**About this time, Afghan Health Minister Mohammad Amin Fatemi was told that no funds were available for urgent humanitarian needs, ministry officials said.**

**A series of high-profile projects promised by Ambassador Khalilzad, such as an agricultural school, were canceled, the two U.S. officials said.**

**They said a burn unit built with CERP funds in Herat did not get sufficient funding to be sustainable.**

At the end of last year, money spent under CERP exceeded \$700 million, according to the U.S. Embassy.

**The huge sums opened the program to allegations of waste and abuse.**



**For example, the commander of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in eastern Afghanistan told a local governor: “I have \$20 million to spend. What would you like me to do with it?” The comment was included in a field report given to one of the two U.S. officials by a Defense Department inspector.**

**In another instance, a former PRT commander in the eastern province of Ghazni used millions of dollars in CERP funds to begin building an airport in an area where one already existed.**

**When an independent audit of CERP funds was attempted by the Defense Department in 2006, the two officials said, the auditors weren’t given full access to review all projects, even though a July 2005 memo from the Pentagon comptroller’s office had required all officials to “cooperate fully with any review, audit or investigation” by U.S. authorities.**

**The two officials said that only \$3 million in projects was audited, and that of that amount, nearly \$1.7 million went for activities outside the original scope of the program.**

The U.S. also struggled to build a functioning police force.

Instead of creating a community-based force to handle everyday law enforcement, U.S. authorities shaped the police into a paramilitary outfit that attempts to fill gaps in the U.S.-led coalition but lacks the training or pay to fight insurgents successfully, according to interviews.

“A narrow focus on counterterrorism in the post-Taliban period led to over-securitization of the rule of law despite the fact that the establishment of the rule of law is the key to winning the people in post-conflict environments,” said Ali Jalali, Afghan interior minister from 2003 through 2005.

**“This led to building the police as a counterinsurgency force. Instead of police protecting the population, they were pushed to fight insurgents. This subordinated the rule of law to operational security tasks,” Mr. Jalali said.**

He added that “the push for quick training and equipping police forces in large numbers thwarted police capacity both as a law enforcement agent and as a counterinsurgency force. The inadequately trained, lightly equipped, poorly paid and badly led police forces deployed in small numbers in remote areas were extremely vulnerable to attacks by well-armed insurgents, causing heavy losses to the force. The neglect turned the police into an incompetent and corrupt force, driving the people away from the government.”

Underarmed and exposed, the police continue to bear the brunt of Taliban attacks, according to the Afghan Interior Ministry, which recorded nearly 1,200 insurgency-related police deaths last year.

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**TROOP NEWS**

# 200 From 844<sup>th</sup> Off To The Obama's Imperial Slaughterhouse

Mar 26, 2009 The Associated Press

KNOXVILLE, Tenn. — More than 200 members of the Army Reserve 844th Engineer Battalion are heading for another deployment to Iraq.

Members of the Knoxville-based unit boarded buses Thursday morning to carry them to Fort McCoy, Wis., to be trained.

The Knoxville News Sentinel quoted Chief Warrant Officer Pat Harvel of Athens, Ga., saying members come from Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, North Carolina and Georgia.

The 844th was deployed to Iraq earlier, arriving home in time for Christmas in 2005 after more than a year overseas.

The heavy-construction unit specializes in road building and other infrastructure work.

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## **Wounded Soldiers Tell Army Secretary Combat Duty Would Be Better Than Abuse They Get At Fort Bragg:**

**“Low Morale And Suicides Pushed By (A) Negative Command Climate”**  
**“They Accused The Unit’s Officers Of Being Indifferent To Their Medical Needs And Punishing Them For Actions That Stem From Their Injuries”**

Mar 24, 2009 By Kevin Maurer, The Associated Press

FORT BRAGG, N.C. — Soldiers in a recovery unit for wounded troops at Fort Bragg told the Secretary of the Army that they feel forgotten by the military and that combat duty

would be better than the treatment they get now, according to a memo obtained by the Associated Press.

The memo summarized the comments of soldiers who attended a closed-door meeting last week with Army Secretary Pete Geren. It was held after the service said it would look into complaints of overzealous discipline reported by The Associated Press.

