

Military Resistance 8D1



Spray And Pray Don't Cut It:

Army Study Finds Taliban Better
Trained And Equipped Than U.S.

Troops:

U.S. Forces “Lack The Precision
Weapons, Deadly Rounds, And
Training Needed To Kill The Enemy In

The Long-Distance Firefights Common In Afghanistan” “American Doughboys In World War I Were Better Trained And Equipped For Afghanistan-Style Firefights Than Today’s GIs”

Soldiers commonly are taught in training to use “suppressive fire,” in effect returning enemy attacks with sprays of gunfire, which are often ineffective in Afghanistan. The round fired from their M4 carbines and M16 rifles, the 5.56mm bullet, don’t carry enough velocity at long distances to kill.

4.2.10 By David Woods, Politics Daily [Excerpts]

American troops are often outgunned by Afghan insurgents because they lack the precision weapons, deadly rounds, and training needed to kill the enemy in the long-distance firefights common in Afghanistan’s rugged terrain, according to an internal Army study.

Unlike in Iraq, where most shooting took place at relatively short range in urban neighborhoods, U.S. troops in Afghanistan are more often attacked from high ground with light machine guns and mortars from well beyond 300 meters (327 yards, or just over three football field lengths).

The average range for a smallarms firefight in Afghanistan is about 500 meters, according to the study.

Unless U.S. troops under attack call in artillery or air strikes and risk civilian casualties, the only way they can fight back is with long-distance precision shooting — a capability currently in short supply among infantry units, according to a study done at the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., by Maj. Thomas P. Ehrhart.

According to Ehrhart’s paper, Army infantrymen do not regularly train and practice shooting at distances of more than 300 meters.

The round fired from their M4 carbines and M16 rifles, the 5.56mm bullet, don’t carry enough velocity at long distances to kill.

While the Army has moved recently to equip each infantry company of about 200 soldiers with nine designated marksmen to overcome this problem, they don’t often carry weapons with sufficient killing power at distance, and there aren’t enough of them, Ehrhart reports.

Army spokesmen had no immediate comment on Ehrhart's paper, which was released by SAMS last month and given wider circulation by defenstetech.org and the Kit Up! blog on military.com.

Most infantrymen in Afghanistan carry the M4 carbine, a version of the standard M16 rifle, but with a shorter barrel. It was designed to allow soldiers to operate from cramped armored vehicles and in the city neighborhoods of Iraq.

But the shorter barrel robs the weapon of the ability to shoot accurately at long distances, because the bullet doesn't acquire as much stabilizing spin when it is fired as it does in a longer barrel.

Soldiers commonly are taught in training to use "suppressive fire," in effect returning enemy attacks with sprays of gunfire, which are often ineffective in Afghanistan.

One reason is the ineffectiveness of the most commonly used round, designated the M855.

Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in the Middle East, was once accidentally shot in the chest with an M855 round from a light machine gun; rather than being killed, he walked out of the hospital several days later.

Ehrhart recalls seeing a soldier shot with a M855 round from a distance of 75 meters in training.

Twenty minutes later he was "walking around smoking a cigarette."

Such incidents may be flukes, but they do illustrate that the rounds can lack killing power.

Most infantrymen are equipped to fire the M855 round from their M4 carbine, M16 rifle, or the SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon), a light machine gun.

When a firefight erupts in Afghanistan, they are unable to fire back accurately at more than 200 or 300 meters, leaving it to soldiers with heavier weapons — the M240 machine gun, 60-mm mortars or snipers equipped with M14 rifles.

"These (heavier) weapons represent 19 percent of the company's firepower," Ehrhart wrote, meaning that "81 percent of the company has little effect on the fight.

"This is unacceptable."

Ironically, American doughboys in World War I were better trained and equipped for Afghanistan-style firefights than today's GIs.

"The U.S. infantry weapon has devolved from the World War I rifle capable of conducting lethal fire out to 1,200 yards, to the current weapon that can hit a target out to 300 meters but probably will not kill it," Ehrhart wrote.

The School of Advanced Military Studies, where Ehrhart was a student last year, trains the Army's brightest young officers for senior leadership.

His unclassified paper, written last year, does not reflect official Army positions. But the paper has rocketed around in military circles and has been read avidly in some units preparing to

At a meeting with reporters this week, Army Secretary John McHugh was asked whether he was familiar with the Ehrhart report. McHugh said he was not, but after hearing a brief description, he said he would track down the paper and read it.

AFGHANISTAN WAR REPORTS

Foreign Soldier Killed Somewhere Or Other In Afghanistan: Nationality Not Announced

4.2 AFP

NATO reported the death of a foreign soldier in a roadside bomb attack in the south of the country on Thursday. The nationality of the soldier was not disclosed, nor the exact location of the incident.

British Soldier Killed Near Babaji

Apr 1 AFP

A British soldier was killed by an explosion while on a foot patrol Thursday in southern Afghanistan, the Ministry of Defence said.