Some of the soldiers told Geren they have “feelings of worthlessness and abandonment,” the memo states.

They told Geren that low morale and suicides in the base’s Warrior Transition battalion are “pushed by (a) negative command climate” that is enforced by the unit’s squad leaders.

“If I had been in the (unit) after I was wounded the first time, I would not have fought so hard to stay in,” one soldier told Geren, according to the memo. “It is very demoralizing and a very different experience from my previous recuperation.”

The comments to Geren mirror those of a dozen current and former soldiers interviewed by the AP about their time in Fort Bragg’s unit.

**They accused the unit’s officers of being indifferent to their medical needs and punishing them for actions that stem from their injuries.**

“Combat was preferable to the (unit) and the platoon level chain of command ... were poorly trained and not earning their special pay to pay close attention to each (soldier’s) case and their progress to transition,” the memo states.

**The soldiers at the meeting told Geren that troops with post-traumatic stress disorder are made fun of, those given electronic memory aides are held to a higher standard, and the unit has become a dumping ground for soldiers at Fort Bragg suffering from drug abuse problems.**

Other complaints included issues regarding pay, lost paperwork and the lack of opportunity for promotion.

None of the soldiers that met with Geren were identified by name, but the memo said all had been assigned to the Warrior Transition system for at least 10 months.

The memo was obtained from a person at Fort Bragg who requested anonymity because the unit’s discipline record is being reviewed.

**At the end of his meeting with the soldiers, Geren asked three “survey” questions on a scale of one to three, with three being the best. The majority of soldiers present gave the unit’s chain of command and platoon leadership a 2 or 1 and rated morale “overwhelmingly low.”**

Only educational opportunities got a three rating.

## **DO YOU HAVE A FRIEND OR RELATIVE IN THE MILITARY?**

**Forward GI Special along, or send us the address if you wish and we'll send it regularly. Whether in Iraq or stuck on a base in the USA, this is extra important for your service friend, too often cut off from access to encouraging news of growing resistance to the wars, inside the armed services and at home. Send email requests to address up top or write to: The Military Project, Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657. Phone: 917.677.8057**

## **Bad Economy No Problem: War Profiteer's Profits Go Up And Up**

March 26, 2009 by Tucker Echols, Staff Reporter, Washington Business Journal & Washington Post

SAIC, a San Diego-based defense contractor with significant operations in the Washington region, said its fiscal fourth-quarter profit rose 21 percent, to \$120 million, from \$99 million in the comparable period a year earlier, as a number of military contracts helped offset weakness in its commercial business, capping a year of growth that saw annual sales top \$10 billion for the first time.

SAIC reported Wednesday that its fiscal year 2009 fourth quarter net income was \$120 million, or \$0.30 per diluted share, compared to \$90 million, or 24 cents per diluted share, in the year ago period.

For the fiscal year, net income was \$452 million, or \$1.12 per diluted share, compared to \$416 million, or \$1 per diluted share, in fiscal 2008. Fiscal year 2009 ended January 31, 2009.

Revenues in the fiscal fourth quarter rose 8 percent to \$2.52 billion and for the fiscal year, revenues increased 13 percent to \$10.07 billion.

**SAIC credited growth in its logistics, information collection and security, and defense I-T sectors for offsetting weakness in its commercial business.**

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## **V.A. Fucks Up Again: "Thousands Of Military Veterans Across The South Are Waiting To**

# Find Out If They Were Exposed To Infectious Diseases” “Why Haven’t I Been Notified Within Five Years?”

**Veterans Affairs officials won’t say if mistakes that may have exposed patients to infections at medical centers in Tennessee and Florida and a clinic in Georgia have been discovered elsewhere.**

Mar 27, 2009 By Bill Poovey - The Associated Press [Excerpts]

CHATTANOOGA, Tenn. — Thousands of military veterans across the South are waiting to find out if they were exposed to infectious diseases by government clinics that performed colonoscopies and other procedures with equipment that wasn’t properly sterilized.

**Veterans Affairs officials won’t say if mistakes that may have exposed patients to infections at medical centers in Tennessee and Florida and a clinic in Georgia have been discovered elsewhere.**

The VA recently warned veterans who had colonoscopies as far back as five years ago at its hospitals in Murfreesboro, Tenn., and Miami that they may have been exposed to the body fluids of other patients and should undergo tests to make sure they haven’t contracted serious illnesses.

“What if you had to worry about giving your wife AIDS?” said 52-year-old Wayne Craig, a Navy veteran who lives in Elora and had a colonoscopy at the VA’s Alvin C. York Medical Center in Murfreesboro, near Nashville, about five years ago.

**“Why haven’t I been notified within five years?”**

The VA declined to answer four Associated Press requests over the past week about the results of what the department described as a nationwide procedure and training review that was to end March 14.

The review of all VA medical centers and outpatient clinics followed reports in February that the department discovered “improperly reprocessed” endoscopic equipment used for colonoscopies in Murfreesboro and ear, nose and throat exams in Augusta, Ga.

Just this week, the VA acknowledged problems at a facility in Miami, too.

Veteran Gary Simpson, 57, of Spring City had a colonoscopy at the Murfreesboro clinic in 2007. He said his blood has tested negative for HIV and hepatitis, but he’s still worried because a nurse told him some diseases don’t show up for seven years.

“He talks about it every day,” said his wife, Janice. “It has really messed with him a lot. It is just too disturbing.”

Nashville lawyer Mike Sheppard said his firm is preparing to file claims on behalf of up to 15 colonoscopy patients, including several who have since tested positive for hepatitis B.

He said an elderly man who had cancer when he had a colonoscopy died shortly afterward.

“We are investigating the death,” Sheppard said.

The VA has now sent letters advising 3,260 patients who had colonoscopies between May 2004 and March 12 at the Miami Veterans Affairs Healthcare System that they also should get tests for HIV, hepatitis and other infectious diseases.

That revelation prompted two Florida lawmakers to demand an investigation by the VA Office of Inspector General.

**The VA has declined an AP request for an explanation of why the time periods during which exposure could have occurred varied at the three locations.**

**Janice Simpson said an employee in U.S. Rep. Zach Wamp’s office in Chattanooga told her that the blood test notices sent to colonoscopy patients of the Murfreesboro clinic were timed to the date of a procedure on a patient with AIDS.**

The VA letter to Craig said he “could have been exposed to body fluids from a previous patient.” Craig said his follow-up test did not show any infection. He said he thinks the VA was saving money by not cleaning the tubing between its use on each patient.

## **NEED SOME TRUTH? CHECK OUT TRAVELING SOLDIER**

**Telling the truth - about the occupations or the criminals running the government in Washington - is the first reason for Traveling Soldier. But we want to do more than tell the truth; we want to report on the resistance to Imperial wars inside the armed forces.**

**Our goal is for Traveling Soldier to become the thread that ties working-class people inside the armed services together. We want this newsletter to be a weapon to help you organize resistance within the armed forces.**

**If you like what you’ve read, we hope that you’ll join with us in building a network of active duty organizers. <http://www.traveling-soldier.org/> And join with Iraq Veterans Against the War to end the occupations and bring all troops home now! ([www.ivaw.org/](http://www.ivaw.org/))**

## FORWARD OBSERVATIONS



“At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed. Oh had I the ability, and could reach the nation’s ear, I would, pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke.

“For it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder.

“We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake.”

Frederick Douglass, 1852

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**“As Long As We Have Boots On  
The Ground In Iraq, The U.S.  
Military Occupation Continues”  
“There Are No ‘Non-Combat’ Or Rear  
Area Troops In A Military  
Occupation”**

# **“Advisers, Trainers, And Guards Are All In The Line Of Fire”**

March 20, 2009 By Robert L. Hanafin; Major, U.S. Air Force-Retired; Vietnam Veterans Against The War Discussion [Excerpts]

As members of Military Families Speak Out (MFSO), our military family questions the continued occupation of Iraq let alone escalation of war into Afghanistan.

It makes no sense to debate how many troops to send to Afghanistan (between 35,000 and 50,000) when how many will remain in Iraq has yet to be decided.

As long as we have boots on the ground in Iraq, the U.S. military occupation continues. There are no “non-combat” or rear area troops in a military occupation.

Advisers, trainers, and guards are all in the line of fire.

The Iraq war has already taken the lives of over 4,200 U.S. troops, and over one million Iraqis.