The death brings to 279 the number of British troops killed since operations in Afghanistan began in October 2001. Of these, at least 245 were killed as a result of hostile action.

Some 34 have been killed this year.

The soldier, from the 1st Battalion of the Coldstream Guards, was killed by a blast near the town of Babaji in central Helmand Province.

“However You Adapt, He’s Smart Enough To Find Different Ways Of Defeating You”

“Roadside Bombs Put Soldiers On The Defensive, Making Them Wary Of Leaving Their Armored Vehicles”

“290 IEDs Were Detonated In Parts Of Helmand And Kandahar Provinces, Tripling From 92 In February Last Year”

Apr 2 By Deepa Babington [Excdrpts]

KANDAHAR (Reuters) –

The signature weapon of the Iraq war has established itself as the Taliban’s weapon of choice in Afghanistan as well, where roadside bombs have proven to be rudimentary and cheap -- but deadly as ever.

Apart from being the biggest killer of NATO troops in Afghanistan, roadside bombs also put soldiers on the defensive, making them wary of leaving their armored vehicles -- striking at the heart of U.S. efforts to meet locals and win their trust.

Unlike the sophisticated devices conjured by Iraqi bombmakers with access to a large supply of ammunition, IEDs in Afghanistan are rudimentary -- often just a yellow pine oil jug or pressure cooker packed with fertilizer or a homemade device crafted out of wood and batteries, stuck into a culvert in the road.

“I was surprised at how rudimentary the devices here are, but very effective,” Lt. Col. Peter Andrysiak, commander of Taskforce Lumberjack, which operates slow-moving convoys of heavily armored vehicles to spot and remove IEDs. “In terms of making do with what they have available, they do a very good job.”

In February, 290 IEDs were detonated in parts of Helmand and Kandahar provinces where a U.S. Stryker brigade patrols, tripling from 92 in February last year.

The number of IEDs found nearly quadrupled to 567 from 157 in the same period.

And all that is before the traditional summer fighting season gets underway.

Typically the bombs are 40-50 pounds in size, with pressure plates that set them off when a vehicle or person steps on them, Andrysiak said.

On a sunny morning at Kandahar airfield, a group of Andrysiak's men rolled out of the base in an impressive convoy of eight mammoth tan vehicles, each outfitted with sophisticated tools, from mine detectors to giant cameras to identify IEDs.

But the simplicity of the devices buried away by insurgents only complicates their task further.

“If you’ve got a device made of wood and batteries, what’s your sensor going to pick up -- a piece of wood lying in the road?” Andrysiak said.

Outfoxing the Taliban appears to be even harder -- the insurgents have shown they are capable of quickly adapting to whatever the troops come up with to thwart IEDs.

“It constantly evolves,” he said.

“However you adapt, he’s smart enough to find different ways of defeating you.”

For example, initially insurgents would place IEDs in culverts by the road. They began burying them nearby when U.S. troops started sealing off culverts.

Once U.S. troops discovered that pattern, insurgents began placing IEDs on the side of roads where soldiers would veer off to investigate a suspicious object.

Recently a route clearance unit stumbled upon a “hoax IED” - something that looked like a roadside bomb but was not, which the soldiers suspected was deliberately laid there to watch the U.S. response.

“They wanted to study how we were going to deal with it,” said Lt. Ashton Herbert, the platoon leader.

Andrysiak is pushing his men to avoid falling into a pattern that sets them up as an easy target for the Taliban.

UK Occupation Troops Butchered In Sangin, The Most Dangerous Place In Afghanistan:

“The Death Rate Around Sangin Has Spiked In The Past Year And Shows No Sign Of Reducing”

[Thanks to Sandy Kelson, Military Resistance, who sent this in.]

April 2, 2010 By Tom Coghlan, The Times [Excerpts]

British troops based in the town of Sangin are suffering more than 12 times the average casualty rate for NATO troops in Afghanistan, making the town the most dangerous place in the country.

More than 10 per cent of the daily casualties suffered by NATO forces are coming from the 3 Rifles Battle Group in Sangin, Helmand province, The Times has learnt, even though the battle group represents only 0.8 per cent of the total Nato force in Afghanistan. The Ministry of Defence confirmed the figure yesterday.

British commanders have become deeply concerned by the death rate around Sangin, because it has spiked in the past year and shows no sign of reducing.

Before last summer the battle group stationed in Sangin was losing an average of six soldiers per six-month rotation.

However, that jumped dramatically last summer as the Taleban began an intensive bombing campaign in the area.

The 2 Rifles Battle Group lost 24 soldiers during the summer months, while their successors in 3 Rifles Battle Group have now lost 29, with more than 100 soldiers injured since September. In the past month nine soldiers have died around the town.