For Iraqis, every day that there are U.S. troops in Iraq is another day that their country is under occupation – an occupation that continues to kill American service members and Iraqis.

To President Obama we say, “How do you ask one of our troops to be the last to die in a “dumb war”? How many more deaths are you willing to accept in a war that you agree should never have started?”

Continuing the occupation won't bring Iraq any closer to political reconciliation. There is no reason to think that a continued occupation will make conditions substantially better in 2010 or 2011 than they are now.

The U.S. military occupation of Iraq is a reason for violence and instability in Iraq, not its solution.

That said, the same occupation of Afghanistan or any escalation of military operations in Southwest Asia will destabilize the entire region.

The Iraq war has been costing US \$10 billion a month, yes Mr. President it is the War Economy that is really hurting America the sooner our government and people come to that realization the faster our domestic economy will improve.

President Obama's planned troop withdrawals troops from Iraq are too slow to bring any substantial reduction in the cost of the occupation over the next two years, and if he decides to transfer even the minimal 35,000 to Afghanistan the cost of our War Economy also escalates.



It will be hard for Congress and the President to turn the war economy around while continuing to pay for the occupation of Iraq plus escalation of war into Southwest Asia simultaneously.

**Congress must remember: funding the war in Iraq is NOT 'support for our troops'  
-- funding this war is killing our troops!**

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## **OCCUPATION PALESTINE**

**“For Most Of The Last Century, A Principled Opposition To Zionism Was A Mainstream Stance Within American Judaism”**

**“Six Years After Kristallnacht, Lessing J. Rosenwald, President Of The American Council For Judaism, Felt Comfortable Equating The Zionist Ideal Of Jewish Statehood With ‘The Concept Of A Racial State -- The Hitlerian Concept’”**

If two decades ago comparisons to the South African apartheid system felt like hyperbole, they now feel charitable.

The white South African regime, for all its crimes, never attacked the Bantustans with anything like the destructive power Israel visited on Gaza in December and January, when nearly 1,300 Palestinians were killed, one-third of them children.

March 15, 2009 By Ben Ehrenreich, Los Angeles Times

It's hard to imagine now, but in 1944, six years after Kristallnacht, Lessing J. Rosenwald, president of the American Council for Judaism, felt comfortable equating the Zionist ideal of Jewish statehood with “the concept of a racial state -- the Hitlerian concept.”

For most of the last century, a principled opposition to Zionism was a mainstream stance within American Judaism.

Even after the foundation of Israel, anti-Zionism was not a particularly heretical position. Assimilated Reform Jews like Rosenwald believed that Judaism should remain a matter of religious rather than political allegiance; the ultra-Orthodox saw Jewish statehood as an impious attempt to “push the hand of God”; and Marxist Jews -- my grandparents among them -- tended to see Zionism, and all nationalisms, as a distraction from the more essential struggle between classes.

To be Jewish, I was raised to believe, meant understanding oneself as a member of a tribe that over and over had been cast out, mistreated, slaughtered.

**Millenniums of oppression that preceded it did not entitle us to a homeland or a right to self-defense that superseded anyone else’s.**

**If they offered us anything exceptional, it was a perspective on oppression and an obligation born of the prophetic tradition: to act on behalf of the oppressed and to cry out at the oppressor.**

**For the last several decades, though, it has been all but impossible to cry out against the Israeli state without being smeared as an anti-Semite, or worse.**

To question not just Israel’s actions, but the Zionist tenets on which the state is founded, has for too long been regarded an almost unspeakable blasphemy.

Yet it is no longer possible to believe with an honest conscience that the deplorable conditions in which Palestinians live and die in Gaza and the West Bank come as the result of specific policies, leaders or parties on either side of the impasse.

The problem is fundamental: Founding a modern state on a single ethnic or religious identity in a territory that is ethnically and religiously diverse leads inexorably either to politics of exclusion (think of the 139-square-mile prison camp that Gaza has become) or to wholesale ethnic cleansing.

Put simply, the problem is Zionism.

It has been argued that Zionism is an anachronism, a leftover ideology from the era of 19th century romantic nationalisms wedged uncomfortably into 21st century geopolitics.

But Zionism is not merely outdated.