Generally Worthless, Corrupt Piece Of Shit Is The U.S. Occupations' Best Buddy In Kandahar:

**“He Pays Off Taliban Insurgents,
He Launders Money, He Seizes
Land”**

**“He Enriches Himself By Helping The
Illegal Trade In Poppy And Opium”**

“He Helps The C.I.A. Operate A Paramilitary Group”

March 30, 2010 By DEXTER FILKINS, New York Times [Excerpts]

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — Ahmed Wali Karzai, the most powerful man in southern Afghanistan, may maintain links with drug dealers and insurgents, as some American officials and Afghans believe. And he might have played a central role in last summer's fraudulent presidential election, as Western diplomats charged.

But Mr. Karzai is also the brother of the Afghan president, Hamid. And after debating Ahmed Wali's future for months — and with a huge military operation in the area looming — Afghan and American officials have decided that the president's brother will be allowed to stay in place.

Senior American officials spent months weighing the allegations against Ahmed Wali Karzai: that he pays off Taliban insurgents, that he launders money, that he seizes land, that he reaps enormous profits by facilitating the shipment of opium through the area.

“My recommendation was, remove him,” a senior NATO officer said this week, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

Instead, American and Afghan officials say they intend to use him to help persuade Taliban fighters to give up

Any decision about Ahmed Wali Karzai is complicated by his relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency, which maintains a large presence in Kandahar.

Current and former American officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, say the agency has paid Ahmed Wali Karzai regularly for many years for performing a variety of services.

Some have regarded the case as a test of American will to confront President Karzai. “Watch what the Americans do,” said a diplomat in Kabul. “If they let Ahmed Wali stay in power, it means they are not serious about governance.”

He helps the C.I.A. operate a paramilitary group, the Kandahar Strike Force, which is used for raids against suspected insurgents.

Ahmed Wali Karzai is also paid for allowing the C.I.A. and American Special Operations troops to rent a large compound outside the city, several American officials said.

He is also one of the area's biggest entrepreneurs, with business and real estate ventures across southern Afghanistan.

“One thing, he is a successful businessman,” the senior NATO official said. “He can create jobs.”

These military and political officials say the evidence, though largely circumstantial, strongly suggests that he enriches himself by helping the illegal trade in poppy and opium.

“If you don’t cooperate, then you don’t do business,” said a Western official in Kabul who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Mr. Karzai pays off insurgents not to attack his properties, the Western official said. And he has been busily engaged in seizing land in Kandahar, particularly land that might be rented to the newly arriving American troops.

“What he is doing is, he finds out where the Americans want to go, then he strong-arms the land department to register the land in companies that he controls,” the official said.

The official said that Ahmed Wali Karzai also laundered ill-gotten money for a host of figures in southern Afghanistan.

“For a lot of people, including drug runners,” the Western official said.

Finally, he appears to be overseeing several armed groups in the Kandahar area. The gunmen exist outside the government, often posted at checkpoints and in escort convoys. They can be seen roaming the streets of Kandahar — usually toting guns.

The Western official said he was worried that deciding to keep Ahmed Wali Karzai might work as a short-term fix in securing Kandahar, but that the Americans might ultimately undermine their own efforts to build a stable government here.

“You’ve seen the polls,” the Western official said. “What’s the number one thing everyone is angry about? It’s not the insurgency, it’s not the drug trade.

“It’s the government,” he said.

**IF YOU DON’T LIKE THE RESISTANCE
END THE OCCUPATIONS**

Troops Invited:

Comments, arguments, articles, and letters from service men and women, and veterans, are especially welcome. Write to Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657 or send email to contact@militaryproject.org: Name, I.D., withheld unless you request publication. Same address to unsubscribe. Phone: 888.711.2550

**BEEN ON THE JOB TOO LONG:
PACK UP
COME HOME**



U.S. Marines from 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment to the south of Marjah in Afghanistan's Helmand province Feb. 21, 2010. (AP Photo/David Guttenfelder)



U.S. Marines in Marjah, Afghanistan, March 18, 2010. (AP Photo/Dusan Vranic)



U.S. soldier near the end of a patrol in the Koz Kunar district March 18, 2010, in Nangarhar province of Afghanistan. (AP Photo/Julie Jacobson)

OCCUPATION ISN'T LIBERATION ALL TROOPS HOME NOW!

NEED SOME TRUTH? CHECK OUT TRAVELING SOLDIER

Telling the truth - about the occupations or the criminals running the government in Washington - is the first reason for Traveling Soldier. But we want to do more than tell the truth; we want to report on the resistance to Imperial wars inside the armed forces.

Our goal is for Traveling Soldier to become the thread that ties working-class people inside the armed services together. We want this newsletter to be a weapon to help you organize resistance within the armed forces.

If you like what you've read, we hope that you'll join with us in building a network of active duty organizers. <http://www.traveling-soldier.org/> And join with **Iraq Veterans Against the War to end the occupations and bring all troops home now!** (www.ivaw.org/)

TROOP NEWS

**THIS IS HOW OBAMA BRINGS THE TROOPS HOME:
HOME:
BRING THEM ALL HOME NOW, ALIVE**



March 2, 2010: The casket of U.S. Army Sgt. Marcos Gorra, 22, of North Bergen, N.J., at Fairview Cemetery, Fairview, N.J. Gorra was killed Feb. 21 at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. The 22-year-old soldier was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C. (AP Photo/Mel Evans)

IRAQ RESISTANCE ROUNDUP



(Graphic: London Financial Times)

How To Stick Your Neck In A Noose In One Easy Lesson: Huge, Painfully Slow Effort Unfolds To Move U.S. War Supplies From Iraq To Afghanistan: [For What Happens When That Effort Is Completed, See Next Article, “The Return Of Whack-A-Mole”]

March 31, 2010 By STEPHEN FARRELL and ELISABETH BUMILLER, New York Times
[Excerpts]

JOINT BASE BALAD, Iraq — Early this year a “fob in a box” — military slang for 80 shipping containers with all the tents, showers and construction material needed to set up a remote forward operating base — was put on trucks here for the trip from one war to another.

Left over and never used in Iraq, the fob rumbled north to Turkey, east through Georgia and Azerbaijan, by ship across the Caspian Sea to Kazakhstan, then south on the old Soviet rail lines of Uzbekistan into northern Afghanistan.

There — the end of a seven-nation, 2,300-mile, two-and-a-half-month odyssey — it was assembled just weeks ago as home for several hundred of the thousands of American forces entering the country.

In trying to speed 30,000 reinforcements into Afghanistan while reducing American forces in Iraq by 50,000, American commanders are orchestrating one of the largest movements of troops and matériel since World War II.

Military officials say that transporting so many people and billions of dollars’ worth of equipment, weapons, housing, fuel and food in and out of both countries between now and an August deadline is as critical and difficult as what is occurring on the battlefield.

Military officials, who called the start of the five-month logistics operation “March Madness,” say it is like trying to squeeze a basketball through a narrow pipe, particularly the supply route through the Khyber Pass linking Pakistan and Afghanistan.

So many convoys loaded with American supplies came under insurgent attack in Pakistan last year that the United States military now tags each truck with a GPS device and keeps 24-hour watch by video feed at a military base in the United States. Last year the Taliban blew up a bridge near the pass, temporarily suspending the convoys.

Overcrowding at Bagram Air Base, the military's main flight hub in Afghanistan, is so severe that beds are at a premium and troops are jammed into tents alongside runways. Cargo planes, bombers, jet fighters, helicopters and drones are stacked up in the skies, waiting to land.

All lethal supplies — weapons, armored trucks, eight-wheeled Stryker troop carriers — come in by air to avoid attacks, but everything else goes by sea and land.

The standard route from Iraq to Afghanistan is south from Baghdad and down through Kuwait, by ship through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi, Pakistan, then overland once again. The “fob in a box” went on an experimental and potentially less expensive journey through Turkey to link up with a new northern route through Central Asia, which was opened last year for supplies going to Afghanistan from Europe and the United States as an alternative to the risky trip through Pakistan.

Both routes circle Iran, by far the most direct way to get from Baghdad to Kabul, but off limits because of the country's hostile relationship with the United States. “These are the cards that we're dealt,” said Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, who oversees all military logistics as the leader of the United States Transportation Command at Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

Nonlethal supplies flowing into Afghanistan include cement, lumber, blast barriers, septic tanks and rubberized matting, all to expand space at airfields and double, to 40, the number of forward operating bases in a country that has an infrastructure closer to the 14th century than the 21st.

MORE:

[Words Of Prophecy: March 2009] “Militias And Sunni Insurgents Are Reorganizing In Parts Of Baghdad And Its Outskirts And In Basra” “They're All Waiting For The Americans To Leave,” Abbas Said

March 27, 2009 By Anthony Shadid, Washington Post Foreign Service [Excerpts]

BAGHDAD, March 26 -- There was a numbed moment Thursday, the interregnum between an attack and its carnage. Then the anger unfurled, as survivors took stock of a

car rigged with explosives that had detonated in a market crowded with women and children in northern Baghdad, killing 16 people and wounding dozens more.

“All of this is your fault!” Sgt. Ali Abbas, one of the policemen who arrived at the scene, recalled women shouting at him and his colleagues.

Amid the panic of survivors and the screams of the wounded, elderly women threw sandals at them, he said. Others spat at the police officers and shouted insults.

His face sweaty, a teenager glared at an American soldier passing him.

“Where were you, mister?” he asked in Arabic.

The soldier, not understanding, looked straight ahead.

Some police and Interior Ministry officials have warned that Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents are reorganizing in parts of Baghdad and its outskirts and in Basra.

“They’re all waiting for the Americans to leave,” Abbas said.