Even before 1948, one of its basic oversights was readily apparent: the presence of Palestinians in Palestine.

That led some of the most prominent Jewish thinkers of the last century, many of them Zionists, to balk at the idea of Jewish statehood.

The Brit Shalom movement -- founded in 1925 and supported at various times by Martin Buber, Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem -- argued for a secular, binational state in Palestine in which Jews and Arabs would be accorded equal status. Their concerns were both moral and pragmatic.

The establishment of a Jewish state, Buber feared, would mean “premeditated national suicide.”

The fate Buber foresaw is upon us: a nation that has lived in a state of war for decades, a quarter-million Arab citizens with second-class status and more than 5 million Palestinians deprived of the most basic political and human rights.

**If two decades ago comparisons to the South African apartheid system felt like hyperbole, they now feel charitable.**

**The white South African regime, for all its crimes, never attacked the Bantustans with anything like the destructive power Israel visited on Gaza in December and January, when nearly 1,300 Palestinians were killed, one-third of them children.**

Israeli policies have rendered the once apparently inevitable two-state solution less and less feasible. Years of Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have methodically diminished the viability of a Palestinian state. Israel’s new prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has even refused to endorse the idea of an independent Palestinian state, which suggests an immediate future of more of the same: more settlements, more punitive assaults.

All of this has led to a revival of the Brit Shalom idea of a single, secular binational state in which Jews and Arabs have equal political rights.

The obstacles are, of course, enormous. They include not just a powerful Israeli attachment to the idea of an exclusively Jewish state, but its Palestinian analogue: Hamas’ ideal of Islamic rule. Both sides would have to find assurance that their security was guaranteed. What precise shape such a state would take -- a strict, vote-by-vote democracy or a more complex federalist system -- would involve years of painful negotiation, wiser leaders than now exist and an uncompromising commitment from the rest of the world, particularly from the United States.

Meanwhile, the characterization of anti-Zionism as an “epidemic” more dangerous than anti-Semitism reveals only the unsustainability of the position into which Israel’s apologists have been forced.

Faced with international condemnation, they seek to limit the discourse, to erect walls that delineate what can and can’t be said.

It’s not working.

**Opposing Zionism is neither anti-Semitic nor particularly radical. It requires only that we take our own values seriously and no longer, as the book of Amos has it, “turn justice into wormwood and hurl righteousness to the ground.”**

**Establishing a secular, pluralist, democratic government in Israel and Palestine would of course mean the abandonment of the Zionist dream. It might also mean the only salvation for the Jewish ideals of justice that date back to Jeremiah.**

[To check out what life is like under a murderous military occupation by foreign terrorists, go to: [www.rafahtoday.org](http://www.rafahtoday.org) The occupied nation is Palestine. The foreign terrorists call themselves "Israeli."]

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## DANGER: POLITICIANS AT WORK



## CLASS WAR REPORTS

**A**rrogant  
**I**ncompetent  
**G**reedy  
**AIG Employees Cheer Refusal To Give  
Back Bonuses**

[The French politician Talleyrand said of the aristocrats who got their heads chopped off for refusing to agree to reforms as the French revolution gathered strength: "They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing." T]

MARCH 26, 2009 By RANDALL SMITH, JONATHAN WEISMAN and LIAM PLEVEN,  
Wall St. Journal [Excerpts]

Some American International Group Inc. employees, vilified for receiving bonuses amid the \$173 billion bailout of their company, are fighting back.

Wednesday, employees at the insurer gave a standing ovation for Jake DeSantis, an executive in AIG's financial-products division, who was the first to publicly refuse to return his retention bonus despite an outcry over the payments.


Joining in the ovation was Gerry Pasciucco, attendees said.

Mr. Pasciucco heads the division that had \$40 billion in losses last year that nearly sank AIG and triggered the government rescue. About five employees of the unit quit Wednesday, said a person familiar with the matter.

Mr. Pasciucco, who was recruited last autumn from Morgan Stanley to manage the AIG unit, declined to comment.

Mr. DeSantis resigned Tuesday, arguing in a New York Times op-ed piece Wednesday that AIG employees are being "unfairly persecuted."

Employees have passed around emails from colleagues who opposed returning the payments.





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