MORE:

Lessons Unlearned: **“A Lull In Guerrilla Action Is Usually A Danger Sign, Not A Victory”** **[Vietnam Then, Iraq Now]**

They had never heard of General Gwynn and so did not realize that, in countering an insurgency, the military was fulfilling a police role and had to apply minimum, not maximum, force; nor would they have known of his warning that a lull in guerrilla action is usually a danger sign, not a “victory”.

The oft-expressed American desire to persuade the Viet Cong “to stand and fight,” a desire inherited from the French, was another pathetic fallacy. These were professional guerrillas who would not stand and fight — except on their own terms.

From: WAR IN THE SHADOWS: THE GUERRILLA IN HISTORY, BY Robert B. Asprey; Captain, USMC, ret’d; William Morrow And Company; New York, 1994

Whatever the President said about guerrilla warfare, these officers, in general, secretly believed that military professionalism would prove more than a match in any battle with “irregulars.” Although, in time, some of the younger advisers would realize this error, the bulk remained convinced that professionalism—by which they meant adherence to Western military doctrines—would *win the war*.

They had never heard of Major Callwell's writings on small wars, so they would never have pondered his sage advice to regard the native as the professional, the newcomer as the amateur.

They had never studied Gallieni's and Lyautey's pacification campaigns. They had never heard of General Gwynn and so did not realize that, in countering an insurgency, the military was fulfilling a police role and had to apply minimum, not maximum, force; nor would they have known of his warning that a lull in guerrilla action is usually a danger sign, not a "victory".

Lacking suitable background, the American command did not realize that Western-style warfare is quantitative and that insurgency warfare is qualitative. To fight the latter successfully is frequently to reverse normal standards of measurement, just as trick mirrors in an amusement park make a fat person thin and a thin person fat.

From the beginning, the American command erred by trying to use maximum, not minimum, force, and by designating the guerrilla the primary target rather than the population that supported him.

Dead guerrillas became "victories"—enough "victories" would "win" the war.

They did not understand that an insurgency is not "won"—except that it fades into relative quiescence.

Unlike the Western battlefield, a rising body count in an insurgency is a danger sign. So is the necessity for "surprise" encounters, no matter how successfully fought.

Progress is not made in an insurgency situation until local peasants are protected sufficiently and have sufficient reason to support government forces and supply necessary information on which to base operations.

The oft-expressed American desire to persuade the Viet Cong "to stand and fight," a desire inherited from the French, was another pathetic fallacy. These were professional guerrillas who would not stand and fight—except on their own terms.

The Americans also failed to understand that qualitative warfare calls for careful target selection—that "saturation" of a battle area contains a number of built-in booby traps in an insurgency situation. The more units involved, the more-attenuated the lines of communication, thus the more targets available to the enemy.

Worse than this, saturation of a battle area invariably damaged the peasants' crops and villages, frequently killing innocent people, thereby alienating the very persons the government needed to "win."

Military commanders could not understand this. When General Harkins "... was asked about the political consequences when villages were hit with napalm, he replied that it 'really puts the fear of God into the Viet Cong.' 'And that,' he said, 'is what counts.'"

“Impreguably Armored By Good Intentions And Ignorance”

With a few splendid exceptions, American advisers did not understand very much. They came with confidence instead of caution; they taught before they learned. From Nolting on down, too many of them resembled Alden Pyle—Graham Greene’s Quiet American, “. . . who was impreguably armored by his good intentions and his ignorance.”

The insurgencies of our time, not to mention those of history, might never have happened. The lessons they furnished weren’t so much lost— they were never learned. To accomplish the military goal in Vietnam, to win the war,” to achieve “victory,” the American military command sought to repair doctrinal deficiencies with machines.

It relied on technology as opposed to motivation, on helicopters and jeeps and trucks and armored personnel carriers, aircraft and ships as opposed to men.

It did precisely what the American military command in China had done nearly twenty years earlier. It attempted to remedy political, social, and economic deficiencies with metal.

The advisers were not at first discouraged because the new technology brought illusory success.

The South Vietnamese Government estimated that the Viet Cong began the year with about sixteen thousand hard-core guerrillas. They estimated that in 1962 they had killed about twenty thousand “guerrillas” (I use quotation marks because we shall never know how many innocents were included in the figure). Yet VC strength, they estimated, had increased to twenty thousand!” . . . At the same time,” Roger Hilsman later wrote, “captured documents, interrogation of prisoners, and other intelligence indicated that at the most only three to four thousand infiltrators had come down the Ho Chi Minh trail.” The other replacements came from hamlets and villages, and if some arrived under duress, a great many others came freely.

Despite ARVN “victories,” the Viet Cong retained control of major areas.

In summer of 1962, this writer flew several missions with U. S. Marine Corps helicopter squadrons operating out of Soc Trang, south of Saigon, the mission being to haul ARVN units to this or that threatened area. Fuel for these machines came from Saigon by tank truck, the Saigon trucker paying the Viet Cong a “toll” in order to pass to Soc Trang.

This meant that at any moment the Viet Cong could prevent marine helicopters from flying. This rarely if ever happened—should it not have occurred to MACV that the effort could scarcely have been hurting the Viet Cong if the choppers were allowed to keep flying?

The fallacy of the new approach was already becoming evident. Initial Viet Cong fright soon turned to bewilderment; analysis followed to produce countertactics. Night operations increased, since helicopters at first did not fly at night.

Assassinations and kidnappings greatly increased, the reasons being to enforce discipline, demonstrate determination, and gain recruits. By spring of 1962, the Viet Cong were beginning to fight back, and, by autumn, were not only pursuing active guerrilla tactics but were standing against ARVN units. Once again, Viet Cong countertactics were immensely aided by intelligence derived from peasant networks that, while on the defensive, were scarcely defunct.

Marines at Soc Trang and American field units elsewhere were living, to use Bernard Fall's term, in a fishbowl, their every movement, their take-off and landing, their resupply, noted and reported by Viet Cong agents.

Static Defense

The new technology did nothing to repair the existing gap between Vietnamese army units and peasants; indeed, helicopter delivery widened the intelligence gap by flying troops over villages and thus eliminating personal contact with the peasants—perhaps a good thing in the case of rapacious army units.

The new vehicles also proved expensive.

Helicopters and armored personnel carriers require large workshop and storage complexes, installations that in Vietnam demanded ground troops to provide security and nonetheless remained vulnerable to guerrilla attack, as did their lines of communication to major supply centers.

Troops so assigned inevitably assumed a static role, to the guerrilla's benefit.

Armor plate and motors did not erase poorly conceived plans. American and Vietnamese planners were trying to strike the enemy all over the place. All too often, these were random strikes, because the commands lacked proper intelligence on which to base specific and profitable operations.

Where good intelligence existed, Viet Cong intelligence frequently countered it. Helicopters and APCs are noisy, and a black-pajama-clad Viet Cong did not take long to ditch his weapon and either commence work in the field or hide along the reeded bank of a nearby canal.

By summer of 1962, frustrated American airmen had begun developing new tactics, for example "eagle flights," whereby helicopters landed a unit in a suspect area. If contact resulted, other, lingering helicopters immediately brought in reinforcements. The poverty of this tactic is too obvious for comment.

Blaming The Reporters

The conflict between Saigon and the field—between wishes and facts—had already produced a chilling corollary: extreme intolerance, on the part of both the Saigon regime and the American mission, of journalists who questioned the validity of allied performance.

In March 1962, Mme. Nhu had begun persuading President Diem to expel three troublemakers, the veteran news correspondents Homer Bigart of the *New York Times*, François Sully of *Newsweek*, and James Robinson of NBC, each of whom was increasingly harassed by the Saigon government, as were other correspondents who, in Joseph Buttinger's words, were "... accused of being part of an international Communist-inspired conspiracy to slander the regime."

"The U.S. mission was anything but forceful in defending these correspondents against abuse and ill-treatment, and almost apologetic in explaining that these men were merely trying to live up to the American concept of a free press. Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., and General Paul Harkins in particular were incensed by the American newsmen's attacks on the regime. . . . They, as well as their superiors in Washington, spoke repeatedly of the "slanted" or even "irresponsible" press reporting out of Saigon, convinced not only that the correspondents who criticized the regime did harm to U.S.-South Vietnamese relations, but also that they were wrong."

Reporters who wrote favorable accounts, among them Marguerite Higgins, Joseph Alsop, and Richard Tregaskis, received comforting little pats for their part in what was rapidly becoming the great deception. The Administration was running scared.

Recruiting for The Resistance, 1960's Style

Lansdale warned that the most urgent function is "... to protect and help the people":

"When the military opens fire at long range, whether by infantry weapons, artillery or air strike, on a reported Viet Cong concentration in a hamlet or village full of civilians, the Vietnamese officers who give those orders and the American advisers who let them "get away with it" are helping defeat the cause of freedom.

"The civilian hatred of the military resulting from such actions is a powerful motive for joining the Viet Cong."

On the following day, Ambassador Taylor joined the select group of officials to report on the Vietnam situation. His words could not have been more gloomy. A new civilian government in Saigon was proving no more effective than the former military government, either in the capital or in the provinces. The Viet Cong everywhere had advanced and were threatening to cut the country in half. Despite heavy casualties produced by an increasingly stronger professionally competent ARVN, the Viet Cong not only were making good their losses but were adopting new and improved tactics:

"The ability of the Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild their units and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. ... (We find) no plausible explanation of the continued strength of the Viet-Cong if our data on Viet-Cong losses are even approximately correct.

“Not only do the Viet-Cong units have the recuperative powers of the phoenix, but they have an amazing ability to maintain morale. Only in rare cases have we found evidences of bad morale among Viet-Cong prisoners or recorded in captured Viet-Cong documents.”

FORWARD OBSERVATIONS



“At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed. Oh had I the ability, and could reach the nation’s ear, I would, pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke.

“For it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder.

“We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake.”

Frederick Douglass, 1852

Hope for change doesn’t cut it when you’re still losing buddies.
-- J.D. Englehart, Iraq Veterans Against The War

I say that when troops cannot be counted on to follow orders because they see the futility and immorality of them THAT is the real key to ending a war.
-- Al Jaccoma, Veterans For Peace

**“What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms.”
-- Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith, 1787**

One day while I was in a bunker in Vietnam, a sniper round went over my head. The person who fired that weapon was not a terrorist, a rebel, an extremist, or a so-called insurgent. The Vietnamese individual who tried to kill me was a citizen of Vietnam, who did not want me in his country. This truth escapes millions.

**Mike Hastie
U.S. Army Medic
Vietnam 1970-71
December 13, 2004**

**Firearms are second only to the Constitution in importance; they are the peoples' liberty's teeth.
-- George Washington**

**The Social-Democrats ideal should not be the trade union secretary, but the tribune of the people who is able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression no matter where it appears no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects; who is able to generalize all these manifestations and produce a single picture of police violence and capitalist exploitation; who is able to take advantage of every event, however small, in order to set forth before all his socialist convictions and his democratic demands, in order to clarify for all and everyone the world-historic significance of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat.”
-- Lenin; What Is To Be Done**

**A revolution is always distinguished by impoliteness, probably because the ruling classes did not take the trouble in good season to teach the people fine manners.
-- Trotsky, History Of The Russian Revolution**

**“The Nixon administration claimed and received great credit for withdrawing the Army from Vietnam, but it was the rebellion of low-ranking GIs that forced the government to abandon a hopeless suicidal policy”
-- David Cortright; Soldiers In Revolt**

**It is a two class world and the wrong class is running it.
-- Larry Christensen, Soldiers Of Solidarity & United Auto Workers**

Anti-War March In Portland, Oregon (Missing In America)



From: Mike Hastie
To: Military Resistance
Sent: March 21, 2010
Subject: Anti-war march in Portland, Oregon (Missing In America)

Anti-war march in Portland, Oregon
on March 20, 2010.
Missing In America.

Mike Hastie
Vietnam Veteran

Photo and caption from the I-R-A-Q (I Remember Another Quagmire) portfolio of Mike Hastie, US Army Medic, Vietnam 1970-71. (For more of his outstanding work, contact at: (hastiemike@earthlink.net) T)

**POLITICIANS CAN'T BE COUNTED ON TO HALT
THE BLOODSHED**

**THE TROOPS HAVE THE POWER TO STOP THE
WARS**

“The single largest failure of the anti-war movement at this point is the lack of outreach to the troops.” Tim Goodrich, Iraq Veterans Against The War

OCCUPATION PALESTINE

Heroic Zionist Forces Destroy Deadly Islamic Terrorist Suicide Cheese



Apr 2, 2010: A cheese factory which was targeted by an overnight Zionist airstrike in Gaza City, Palestine. (AFP/Mohammed Abed)

Following International Public Pressure Campaign, Award-Winning Palestinian Journalist To Be Allowed Entry To The U.S.

From: Mohammed Omer

Sent: Monday, March 29, 2010 6:26 PM

Subject: Following International Public Pressure Campaign, Award-winning Palestinian Journalist to be Allowed Entry to the U.S.

“Reflections on Life and War in Gaza,”

Featuring Mohammed Omer

Speaking Tour on Conditions in Palestine to Take Place as Debate Between U.S. and Israel over Expanded Settlements Continues

**Chicago: 7:00 pm, Monday, April 5th
at the Newberry Library, 60 W. Walton
with ALI ABUNIMAH, author, One Country, and founder,
Electronic Intifada
Hosted by Haymarket Books, Contact: 773-583-7884
Free and Open to the Public**

CHICAGO, IL— Back from the brink of cancellation, a speaking tour on conditions in Palestine will take place April 5th-9th with award-winning journalist and photographer Mohammed Omer. Subjected to an extended, and unexplained, hold on his visa, Omer and supporters launched a public pressure campaign, winning his entry from the U.S. consulate.

As Omer related, “The support has been essential, and it proves that public pressure is effective. I am immensely grateful and can’t wait to thank all of you in person. I have always regarded the United States as the champion of freedom of the press. This is where I hope to practice this right.”

In 2008, Omer became the youngest recipient of the prestigious Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism, for his firsthand reportage of life in the besieged Gaza strip. As his prize citation explained, “Everyday, he reports from a war zone, where he is also a prisoner. He is a profoundly humane witness to one of the great injustices of our time. He is the voice of the voiceless... Working alone in extremely difficult and often dangerous circumstances, [Omer has] reported unpalatable truths validated by powerful facts.”

Upon attempting to return to Gaza following his acceptance of the Gellhorn award in London, Omer was detained, interrogated, and beaten by the Shin Bet Israeli security force for hours; and eventually hospitalized with cracked ribs and respiratory problems (For the full story, visit Israel’s Haaretz). He has since resided in the Netherlands and continues to undergo medical treatment there for his subsequent health problems.

Nearly canceling his planned speaking tour, the U.S. consulate held his visa application without explanation. Organizers decided to protest, as in recent years, numerous foreign scholars and experts have been subject to visa delays and denials that have prohibited them from speaking and teaching in the U.S.—a process the American Civil Liberties Union describes as “Ideological Exclusion.”

As his hosts at Haymarket Books commented, “The issue of Palestine, and particularly the voice of Palestinians is so frequently side-stepped and marginalized in mainstream

political discourse. Yet the Israeli-Palestinian conflict plays a huge role in American foreign policy, as we can see in the ongoing debate between the U.S. and Israel over expanded settlements. We believe that the conditions in Palestine represent one of the great humanitarian catastrophes of our time; and we were simply not willing to accept that Mohammed did not have the right to travel to the U.S. to share his reportage—and that Chicagoans did not have the right to hear what he has to say.”

Omer will visit Houston, Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Chicago, as planned, to discuss his reportage, personal experience, and the struggle for Palestinian rights.

Houston: 7:00 pm, Tuesday, April 6th at the Rothko Chapel, 3900 Yupon
Contact: 713-524-9839, Free and Open to the Public

Albuquerque: 11:00 am, Thursday, April 8th at UNM Student Union Building (SUB)
Ballroom

Hosted by the UNM Coalition, Free and Open to the Public

6:30 pm, Thursday, April 8th, at the Albuquerque Mennonite Church, 1300 Girard
Hosted by Middle East Peace and Justice Alliance, Suggested Donation: \$20 (no one turned away), Contact: lorir@unm.edu

Santa Fe: 6:30 pm, Friday, April 9th at the Unitarian Church in Santa Fe, 107 West
Barcelona

with DAHR JAMAIL, author, *Beyond the Green Zone* and *The Will to Resist*, and co-recipient of the 2008 Martha Gellhorn Award

Hosted by Middle East Peace and Justice Alliance and Another Jewish Voice-Santa Fe,
Suggested Donation: \$5 (no one turned away), Contact: ngharrison1@gmail.com

Background on Mohammed Omer:

Mohammed Omer was born and raised in the Rafah refugee camp in the Gaza strip. He maintains the website *Rafah Today* and is a correspondent for the *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*. His home in Rafah was crushed by an Israeli bulldozer while the family was inside, seriously injuring his mother. Yet, as Omer explained in an article he wrote upon winning the award, “My ambition was to get the truth out, not as pro-Palestinian or anti-Israeli, but as an independent voice and witness.” His reportage features interviews with regular Gazans attempting to survive amidst bombing, home demolitions, and the crippling economic blockade, which has created devastating shortages of electricity, water, fuel, and other necessities for survival.

Mohammed Omer is available for select interviews. To request, contact: Sarah Macaraeg, 312-315-8476, sarah@haymarketbooks.org

Additional background:

Haaretz: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/999330.html>

ACLU: <http://www.aclu.org/national-security/ideological-exclusion>

Chronicle of Higher Education: <http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/25/lasso>

Rafah Today: <http://www.rafahtoday.org/>

Ali Abunimah, CNN Editorial:


<http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/03/17/abunimah.settlements.israel/index.html?iref=allsearch>

Contact:

Sarah Macaraeg, 312-315-8476
sarah@haymarketbooks.org

[To check out what life is like under a murderous military occupation by foreign terrorists, go to: www.rafahtoday.org The occupied nation is Palestine. The foreign terrorists call themselves "Israeli."]

DANGER: POLITICIANS AT WORK



RECEIVED:

TAKE A STAND FOR THE LAND

Apr 2, 2010 NOLA_C3_Discussion

SUNDAY, APRIL 4, 2010-- 5 PM RIGHT TO RETURN MARCH & RALLY

& the starting point of the Poor Peoples Economic Human Rights Campaign's
march from New Orleans to Detroit to the U.S. Social Forum in June

SURVIVORS VILLAGE

**3800 block of St. Bernard Ave.
[New Orleans]**

Residents are being systematically excluded from the land they lived on prior to the storm using income requirements, credit and background checks, and oppressive rules.

They were already excluded from 75% of the land by just being poor, since this land was reserved for mixed income (non poor) tenants.

ALL RESIDENTS IN ST. BERNARD PRIOR TO THE GOVERNMENT CAUSED DISASTER HAVE AN ABSOLUTE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEIR COMMUNITY.

Open up the new development to the people NOW!!!

Vietnam GI: Reprints Available



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10025-5657

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Military Resistance/GI Special are archived at website

<http://www.militaryproject.org> .

The following have chosen to post issues; there may be others:

<http://williambowles.info/wordpress/military-resistance-archives/> ;

news@uruknet.info; http://www.traprockpeace.org/gi_special/

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